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ABSTRACT
“We Do Not Know Which Path to Take”
Mahieddine Bachetarzi, Music, Theater, and Salafist Nationalism in Interwar Algeria
(1919 – 1939)
by
Philip L. DeVries

Algerian nationalism in the interwar period did not emerge via a simple progression, nor as a
unitary awakening; it was a polyvocal and multivalent movement comprised of disparate Muslim
Algerian, Jewish Algerian, and European voices. The outward appearance of a singular
movement is due in no small part to the cooption and monopolization of nationalist discourse by
the Islamic reformist organization, the Association des oulémas musulmans algériens (AOMA),
and their followers, including the Muslim musician and playwright, Mahieddine Bachetarzi.
Indeed, while AOMA clerics and affiliated historians created the exclusively Arab-Muslim story
of Algerian history that prevails today, cultural figures like Bachetarzi were instrumental in
disseminating and naturalizing the AOMA’s narrative in musical and literary works. By
examining Bachetarzi’s life and work, and by engaging with his personal memoirs with
unprecedented depth and rigor, this paper demonstrates both the ‘constructedness’ of Algerian
nationalism and the importance of culture to nationalist messaging.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In the winter of 1936-1937, the Muslim Algerian tenor, troupe manager, and playwright
Mahieddine Bachetarzi (1897 - 1986) wrote a theatrical piece entitled El-Kheddaine, or “The
Traitors.” The comedy tells the story of Zoubir and his adopted brother, Djafar. Zoubir, a
politician, is married to a woman named Layla, whom Djafar also loves. Djafar makes advances
on Layla, but she harshly rejects them. Spurned, Djafar resolves to get his revenge by tarnishing
Zoubir’s reputation. He makes common cause with Zoubir’s political enemies, spreads malicious
rumors through French presses, and recruits two goons to spread lies about Zoubir in the streets.
Namely, they are told to trumpet the dubious claim that Zoubir supports the so-called “Pink
Project,” a bill drafted by French socialists, while simultaneously maintaining friendly relations
with the authors of a counterproposal. The “Pink Project,” a clear allusion to the 1936 BlumViollette proposal that would have reformed and liberalized the French colonial state in Algeria
if passed, is implicitly supported, while the counterproposal is implicitly opposed. The play ends
happily as an illiterate government official intervenes and sides with the Pink Project, while
Djafar is chased out of town. The main message of the play (most of Mahieddine’s plays had
unambiguous morals) is that Muslim-Algerian prosperity and French democracy are not
antithetical, and that the French can indeed help Muslims to overcome the colonial system, but
the process must not be undermined by conniving, self-interested Muslims or by Muslim
factionalism. Implicit in this message is a condemnation of Sufi Muslims, whom Mahieddine
believed to be the chief source of such factionalism. The inclusion of an illiterate bureaucrat as a
hero is a tongue-in-cheek reference to Muslim political authorities, many of whom Bachetarzi
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despised. But here, in El-Kheddaine, he shows that they sometimes, despite their best efforts,
unwittingly help their coreligionists.1
Almost immediately after Bachetarzi published El-Kheddaine, he and his troupe, ElMoutribia (meaning “The Troubadours” or “The Melodious”), showcased their new production.
Muslim Algerian presses anticipated the new play excitedly, as did many young educated
Muslims and intellectuals. A journalist for La Voix Indigène giddily reported that Bachetarzi’s
theater offered a “school of life” for his nation’s youth,2 while a journalist for La Défense called
Algerian theater the “order of the day.”3 But problems arose on the road. As often as supporters
welcomed El-Moutribia in their cities, their opponents and adversaries met them and tried to stop
them from performing. Across the country on this tour, Bachetarzi and his partners encountered
friends and enemies emanating from across the religious, social, economic, and political
spectrums. Some French authorities aided in their productions while others barred them from
entering their towns; some Muslim intellectuals believed Bachetarzi to be on their side, while
others thought him an enemy; and local presses tended to echo the sentiments of whichever
voices spoke loudest and most recently. But two parties remained relatively consistent in their
stances toward El-Kheddaine and El-Moutribia. On one side, the clerics of the Association des
oulémas musulmans algériens (meaning “Association of Muslim Algerian ‘ulemā;” AOMA for
short) stood steadfastly by Bachetarzi, assured that his aims and theirs aligned. On the other side,
members of local Sufi orders and their leaders, called marabouts, repeatedly opposed ElMoutribia’s efforts, confident in their enmity. Even as he describes French colonial roadblocks
and legislative prohibitions in his Mémoires, Bachetarzi saves his most ferocious criticism for the

1

Mahieddine Bachetarzi, Mémoires, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Algiers: Editions Nationales Algériennes, 1968), 308-310.
“La Théâtre, l’école de La Vie,” La Voix Indigène (Algiers, January 21, 1937). La Voix Indigène, January 21, 1937.
3
“L’ordre Du Jour,” La Défense (Algiers, January 22, 1937). La Défense, Algiers, January 22, 1937.
2
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marabouts, whom he claims colluded with colonial governors and undermined his efforts to
educate the Algerian people.
Indeed, as an exemplar of these dynamics, no individual scene from this 1937 tour is
more noteworthy than the one which took place in Inkermann (now called Oued Rhiou), a small
town about one hundred sixty miles west of the capital. There the mayor, M. Reboul, approached
Bachetarzi and requested that he perform a play other than El-Kheddaine. Failure to comply, he
warned, would result in a city-wide ban on performances by El-Moutribia. Bachetarzi accepted.
In his Mémoires, he explains that M. Reboul had been motivated by the son of a local marabout,
who convinced the mayor that El-Kheddaine was not only anti-marabout but also anti-French.
That night, spurning the mayor’s warning, Bachetarzi and his troupe began to perform ElKheddaine. As Bachetarzi tells it, the marabout’s son was in attendance, and, despite the raucous
approval of the majority-Muslim audience, he rushed to inform the mayor of the transgression.
Without warning, in the middle of the performance, the mayor cut the power to the theater, the
stage and the house went dark, and the crowd began to murmur with indignation.
Momentarily, Bachetarzi lit a candle and walked to centerstage to address the audience.
He apologized and informed them that they would all be reimbursed for the evening. The crowd
roared with disapproval, much to Bachetarzi’s confusion. In the darkness, he could not discern
much but that about twenty young Algerians rushed for the exits. But, within minutes, they
returned and suddenly – “an invasion of fireflies!” They brought candles, acetylene lamps, and
“all the known modes of lighting other than electric.” The show would go on, they insisted.
Triumphant, Bachetarzi and El-Moutribia retook the stage and finished El-Kheddaine by the
candlelight of several hundred young Muslim Algerian activists. Defeated and humiliated, M.
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Reboul could do nothing for the moment but slink away, out of the theater and back to his
home.4
Bachetarzi later described the El-Kheddaine tour as the moment when he learned how
easily his work could be misinterpreted. This naivety is characteristic of Bachetarzi as he
presents himself in his three-volume Mémoires, but it is hard to believe that he was so unaware
of the content of his work. By 1937, he had published numerous plays and written numerous
original songs, and a significant number of them contained highly politicized lyrics. Bachetarzi is
often remembered now as an early champion of Algerian nationalism, but his Mémoires reveal a
much more complicated figure. For while he did often call for Muslim Algerian unity and
resistance to the worst offenses of the French colonial government, he also loved French culture
and advocated integrationism for many years. Perhaps even more significantly, Mahieddine
Bachetarzi also consistently and quite intensely criticized the practitioners of Sufi Islam in
Algeria: the marabouts, their brotherhoods, their zawiya institutions, and their followers. In this
way and others, it is clear that Bachetarzi was actually a much more complicated figure than the
one commonly portrayed by government-sanctioned historical accounts in Algeria today. And
indeed, the very ambiguity of his character and politics are representative of the polyvocal,
multivalent, and often contradictory nature of Algerian politics in the Interwar Period. By
tracking Bachetarzi’s development as a musician and a playwright, and by examining his works,
I will illustrate in this essay that the initial intellectual diversity of the Algerian nationalist
movement during the 1920s ultimately gave way to a more restrictive and exclusive vision of
Algerian national identity in the 1930s. Bachetarzi’s works also highlight the ways in which

4

Bachetarzi, Mémoires, vol. 1, 304-305.
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Algerian relationships with France continued to be incredibly difficult and complex throughout
the entire interwar period and beyond.
Indeed, Bachetarzi’s contributions to Algerian music and theater indicate his lasting
influence on Algerian culture and politics. In this study, I will focus on his exploits, his
published works, and his memoirs, published in three volumes and entitled Mémoires. I will
analyze, through the lens of Bachetarzi’s life, the points where culture and nationalist politics
intersected in interwar Algeria, and I will thereby demonstrate that the polyphony which
characterized the nationalist milieu in the early interwar period gave way to a more restrictive
and shuttered vision of national identity forwarded by the Salafist clerics of the AOMA and their
supporters. Bachetarzi, as a friend, affiliate, and business partner of many different nationalists
during the interwar period, emblemized some of the major trends in the nationalist movement. In
particular, his allegiance to the AOMA strengthened through the 1930s, the nationalist messages
put forth in his music and theater grew more radical, and he ultimately helped to reinforce and
naturalize the AOMA’s constructed historical master-narrative of Algerian history and Algerian
national identity.
In the course of this study, we will see how Bachetarzi and his peers came of age in an
ethnically and culturally diverse colonial state that experienced an explosion of social, cultural,
intellectual, and political activity after the First World War. We will see how some of the major
Algerian nationalist parties arose amidst this vibrant atmosphere, how their intentions and their
methods aligned and how they varied, and how these groups at times colluded and at other times
clashed with one another. For historians of Algeria, much of this will be familiar, but a review of
historical context is necessary to set the scene. Meanwhile, the latter half of this essay represents
a novel contribution to the field, as I will inquire into the intersections of culture and nationalism
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in interwar Algeria in a unique way – by focusing specifically on one man, Mahieddine
Bachetarzi, and his use of music and theater to reflect, explore, negotiate, and disseminate
nationalist ideas.
In the spring of 1962, diplomats representing the Front de libération nationale (FLN)
signed the Évian Accords with French president Charles de Gaulle, securing Algeria’s
independence and officially ending the Algerian Revolution. The war for independence had torn
the country asunder for over seven years. The conditions of the war’s ending all but guaranteed
that the FLN would have exclusive control of the government and sole authority to shape the
nascent Algerian state. Despite bloody infighting throughout the summer of 1962, the selfproclaimed revolutionary vanguard party quickly took advantage of the goodwill they had earned
through revolutionary struggle by attempting to build an independent, Muslim, socialist state that
would serve as a beacon of hope and opportunity for the emerging Third World.
Years later, in April 2000, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a longtime FLN military
officer who had fought in the revolution as a teen, renamed the Théâtre national algérien (TNA),
located in the capital city of Algiers, in honor of one of Algeria’s first and most influential
playwrights, Mahieddine Bachetarzi.5 The decision might have seemed interesting and perhaps
more than a little perplexing for anyone familiar with Bachetarzi’s life and career. Bachetarzi
had certainly been a powerful force in Algerian music and theater for decades, but he had come
to the support of the FLN’s militant anticolonialism quite late. Bachetarzi had in fact supported
the idea of a close and continuing relationship between Algeria and France, perhaps even a
continuation of the colonial system, through much of the interwar period. And he had thrown
himself completely at the feet of the Vichy regime during the Second World War. That said,

5

“Histoire du bâtiment,” Théâtre national algérien de Mahieddine Bachetarzi, https://tna.dz/fr/histoire-dubatiment/. Théâtre national algérien de Mahieddine Bachetarzi, https://tna.dz/fr/histoire-du-batiment/.
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Bachetarzi’s affiliations and his use of narrative to create particular interpretations of national
history did align him ideologically and methodologically with some of the FLN’s predecessors,
especially the AOMA.
The FLN’s silencing of Bachetarzi’s complicated past is consistent with their general
strategy of historical narrative construction. Construction is the operative word here, as the FLN
and the AOMA who in many ways inspired their methodology both sought to use history as a
tool to naturalize their own conceptions of Algerian national identity. This is where Bachetarzi
and the FLN overlap, as Bachetarzi became closely connected with the AOMA during the latter
half of the interwar period, and he often deployed his musical and theatrical talents to further
their religious, cultural, and political views. Because of this, one might reasonably argue that the
FLN’s decision to honor Bachetarzi by renaming the TNA after him was actually a kind of
culmination of the work he had done during the interwar period. It was a nod to his participation
in the construction of an Algerian past and national identity that were solely and explicitly Arab
and Muslim.
The FLN and their affiliated historians have devoted considerable time to creating a
certain narrative of Algerian history – one that depicts the nation as solely Arab and Muslim in
its origins, and one that silences Algerian polyvocality by retrospectively absorbing different
historical figures within a singular narrative of ‘evolution’ and ‘awakening.’ According to the
FLN, the Algerian nationalist movement was one with a simple, omnidirectional storyline, in
which nationalists of all stripes worked together across generations to achieve the same end: the
total separation of Algeria from the French Empire. This end, of course, was finally realized by
none other than the FLN, and the FLN are therefore, according to themselves, the inheritors of a
long and singular nationalist tradition. And they are the ones who finally achieved it, without
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help or opposition from any other Algerian groups. The truth, though, is that Algeria has long
been a richly diverse and multicultural place, and the interwar period, when Algerian nationalism
first took organized political form, was a time when diversity, multiculturalism, and polyvocality
arguably reached their zenith. A plethora of nationalist parties arose, each with disparate aims
and demographic makeups; some of them even opposed each other, and such opposition
sometimes ended in violence. Mahieddine Bachetarzi was not a politician, but he was intimately
connected to many Muslim Algerian nationalists and political activists. He was most active
during the interwar period, and his artistic works grew increasingly politicized as the 1920s and
1930s progressed. His works therefore provide indications of the general development of
Algerian nationalism during this time.
In the past twenty years or so, the interwar period has become a subject of intense interest
for historians of Algeria. It was a moment of remarkable political, social, and cultural vibrancy –
a time of widespread interaction and mixing between ethnoreligious groups, and it was when the
first wave of Algerian nationalist political parties formed. Historians like James McDougall, Jane
Goodman, Ethan Katz, and Christopher Silver, and anthropologists like Jonathan Glasser, have
all done remarkable research and produced fascinating texts discussing the topic of interwar
Algerian cultural and political activity. Mahieddine Bachetarzi is usually only ever mentioned in
their works in passing, as an especially vivid illustration of wider trends, or, in the case of
Glasser, as a relation to other people of interest. But he is a figure of significant historical
relevance and interest who requires further examination and analysis. Indeed, he embodies some
of the most noteworthy aspects of interwar Algerian society and politics. He was among the first
Algerians to achieve international fame and success, especially across North Africa and Europe,
both as a practitioner of Andalusi classical music and as a playwright and founding father of
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Algerian theater. As such, and through the content of his musical and theatrical productions, he
provides the interested historian with a novel, cultural lens on a period of immense intellectual
and political activity.
Bachetarzi’s works and opinions reflect the progression of Algerian nationalism during
the interwar period, and they illustrate the fact that the interwar Algerian nationalist movement
was, at least initially, not defined by a singular ideology, but was rather a polyvocal, multivalent
space. In some ways, it resembled a debate more than a movement, as ‘movement’ implies a
certain ideological unity that was lacking in the interwar period. James McDougall, leading
scholar of modern Algerian history, argues that Algerian nationalist discourse developed in ways
similar to a Foucauldian “practice imposed on things;” rather than awakening to a preexisting,
primordial Algerian national identity, the Algerian people explored various interpretations of
nationalism, until one particularly powerful and influential group, the Association des oulémas
musulmans algériens (AOMA), successfully imposed their own interpretation into religious,
intellectual, and political spaces.6 Through my examination of the life and works of Mahieddine
Bachetarzi, it is my goal to confirm McDougall’s argument, and then to build on it by showing
the ways in which Bachetarzi employed his crafts to impose and naturalize AOMA discourse in
cultural spaces like the Andalusi musical milieu and in Algerian theater.
Two of the central concepts (or perhaps phenomena would be a better word) that I
explore in this essay are nationalism and culture. I am especially interested in the intersection of
the two. Thus, it is essential to explain the theoretical foundations from upon I build my own
understandings of these two ideas. Nationalism as we know it in its modern form arguably dates
to the French Revolution, when revolutionaries and romantics developed an idea of national

6

James McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 8.
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identity as something primordial, essential, and timeless that emerges or ‘awakens’ within a
people when the time is right. Over two centuries later, this is still how many of the old guard of
the FLN conceive of Algerian nationalism, or at least it is how they would like their people to
conceive of it. But, in academia if not in other fields, most people moved beyond this idea of
nationalism decades ago. Benedict Anderson’s 1983 classic, Imagined Communities: Reflections
on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, marked a pivotal moment in our understanding of
nationalism and national identity, of what they are and how they develop. Countering notions of
primordialism and timelessness, Anderson argues that nationalism as a movement within a given
geographical space and/or demographic body is a historically contingent phenomenon. National
identity is a constructed thing, a “cultural artefact” that is built through conflict and
conversation.7 Anderson says that nationalism and ‘nation-ness’ first arose in a particular place
and time (the West at the end of the eighteenth century) because of particular social, cultural,
political, and economic circumstances, but that it then became a “modular” thing capable of
being transplanted to different situations relatively smoothly, which occurred with regularity
during the period of decolonization in the latter half of the twentieth century. Ernest Gellner’s
Nations and Nationalism, also published in 1983, echoed many of Anderson’s ideas and in some
ways elaborated on them by arguing that nations “are a contingency” and that they arise as an
almost inevitable consequence of modernity.8
Algerian historian James McDougall has recently built on these authors’ ideas with his
text, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria, in which he investigates the Algerian
nationalist movement in the interwar period. He counters notions of primordialism and argues

7

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York, NY:
Verso, 1983), 4.
8
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 6.
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instead that Algerian national identity was a hotly disputed topic between the wars, with intense
disagreements over the nature of the Algerian character both within and across ethnic and
religious lines. McDougall argues that it was not until the AOMA monopolized political
discursive space that conceptions of the Algerian nation and Algerian national identity began to
ossify and to become naturalized. McDougall draws heavily from philosopher Michel Foucault’s
works and his notion of a “practice imposed on things.”9 In works like Les mots et les choses,
L’archéologie du savoir, and L’Ordre du discours, Foucault, who was always interested in
systems of knowledge, how we develop them, and how they bind our thoughts within given
frameworks, believed that different intellectual matrices and discursive methods have been
somewhat unwittingly imposed upon human thought throughout different phases of history, and
that these matrices inevitably shape the lengths and bounds of our mental capabilities.
McDougall adapts and melds Foucault’s ideas and Anderson’s definition of nationalism to the
interwar Algerian context, arguing that the Algerian nationalist movement began as a diverse and
polyvocal space, but that, through the 1930s, certain religio-political groups imposed certain
cultural, social, and political frameworks, methods, and practices on Algerian nationalist
discourse in a Foucauldian manner.10 Algerian nationalism did not ‘arise’ or ‘awaken’ within a
people immediately unified by their own awakening; it developed through conversation,
negotiation, debate, and eventually through religious co-option and discursive monopolization.
McDougall’s work is tremendous, and I seek here only to build upon it, and to look at the ways
in which Algerians deployed culture as a means by which to construct and naturalize certain
conceptions of national identity and the Algerian nation.

9

Michel Foucault, L’ordre Du Discourse (Paris: Éditions Galliard, 1971), 55.
McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism, 8.
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Thus, culture is central to my argument. I want to look especially at the ways in which
individuals used culture as a means of resistance and the ways that they used culture to process,
filter, and disseminate complex political and social theories among the mass of Algerian people.
Underlying my thought processes always is the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, especially his concepts
of “dialogism” and the “carnivalesque.” In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin discusses
the beloved Russian author’s peculiar narrative style, in which his narrators are not omniscient or
omnipresent forces, nor are they really in any way authoritative; they are rather average people
with their own thoughts, beliefs, and prejudices, not unlike the characters in the stories they tell.
To read a Dostoevsky novel is to experience a story as if it were told by an especially eloquent
and verbose townsman, whose linguistic skills were so immense that he could plunge the listener
within the story, so that they felt submerged in it, among its characters, equal to them, never
knowing more or less Truth (with a capital ‘T’) than they do. The experience of reading a
Dostoevsky novel is to be part of the experience.11
How does this apply to historiography? What Bakhtin describes in Dostoevsky’s works is
a narrative style he calls “polyphony” – a style which refuses to elevate the authority of any one
voice over the others. Dostoevsky also develops his plots and ideas through “dialogism” – the
use of these different voices and their interactions to develop ideas and concepts. Bakhtin argues
that human beings do not find truth by referring to any one authoritative voice or single supreme
knowledge, but rather through their continual interactions with one another. Humans develop
ideas and reach closer to the truth by discussing and debating with each other, not through
turning to one singular source. As we will find, this is precisely the mechanism by which
Algerians developed their conceptions of nationalism in the interwar period and beyond. Rather

11

Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Michigan
Press, 1984).
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than ‘awakening’ to an underlying, preexisting, essential Algerian form, Algerians debated the
form and meaning of Algerian national identity for decades, developing their ideas through
discussion, negotiation, debate, and outright combat. The Algerian nationalist movement can
therefore be understood as a polyphonous, dialogic space akin to the kind described by Bakhtin.
Bakhtin’s other important concept for our purposes is the carnivalesque, which he
develops in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics and in Rabelais and His World.12 As defined by
Bakhtin, the carnivalesque is a literary style that reflects the traditions of the carnival. Anyone
familiar with works like Robert Darnton’s The Great Cat Massacre will already have some
understanding of this idea.13 In traditional Western carnivals and carnivalesque rituals and
festivals, normal societal hierarchies are turned on their heads and customary practices are
inverted. Kings become jesters and jesters become kings. Such role reversals and inversions tend
to produce great hilarity among the crowd, and indeed the fixation on humor is important, as it
hints at the way that the carnivalesque is employed in literature to subvert expectations and
invert established systems and structures. Similarly, we can see throughout history ways in
which humor and the carnivalesque have been employed to sap and subvert the power and
influence of dominant groups.
Bakhtin’s work and his ideas can help us to understand some of the ways that other
writers’ theories apply to interwar Algeria. For one, his concept of dialogism can elucidate some
of the methods by which subordinate groups engage dominant groups short of violent
confrontation. In Domination and the Arts of Resistance, James C. Scott argues that dominant
and subordinate groups engage each other and one another intellectually through the use of
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public and hidden “transcripts.” Social scientists, he says, have tended to study societies through
written records, government archives, and other public documents. Even field interviews with
everyday people inevitably take on a formal, somewhat unnatural nature. Such documents and
interactions make up what Scott calls the “public transcript.” In Domination, he shows that every
system of power relations has another form of discourse, a “hidden transcript,” lying beneath the
more visible, public one. Every time subordinates grumble about despised superiors, or voice
their grievances in their favorite taverns, or share among themselves stories of divine retribution,
they contribute to hidden transcripts. Scott believes that tracking hidden transcripts can help
scholars to better understand the nature of resistance. Remembering Bakhtin, we can conceive of
Scott’s public and hidden transcripts as examples of dialogism in the political, social, and
cultural spaces of history.14
In Ordinary Egyptians, Ziad Fahmy applies Scott’s ideas, challenging assumptions that
Egyptian nationalism and nationalist ideas derived exclusively from Western-educated elites.
Instead, he argues that mass media and popular culture helped translate European theories into an
Egyptian context in forms that were digestible by everyday people. Fahmy even quotes Scott’s
Domination, implying that mass media can operate as a kind of publicly displayed hidden
transcript.15 He references Bakhtin too, arguing that mass media served as a carnivalesque space
in which humor was employed to subvert colonial hierarchies and empower the colonized. In A
City Consumed, Nancy Reynolds draws on Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism to convey the
polyvocal nature of Egyptian nationalism prior to the Cairo Fire of 1952. She then deploys
Foucault’s idea of a practice imposed on things to show how the Cairo Fire was utilized by select
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groups to erase “ambivalences” and construct a neater, cleaner narrative of Egyptian
nationalism.16 Turning to North Africa, Christopher Silver, in his article “The Sounds of
Nationalism,” builds upon the intellectual lineage of Bakhtin, Foucault, Scott, Fahmy, and
Reynolds by analyzing one particular figure, Samy Elmaghribi, a Moroccan singer who used his
platform and his art to refashion complex nationalist ideas into a simpler, more inclusive
‘Moroccanism.’17
In this essay, I will build upon these writers’ works to show the ways in which the
polyphony and multivalence that initially defined the Algerian nationalist movement in the
interwar period were subsumed and subverted by the AOMA and their allies, and by the endless
intransigence of the French colonial administration. I will demonstrate all of this by focusing on
one man in particular, Mahieddine Bachetarzi, who employed music, theater, and humor to
criticize French colonialism and to negotiate the terms and bounds of Algerian nationalism. The
foundation of my work here is therefore Mahieddine Bachetarzi’s Mémoires, published in three
volumes between the 1960s and 1980s, after the FLN had already assumed control of the
Algerian state. Throughout his life, Bachetarzi kept private journals, made daily notes, and
meticulously collected newspaper articles and reviews that documented his work, his life, and
local and national developments. These journal entries, notes, and documents informed the
majority of the content in his Mémoires, and they also include descriptions and snippets of
reviews of many of his theatrical pieces. Thus, his Mémoires form the basis of my scholarship.
Other scholars have pulled from these volumes before, but never, to my knowledge, to this
extent, nor with the intention of focusing on Bachetarzi specifically. I therefore hope that my
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devotion to Bachetarzi himself will provide a new perspective on the now well-tread field of
Algerian nationalist history.
However, before I begin to develop my argument in earnest, I will need to set the scene.
In the second chapter of this text, I will describe Algeria at the turn of the century, entering the
First World War and the interwar period. The capital city of Algiers will be the focus, as it is the
city in which Bachetarzi was born, and it is the one to which he returned time and time again
throughout his life. In the third chapter, I will provide a brief but much needed overview of the
Algerian nationalist movement in the interwar period: its leading figures, its most significant
political parties, and the different ideas and visions of the nation that they discussed and debated.
I highlight in this chapter that Algerian nationalism in the interwar period was not a moment of
‘awakening,’ in which Algerians across the country discovered a singular, selfsame idea of the
nation; rather, it was a time of tremendous intellectual energy, in which Algerians of all
ethnoreligious and economic stripes conversed and negotiated with one another, until their
various visions were finally subsumed by a single party: the Association des oulémas musulmans
algériens, or AOMA. In the fourth chapter, I will shift my focus to culture specifically, and the
Andalusi musical revivalist movement in particular. Before his first forays into theater,
Bachetarzi became famous as a masterful practitioner of Andalusi music. This genre carried
tremendous political and cultural significance for Muslim and Jewish North Africans, and it also
became a source of great interest for European ethnographers and musicologists. It thus
represents one of the main cultural meeting grounds for different groups that were meanwhile
engaged in the Algerian nationalist movement. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I will turn to Algerian
theater, a genre which Bachetarzi helped to found, and the medium through which he actualized
his increasingly radical vision of Algerian nationalism. My intention with this structure is to
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illustrate through Bachetarzi’s work the general thrust of the Algerian nationalist movement
through the interwar period, as it moved from a polyvocal space to one utterly co-opted by some
of the more radical voices in the Algerian Muslim community.
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CHAPTER 2. ALGERIA AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY:
IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND NATIONALISM IN THE CITY AND THE COUNTRYSIDE

Now I bid tender night to the dormant martyrs below
To the one thousand and one nights, to the angry shining stars above
To the vaudevillian theatre, to the troubadours and beggars within
To us personas of a forgotten tragedy and long acts playing without
To you Mother Algiers.
Benarrioua Aniss18

Algeria is one of the five modern nation-states that make up what is commonly referred
to as North Africa, or the Maghrib as it is called in Arabic.19 Though Algeria and its neighbors
are all majority-Muslim nations today, they have been inhabited by humans since long before the
advent of Islam. The Berbers, or Imazighen as they often call themselves, are the indigenous
people of the Maghrib, with archaeological evidence indicating continued habitation as far back
as 10,000 BCE. Several independent Berber states arose and ultimately unified as the Kingdoms
of Numidia and Mauretania around the time of the Second Punic War (218 – 201 BCE), but the
Maghrib suffered continuous foreign incursions from the first arrival of the Phoenicians in the
ninth century BCE up until very recently.20 Millions of Berbers still live in the Maghrib today,
but because of the many waves of colonization through the millennia, the region is now highly
ethnically diverse.
The most significant incursions of the Common Era were those perpetrated by Muslim
Arabs, Ottoman Turks, and the French. Within a century of Muḥammad’s conquest of the
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Arabian Peninsula, his successors swept into the Maghrib, seizing territory, establishing
administrative control, and spreading Islam. Since that time, Arab culture and religion have
become dominant. Even the Ottoman Regency established in the city of Algiers along the
Mediterranean coast in 1516, though ostensibly under Ottoman control, was largely administered
by local Arab and kouloughli21 officials. The Ottoman Regency of Algiers became one of the
most powerful centers in the Maghrib and indeed one of the most formidable states along the
whole Mediterranean.
However, by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was
in decline, including the Regency. When, at the behest of the reeling and desperate Bourbon
dynasty, the French Expeditionary Army landed on a beachhead just fourteen miles from Algiers
in 1830, Ottoman authorities struggled to contain it. The most significant resistance to the French
invasion was instead led by a Sufi Muslim religious leader, ‘Abd al-Qādir ibn Muḥy al-dīn, or
Emir ‘Abd el-Qādir, as he is commonly known. However, despite a decades-long struggle, even
he ultimately could not contain the French invasion. Various groups of Algerian Muslims and
Berbers attempted other rebellions over the next several decades, but by the 1870s, the French
had effectively seized total control of the Algerian state. As hostilities diminished and the
country grew ‘safer,’ French and European settlers flooded coastal cities like Algiers, Oran, and
Annaba, drastically changing their demographic makeup and their architectural and cultural
characters.22
Algeria at the turn of the twentieth century was a country defined by its turbulent history
and its diverse population. Conflicting conceptions of religious and political identity clashed all
across the country, perhaps nowhere more so than in the capital city, Algiers, where Mahieddine
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Bachetarzi was born in 1897. The city was riven with ethnoreligious and political tensions, and
this atmosphere shaped Bachetarzi’s worldview and outlook. The code de l’indigénat, the
repressive code of laws which dictated Muslim life in the French colonial state, imbued him with
a sense of resentment toward the colonial system, while French culture earned his respect and
even his envy. The rich atmosphere of the Algiers Casbah taught appreciation for
multiculturalism and for the bond between Maghribi Muslims and Jews, while Muslim Algerian
nationalist movements encouraged solidarity among Muslims to the point of ethnocentrism. Even
as the ascendent salafiyya movement, which called for modernist reform (iṣlāḥ) of Islam,23
promised uplift and education, it also threatened to sow divisions between Muslims and Jews by
strictly defining what it meant to be Muslim and to be Algerian. Bachetarzi grew up in the midst
of all these currents, he was cognizant of them, and he often felt himself torn between them. As
we shall see, this tension shaped his work, his career, and the whole course of his life in much
the same way that it shaped the future of the Algerian nation.

Rock the Casbah: Youth in Algiers
Mahieddine Bachetarzi was born on December 15, 1897 near the “ancient core” of
Algiers: the Casbah, an historically rich, ethnically diverse, culturally vibrant, and politically
turbulent environment.24 The Berber Zirid dynasty founded the city along the Mediterranean
coast in the tenth century CE, and the Ottoman Turks declared Algiers (in French, “l’Alger;” in
Arabic, “el-Jazā’ir,” meaning “The Islands”) to be the capital of their Regency six hundred years
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later. By that point, it had become one of the major port cities of the Maghrib. Already during the
Ottoman era, dozens of small neighborhoods of Arabs, Andalusians, Berbers, Turks, Saharans,
and Europeans had proliferated in Algiers, and the port served vital commercial, administrative,
and military functions for the Regency.25 After the French invasion in 1830, Algiers became a
favorite spot of settlement for both Frenchmen and other European settlers, including Spaniards,
Italians, Maltese, and many others. But despite this influx of Europeans, “Algiers-the-White,”
named so for its densely packed and alabaster-colored housing complexes, never fully lost its
Maghribi character.26
We know from Bachetarzi’s Mémoires, published in three volumes between the 1960s
and 1980s, that his ethnically Turkish father and Maghribi-Arab mother ran a general store called
Hanout el-Faradji, where they sold the kerosene that family friends and neighbors used to fuel
their lamps. We know too that, as a child and an adolescent, Bachetarzi worked as a cashier and
custodian at his father’s store. He admired his father and he was proud of his family’s business,
if a bit bored to be working there. It is undoubtable that the Bachetarzi family’s position as shop
owners would have made them economically more secure than many of their neighbors, who
mostly worked as unskilled laborers, servants, and maids.27 Bachetarzi even compared his family
to local “nobility” and boasted that their kerosene illuminated close to half of the Casbah’s
streetlamps.28 His privileged socioeconomic background seems not to have greatly complicated
his relationships with childhood peers, but it certainly enabled him to enjoy more leisure time,
during which he explored and absorbed the many cultural productions in the city around him. His

25

Ibid., 13-14.
Ibid., 25.
27
David Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 165-176.
28
Bachetarzi, Mémoires, vol. 1, 30.
26

28

economic advantages also opened doors to educational opportunities. In the streets and in school,
the world which opened up before him was one rich with ethnic and cultural variety, but also one
soured by tensions and resentments.
Even at home, with his own family, young Mahieddine probably had to negotiate
differing interpretations of religious, social, and political matters with his more conservative
parents. He speaks in his Mémoires about how his family’s conservatism impacted his musical
career in its early stages, but otherwise he mostly glosses over his early childhood, skipping
ahead to his teens. Aside from what can be drawn from tidbits and hints dropped haphazardly
throughout the memoir, further details regarding Bachetarzi’s interactions with his family must
be gleamed from other sources, which describe life in similar circumstances. Historian
Mohammed Harbi wrote a memoir that fills in some of the gaps. In particular, Une vie debout
(“A Lifetime Standing”) provides excellent insights into everyday life for a young bourgeois
Algerian living under French colonial rule. Harbi was born in 1933 in a town called El-Arrouch,
smaller than Algiers and about two hundred fifty miles to the east, but like Bachetarzi, Harbi
came from a wealthy Muslim family with both traditional and contemporary influences. And,
also like Bachetarzi, Harbi found himself as young man torn between the more conservative
impulses of many of his older family members and the more progressive attitudes of his younger
peers.
The Harbi family began its economic rise after the passage of the 1863 Sénatus-Consulte
permitted Algerian Muslims to accrue private property, and this was probably true of the
Bachetarzi family as well. Harbi confirms that, by the time he was born, his was one of the most
economically and politically prominent Muslim families in the region. Still, his family was fairly
conservative in its patriarchal structure and its separation of male and female domains. Harbi

29

notes dryly that he expected no “paternal love” from his father, and his father expected no
reciprocal affections from him; an Algerian son was expected to show his father “obedience and
respect, even fear.”29 The patriarch of the family, Harbi’s grandfather, was also deeply religious
and highly orthodox in his practice. But despite these traditional elements, Harbi also explains
that his grandmother, for one, constantly negotiated the bounds of female subjugation with his
grandfather. Harbi eventually realized that his grandmother showed deference to her husband in
public, as dictated by custom, but that, within the privacy of their home, hers was often the final
word.30 In this way and others, his family members were constantly in discussion about
competing currents of conservatism and progressivism, with different family members leaning in
either direction. Other than his grandmother, Harbi depicts his older relatives as generally more
conservative and, given the fact that Harbi was not born until 1933, we can surmise that
Bachetarzi, who was born earlier, had a family that was at least as conservative as Harbi’s, if not
more so.
Still, despite any clashes or disagreements, Bachetarzi, like Harbi, likely inherited a great
deal of cultural and historical knowledge from his family, especially his female relatives.
Mothers and grandmothers were most Muslim Algerian children’s first sources of cultural and
historical knowledge. Harbi tells us that his mother would tell him scary stories of “Bijou,” a
ghoulish troll who ate children, based on a centuries-old North African fable,31 and named after
General Thomas Robert Bugeaud, the infamous commander of the 1830 French Expeditionary
Army. Harbi’s mother also taught him traditional Algerian songs – anti-conscription protest
music and music celebrating Algerian nationalist leaders like ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Ibn Bādīs, Ferhat
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Abbas, and Messali Hadj, all three of whom we will discuss in more detail later.32 Some of these
songs would certainly not have been written yet when Bachetarzi was young, and we know for a
fact that he inherited many of his musical and cultural sensibilities from his community and from
his mosque, but Harbi’s memoir nevertheless suggests that Bachetarzi’s family was probably an
equally important font of musical, historical, and cultural knowledge.
Arguably just as important to Bachetarzi’s cultural education was his religious
upbringing. Though he speaks little about his family’s religiosity, the fact that he attended both a
Qur’anic school and a madersa33 indicates that his family were practicing Muslims. In his
memoir, Mohammed Harbi shows, somewhat resentfully, that Islam was a cornerstone of
Algerian life. He writes, “religion was not a matter of conscience. We came into it when we were
born…Islam was a legacy that we had no right to renounce, and the life of the Prophet a model to
be replicated…a set of codes, gestures without normative references.”34 Harbi seems far from
enthusiastic about his religious upbringing, but the fact that his bourgeois family was still so
reflexively religious in the 1930s and 1940s suggests that Bachetarzi’s family must have been
similar.
The Bachetarzi family’s choices in education are clear examples of their piety and
conservatism. While Mohammed Harbi split his time between a French school, a Qur’anic
school, and an Arab madersa, Bachetarzi makes no mention of French school, saying instead that
his schooling was split between the Madersa el-Assria and the Qur’anic lessons at the Djama‘a
el-Djedid (“New Mosque”).35 Again, where Bachetarzi is frustratingly coy with details about his
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life, Harbi provides context. He describes the French school as having been a fairly typical
Western-style educational facility, and he contrasts that with the Qur’anic school, which he calls
a “place of subjugation” where “passive obedience and submission” were taught.36 Harbi
recounts his experiences at the Qur’anic school with resentment and, given the unorthodoxy of
his lifestyle and the irreverence of his adult work, one might assume that Bachetarzi felt similarly
caged in by the Qur’anic school at the Djama‘a el-Djedid.
However, Harbi credits the madersa he attended with a much more significant role in his
education and in the formulation of his worldview. Qur’anic school taught little more than
theology, and French school taught everything through a Eurocentric lens, but the madersa
introduced Harbi to the “history and geography of Algeria and the Muslim world.” It was there
that Harbi first learned about Algerian history from the point of view of other ‘native’ Algerians.
It was there, Harbi says, that he truly became an Algerian.37 The sense of Algerian-ness instilled
at the madersa in his neighborhood, he muses, was a crucial reason why he and many of his peers
and neighbors became Algerian nationalists and fought in the Algerian Revolution (19541962).38 These Arab schools were much more widespread by the 1930s and 1940s than they were
during Mahieddine Bachetarzi’s childhood, but we know for a fact that he attended one – likely a
perk of his bourgeois upbringing.
But, again, he speaks very little about his experiences as a youth in his memoirs. Of what
is written, Bachetarzi devotes more time describing the urban political, social, and cultural milieu
of early twentieth-century Algiers. We might infer from this that his surroundings had more of an
impact on his worldview than his education, or at least that he believes that they did. Of course,
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the music and arts that colored the Casbah were profoundly influential on Bachetarzi as a youth,
but the other defining features of life in Algiers at this time were ethnic diversity and, of course,
the social stratification imposed and maintained by the French colonial system. The collision of
multiple ethnicities with similar languages and cultures, as well as the clunky imposition of a
more foreign, European culture, must all have had an impact on the Algerian zeitgeist, and on
Bachetarzi himself. As diverse as it was, colonial Algiers was also a rigidly segregated city, with
especially stark divisions between European settlers, Jews, and Muslims, all of whom faced
unique challenges (some more than others) and navigated obstacles in their own particular ways.
These divisions, at least as much as the points of convergence between peoples, shaped Algerian
cultural and political discourses in the early twentieth century.

Stratification and Segregation in French Colonial Algeria
Historian David Prochaska has labelled colonial Algeria a “plural society,” meaning that
it was “made up of a set of socially segregated subgroups sharing only the narrowest and most
provisional cultural consensuses.”39 In this sense, colonial Algeria was similar to most other
colonies. But Prochaska narrows his definition by reminding us that pre-1954 Algeria was, above
all, a settler colonial society, meaning that it was comprised of three groups: ‘native’ peoples
(Berbers, Arabs, etc.), temporary migrants (colonial administrators, military personnel,
merchants, missionaries, etc.), and permanent settlers (traditional colonies lacked this third
group). Prochaska argues that settler colonial society differs from other forms of colonialism in
that the presence of a permanent foreign implantation compels the settler colonial society to
stratify more based on ethnicity and race than on socioeconomic class (though class is not
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entirely irrelevant). This leads to a great deal of “status anxiety” and tension when groups
collide. Western-educated Muslim and Jewish Algerian elites, called évolués, and poor European
settlers, called petits blancs, experienced just such a collision.40 But, more often, the different
ethnic groups turned in from one another as much as possible, creating distinct ethnic pockets
throughout Algiers and other cities.
Prochaska argues that the “relationship, the relative difference, between the colonizers
and the colonized” characterizes the colonial city.41 Frantz Fanon saw in colonialism the
“unilaterally decreed normative value of certain cultures,” generally at the expense of colonized
cultures, and he believed that this “systematized hierarchization implacably pursued” inevitably
leads to social, economic, and political segregation.42 In Algeria, this complicated, oppressive
relationship was made more so by the fact that the “colonizer” group expanded progressively
throughout the nineteenth century, based on the French government’s selective extension of
citizenship to more and more peoples. By the 1920s, seventy-five to eighty percent of the
population in Algiers was legally ‘French,’ but even these ‘French’ tended to separate from one
another. Many Jews, for example, tended to live more closely to Muslims, despite being declared
French by the 1870 Crémieux Decree. They therefore acted frequently as intermediaries between
Europeans and Muslims. Muslims were almost entirely restricted to singular neighborhoods, like
the Casbah in Algiers, while Europeans occupied most of the rest of the city, where they
subdivided amongst themselves based on countries of origin.
Residential segregation went hand-in-hand with socioeconomic segregation. A corollary
of the plural society, as defined by Prochaska, is the “dual economy.” In Algeria, the ‘lower’
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ethnic groups generally participated in a highly decentralized “bazaar economy,” and they
depended heavily on the “tertiary or service sector” for employment. Meanwhile, European
settlers and, increasingly Jews too, participated in a “firm-centered economy” that was directed
towards the greater interests of the colonial administration and the metropole.43 This manifested
itself physically in colonial cities like Algiers, where a “Western-style central business district”
arose and catered to the needs and objectives of Europeans, while a “corresponding indigenous
and stranger retailing district” provided trade and economic opportunities for Muslims. In
between the two, Jews operated in an intermediate sphere. Traditionally, they had established
commercial districts in close proximity to Muslim neighborhoods, where they had catered to a
mostly Muslim clientele. But, over the course of the early twentieth century, many Algerian
Jews, now ‘French’ by law, focused their businesses more on European markets.44 Economic
segregation also took form through “occupational specialization,” which led to entire industries
being dominated by particular ethnic groups. The economic dual system was further aggravated
by a dual system of taxation, which placed undue burden on Algerians without French
citizenship.45 Segregation in its various forms drove misunderstandings and resentments between
various communities, which in turn spurred the crystallization of group identities as each ethnic
group was compelled for various reasons to turn further in on itself and homogenize.
Sophie Roberts writes that a “core element” of colonial Algerian life was the existence of
“hierarchies and complex power dynamics” that separated the rulers from the ruled and the
colonizers from the colonized.46 In the decades after the initial French invasion, Algerian
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Muslims and Jews, religiously distinct but culturally and ethnically almost indistinguishable to
European eyes, wallowed together at the bottom of the colonial social ladder. According to
French settlers and colonial officials, Algerian Muslims and Jews were both “indigènes,” natives
lacking in refinement and education. Despite these racist overtones, the lumping together of
Jewish and Muslim Algerians was not without any justification. These communities had lived
side by side in Algeria in some cases for centuries or more. They were ethnically alike, spoke the
same language outside religious settings, ate similar food, wore similar clothes, and played
similar music. And many Muslim and Jewish Algerians traced their heritage back to the same
legendary place: Muslim Spain, or al-Andalus. In many cases, Algerians Muslims’ and Jews’
shared identification as Andalusians and/or North Africans was enough to bridge religious
differences.
But, referencing Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker’s work on the subject, Roberts
reminds us that identity is a fluid thing, defined by different individuals at different moments by
different “categories of practice” – be they ethnicity, class, religion, political affiliation, or any
other reference point.47 Soon after the 1830 invasion, French Jews took an interest in their
Algerian coreligionists. They sought the “regeneration” of supposedly uncivilized Algerian Jews
through assimilation into French civil society.48 This process culminated in the passage of the
Crémieux Decree in 1870, which declared all “indigenous Jews of the departments of Algeria” to
be French citizens.49 Algerian Jews did not all become French citizens altogether willingly, as
citizenship entailed more government oversight of their religious practices.50 But most eventually
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embraced their French citizenship and tried to assimilate with French culture, primarily because
the 1870 Crémieux Decree and Jewish citizenship were met with intense bitterness and
resentment from Muslims and especially European settlers, who felt their political power
threatened by Jewish enfranchisement. Throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century,
Algerian politics became much more brazenly antisemitic, and anti-Jewish violence became
much more frequent. 51
Jews assimilated largely in response to this rising tide of antisemitism. Many felt torn
between their impulse to communal insularity, their Maghribi heritage, and French citizenship,
but they figured that envelopment within French culture might prove their commitment to France
and thus might shield them from some of the European settlers’ worst antisemitic behaviors.
Albert Memmi, a Tunisian writer of mixed Berber-Italian/Jewish descent, declared that “the Jew
turned his back on the east” by assimilating with French culture, but the reality is more
complicated.52 Jews publicly embraced their new ‘European’ identity, but in private clung
loyally to many of their Maghribi traditions. Assimilation was a reactive, defensive, and selective
response to anti-Jewish violence. The fact that Jews generally eschewed French education makes
this clear; since it was not seen as necessary to their survival, most Jews mostly did not send
their children to French schools. However, wearing European clothes and speaking French
helped them to blend in with other French citizens, and thus protected them from discrimination
and violence. As Elizabeth Friedman explains, Algerian Jews’ strategic assimilation is shown by
their emphasis on their French, rather than their European, “essence.” This emphasis directed
attention away from citizens’ origins in France, Italy, North Africa, or wherever else, and shifted
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it towards their shared Frenchness. The homogenization of the French-Algerian citizenry thereby
protected Jews from being otherized and thus worked to their advantage.53
This homogenization also worked to the advantage of many European settlers,
collectively called pieds noirs or colons.54 A significant percentage of these immigrants came
from countries other than France, especially Spain, Malta, and Italy. Prior to the naturalization of
all European settlers in 1889, these other Europeans actually outnumbered French people in
Algeria.55 However, the French controlled the colonial government, and thus they sat highest
atop the ethnic hierarchy, followed by other Europeans, and then by the various ‘native’ peoples.
The lowest Europeans, the so-called petits blancs, occupied a precarious position, especially with
the ascension of Algerian Jews after 1870. They feared they might be subsumed by these newly
naturalized Jews, or by any other indigènes who might later be in the ascendent, and they
therefore sought to minimize the possibility for differentiation between them and the French
through legislation, culminating in the Naturalization Law of 1889, which made all European
Algerians French citizens.
By the turn of the century, European identities in Algeria had mostly merged into a
singular, ‘Latin’ pied noir ethnic identification. French culture remained the majority shareholder
in the pied noir ethnic stock, but elements of Spanish, Italian, Maltese, and even indigenous
Algerian culture seeped in as well. The pieds noirs rallied themselves around a romanticized
rugged, individualistic stereotype of the colonial settler. Despite the fact that the vast majority of
Europeans lived in cities and towns, they nevertheless saw in themselves the early pioneers who
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entered into a wild country of drifters, soldiers, indigènes, and unclaimed land immediately after
the 1830 invasion. Metropolitan French attitudes toward European Algerians were often scornful
and disdainful, and the disrespect of their metropolitan countrymen reinforced the rugged and
rebellious self-image of the pieds noirs.56
Homogenization cemented settler control of colonial Algeria. Europeans rallied around
their own political candidates and worked to exclude Jewish and Muslim candidates and their
supporters from the political process. Settler dominance expressed itself in other ways too.
Zeyneb Çelik describes how colons tore down or gutted Muslim buildings and monuments.
French-designed and -constructed buildings proliferated and lent Algerian cities a decidedly
European architectural character.57 European districts monopolized the political and cultural
lives of colonial cities like Bône (now Annaba). Street names, city squares, and other important
public centers lost their Arab and Amazigh names, replaced by French and European names.
Meanwhile, pieds noirs otherized and exoticized indigenous Algerians, as evidenced by
European-made postcards, pictures, and paintings, all dripping with patronizing Orientalism.
Algerian cities developed around European commercial interests, shifting from economically and
industrially diverse urban and semi-urban centers into mining towns, industrial parks, and singlecrop agricultural centers. 58
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The ‘Statut Personnel Musulman’
The homogenization of the pieds noirs, and the gradual absorption of Jews into their
‘Latin’ tent, worked to Muslims’ distinct disadvantage. The Crémieux Decree and the 1889
Naturalization Law both suddenly and drastically expanded the definition of a French citizen in
Algeria, and so the “otherness of colonised [sic] persons” was in both cases shown to be “neither
inherent nor stable.”59 French citizens dominated most Algerian cities, but Muslims still made up
the majority of the population nationally. If Muslims ever won citizenship, it would threaten the
near-monopoly on political power that colons enjoyed. This compelled them to rigidly define and
maintain the difference between colonizer and colonized. Hence, the code de l’indigénat (“native
code”), which codified the difference and institutionalized the repression of Algeria’s ArabMuslim population.
A key metric for the determination of citizenship in France and all its départements was
one’s civil status, or personal status. The French government used the marker of civil status to
make legible its colonial population, identifying which people were subject to French laws and
civic codes and which were not.60 In the legalistic terminology of French colonial governance,
“local” civil status, also called “statut personnel musulman” denoted those subjects who did not
necessarily abide by French laws and did not participate in French civil institutions. Essentially,
this meant Muslims. Unlike Jews, who were forced to abandon their own Hebrew institutions
and adopt French civil status by the Crémieux Decree, Muslims were given the option to retain
their own juridical and civil institutions. But the choice was a cruel one, for Algerian Muslim
institutions operated under shari’a, religious laws fundamental to Islamic tradition. Adopting
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French civil status therefore required forsaking shari’a, tantamount to apostasy for most
Muslims. Since French civil status was a requirement for French citizenship, Algerian Muslims
were forced to choose between citizenship and their religion. Most Muslims chose religion.61
It is likely that colonial officials were fully aware of the impossibility of the choice they
had offered to Muslims; more than one historian has theorized that colons foisted this conundrum
upon Muslims as means to bar them from citizenship.62 Despite the impossible choice presented
to Muslim Algerians, they were still punished for their decision. Until the 1950s, the colonial
government classified those with local civil status (i.e., Muslims) as “indigènes” and imposed
upon them the code de l’indigénat, a collection of oppressive policies to which French citizens
were not subjected. The code granted colonial administrators the right to fine and even imprison
indigènes without due process or a fair trial. Until World War One, colonial authorities
imprisoned roughly twenty thousand Muslims a year. The legal subjugation of Muslim Algerians
also justified and facilitated their collective “tutoiement” by the European settler population.63
Muslims thus suffered both legal discrimination and social degradation during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. And they could not help but compare their deteriorating status to that of their
Jewish compatriots. While both the Crémieux Decree and the code de l’indigénat were imposed
on mostly unwilling native populations, the former legislation encouraged the diffusion of
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Algerian Jews into French society, while the latter compelled Muslims to turn inward. This
inward turning would eventually produce disastrous consequences for the French Empire.
Mahieddine Bachetarzi often felt the crushing pressure of colonial repression during his
life, especially after he entered the public sphere, but the specific place of his birth, along with
his family’s unusual economic condition, meant that he did not suffer in his youth to the same
degree as many of his poorer coreligionists. Bachetarzi’s father was ethnically Turkish, his
family was part of the then very small Muslim bourgeois community in Algiers, and his family
home was not actually in the Casbah, but in Saint-Eugène (now called Bologhine), a suburban
neighborhood just north of the Casbah.64 In the complicated and emotionally fraught ethnic and
economic hierarchies of colonial Algeria, Bachetarzi’s mixed ethnicity and class status would
therefore have placed him ‘higher’ on two hierarchical pyramids than many of his neighbors and
peers. And yet, he still spent much of his time in the Casbah. Nestled along the Place Randon
(now Amar Ali Street), the Bachetarzi family store was located in the heart of the lower Casbah,
not far from the docks and the “pêcherie,” and just blocks from the Djama’a el-Kabir (“Great
Mosque of Algiers”), the oldest mosque in Algiers and the second oldest mosque in the country.
Tightly packed, white-walled, and interconnected homes lined the narrow and winding roads of
Bachetarzi’s neighborhood. The roads themselves served as playgrounds where groups of
children amassed during the day and played games while their grandparents watched them from
the balconies above. This close-knit community of multifamily buildings was dotted with
mosques, synagogues, shops like Hanout el-Faradji, Arab bathhouses, and cafés maures
(“Moorish” cafés). Despite being born just outside of it, Bachetarzi grew up in this neighborhood
and was not merely a witness but a full participant in several of the most important political and
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cultural movements emanating from the Casbah in the interwar period. Among these was the
Algerian nationalist movement, which first organized itself into political parties after World War
One.
The statut personnel musulman and the code de l’indigénat codified differences, however
arbitrary, between colonizer and colonized. But, in doing so, these laws also created the space in
which, and the difference by which, an Algerian national identity, separate and distinct from
French culture and influence, could be defined. As James McDougall elegantly states,
Unable to escape from their subject status…Algerians appropriated it for themselves,
infused it with their own meanings. The colonial creation and maintenance of the
judicial/religious/ethnic difference of the colonised [sic] population in the statut had
produced a crucial discursive site of contest, invoked and mobilized first by colonial
administrators and the settler lobby…but subsequently by Algerians themselves for
whom the status personnel musulman, translated into Arabic as shakhṣiyyatunā ‘lislāmiyya, ‘our Islamic personality’, came to signify something the colonial system,
having created it as such, could not admit – the definition of specifically ‘Muslim
Algerian’ as a political community.65
Colonial policies played a major role in spurring the development of an Algerian national
identity, but this is not to suggest that the Algerian nationalist movement was by any means
unified in the interwar period. As we will see in the next chapter, many of the earlier movements
that would be grouped together retrospectively as parts of the larger ‘Algerian nationalist
movement’ actually had highly disparate political goals, and conflicting conceptions of what it
meant to be Muslim and what it meant to be Algerian.
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CHAPTER 3. THE ‘AWAKENING’ OF ALGERIAN NATIONALISM:
SUFI BROTHERHOODS, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE SALAFIYYA MOVEMENT

Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born
between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction.
Mikhail Bakhtin66

Historians tend to date the beginnings of Algerian nationalism to the early twentieth
century, but resistance to French incursion, be it explicitly nationalist or not, began much earlier.
Almost immediately after the first thirty-four thousand French soldiers landed on the beaches
twenty miles west of Algiers in 1830, multiple Arab and Berber groups took up arms against the
invaders. Emir ‘Abd el-Qādir led the most notable of these early resistance movements. ElQādir’s father, Muhyi al-Din al-Hasani, was a muqaddam67 in a prominent Sufi school, who
claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammed. In the immediate wake of the French invasion,
Muhyi al-Din called for jihad against the European aggressors. Too old to lead the resistance
himself, Muhyi al-Din’s son was elected Emir in 1832. Uniting numerous Arab and Berber tribes
in resistance against the French, Emir ‘Abd el-Qādir staged raids against French outposts and
supply lines while simultaneously pressing French officials for a truce. After five years of
sporadic fighting, he received his truce, the Treaty of Tafna, by which he claimed control of
nearly the entirety of the modern-day western province of Oran, where he established his own
state. He consolidated his power, incorporating practically every surrounding tribe within his
new political body, and establishing an Islamic theocracy. The peace treaty benefitted the French
too, as it kept potentially rebellious indigenous forces contained and preoccupied while the
European invaders strengthened their grip on the coastal and eastern portions of the country.

66
67

Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.
A kind of Sufi spiritual teacher, though not as ascetic as a marabout, nor as exalted as a shaykh.

44

The French broke the Treaty of Tafna in 1839 and provoked ‘Abd el-Qādir back into
open conflict. For a time, his guerrilla tactics confounded the French Expeditionary Army. But
after General Thomas Robert Bugeaud adapted his strategy and his tactics, implementing a fast
and efficient “flying column” formation and burning crops and villages, he was able to swiftly
and brutally suppress el-Qādir’s forces, laying waste to the Algerian countryside in the process.
El-Qādir surrendered in 1847 on the condition that he be allowed to flee to Egypt, a promise that
the French promptly broke, imprisoning him until 1852.68 His rebellion ended in defeat, but
many historians and laypeople remember el-Qādir today more for his piety and his respectful
conduct of war than for his military blunders or political failures. The historical image of him
that survives earns the admiration of not just his countrymen, but many Europeans as well. And
indeed, his humanitarian treatment of enemy combatants and prisoners of war both during and
after his military campaigns won him great renown, even touching Abraham Lincoln, who gifted
him two American pistols.69 More importantly for our purposes, though, ‘Abd el-Qādir served as
an inspiration to his peers and to later generations of Algerians, who strategically refashioned
him as an anti-colonial hero.70 In the interwar period, Algerian historians pointed to him as an
example of resistance to French occupation. And, over a century after his defeat, his political
strategies and military tactics inspired the last and most successful Algerian nationalist
movement, the Front de libération nationale (FLN).
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‘Abd el-Qādir’s rebellion proved the most successful instance of Algerian resistance in
the nineteenth century, but it was not the last. The largest such campaign against French
imperialism before the Algerian Revolution (1954 – 1962) was the Mokrani Revolt, which began
in 1871. The start date of the revolt has led some to credit the passage of the Crémieux Decree
with sparking it, and while resentments over the preferential treatment of Algerian Jews may
have played a role, it is doubtful that this was the sole or even the primary motivation for the
uprising.71 Regardless, the Mokrani Revolt, begun by a Kabyle Berber shaykh whom French
authorities had tried to oust, quickly expanded into a massive rebellion of roughly two hundred
fifty tribes and hundreds of thousands of irregular troops. The rebels succeeded in taking several
towns and cities in eastern Algeria, but were eventually put down by better-trained and betterequipped French forces. Despite the size of the rebellion, it was perhaps most significant
historically because of its aftermath. Colonial authorities imprisoned hundreds of Kabyles and
imposed a fine of thirty-six million francs on the Kabylie region. Most damaging of all, the
French confiscated four hundred fifty thousand hectares of land from native Algerians, all of
which were given to pieds noirs. This massive redistribution of land began a trend of repression
and retribution which, by the turn of century, had resulted in the dispossession of the majority of
rural Algerians. Those who lost their land were forced either to begin working as laborers on
their former lands, now owned by Europeans, or to flee to the cities in search of work there.
French reprisals crippled the Algerian population, and the Mokrani Revolt was thus the last
major resistance movement against French occupation in the nineteenth century.
From 1830 to 1870, the French military were the primary administrators of the Algerian
colony. While ruthless in their execution of combat missions, the French military were actually
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relatively lenient as civil administrators. They established Bureaux Arabes throughout the
colony, which handled indigenous affairs in a “paternalistic” manner that frustrated ardently antiArab settlers. When Napoleon III announced his intention to establish an overseas “royaume
arabe,” equal in prestige and development to the metropole, settlers became “openly hostile” to
the French metropolitan government and the military.72 After Prussia captured Napoleon III in
1870, European demonstrations effectively drove the military government out, allowing the
settlers to establish their own civilian-led administrative committees. From that point until
Algeria won its independence in 1962, the country was governed by a settler-dominated civilian
administration. The leaders of the French Third Republic directed Minister Adolphe Crémieux to
“completely assimilate Algeria into France,”73 which he achieved by creating seats in the French
National Assembly to represent the Algerian départements, by confirming settler control of local
municipalities, by naturalizing Algerian Jews via the Crémieux Decree, and by appointing a
civilian Governor-General, who reported to the French Ministry of the Interior. All of these
changes solidified civilian settlers’ hold over the Algerian government.
The post-1870 government divided Algeria into three départements – large municipalities
not unlike provinces or states: Oran, Constantine, and Algiers. The military kept control of the
southern, Saharan portion of Algeria. A prefect administered each département and answered to
the Governor-General, while an elected conseil général handled the affairs of civil government.
Each département was represented in the French metropolitan National Assembly by two
deputies (three after 1928) and one senator. Capitalizing on corrupt patronage networks which
dominated Algerian politics, some of these deputies and senators held office for decades.74
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Locally, wealthy industrialists and landowners used their fortunes, productive capabilities, media
outlets, and their networks of clients to secure and hold political power.75
The colonial government established communes mixtes in majority Muslim areas, with
French administrators maintaining settler control. In the more urbanized north, where settlers
predominated, French-style communes de pleine exercise were established. All French citizens
had the right to vote, but only Muslim property owners (of whom there were few, since French
property laws did not respect as private the kinds of communal landholdings many Muslim
communities shared) and civil servants could vote, and even then, only in municipal elections.
Traditional Maghribi Muslim political bodies, called jama`at and resembling a municipal council
with members elected by the community, were suppressed and in some cases replaced by the socalled adjoint indigène, or native representative. The adjoint indigène, tasked with enforcing
French law in Muslim communities, was often labelled a collaborator by his coreligionists.
Settlers defended these structural changes as means to assimilate the Algerian population, but
Jules Ferry, among others, admitted that the commune de pleine exercise merely served the
“exploitation of the native in broad daylight.”76 David Prochaska elaborates on Ferry’s point,
arguing that these communes became “political vacuums,” in which settlers could exploit
Muslim disenfranchisement and consolidate their hold on political power in Algeria while
simultaneously insulating themselves from the influence of French metropolitan politicians and
institutions.77
The establishment of the Délégations financières in 1898 accelerated this insulation. The
Délégations financières was an elected assembly, seated in Algiers, that administered budgetary
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matters. As a budgetary committee, this assembly further isolated Algeria from French oversight
by transferring control of the colony’s finances to the Algerian population. The assembly
consisted of forty-eight Europeans and twenty-one Algerians, whose seats were divided into
Arab and Berber sections, essentially splitting the Muslim vote.78 The Délégations financières
therefore furthered two settler goals by weakening the ability of the metropole to interfere in
colonial affairs, and by limiting Muslim influence on the colony’s finances as much as was
legally possible.
Disenfranchisement, dispossession, and heavy economic burdens rendered most Muslim
Algerians powerless under the new system, but a select few families deftly used their wealth,
influence, and education to ingratiate themselves to and even assimilate into civil and political
colonial society. These francophiles and “béni oui-oui” (“yes men”) sometimes drew the ire of
their coreligionists and native compatriots, who disparaged them as collaborators, “aliénés,” and
“naturalisés.” But, whether or not such accusations of accommodation and collaboration were
accurate or not, these wealthy, Western-educated Muslims were among the only members of
their communities who could act as intermediaries between them and the settlers, and they were
often the most vocal advocates for their fellow Muslims.79 Indeed, it was from the ranks of
middle- and upper-class francophilic Muslim families that many of the first Algerian nationalist
parties arose.
In the previous chapter, we briefly discussed the Arab madersa as an important center of
learning for both Mahieddine Bachetarzi and, later, Mohammed Harbi. Harbi’s personal account
of his education confirms what is argued in much scholarship, in that he credits his studies under
Arab teachers for imbuing him with a sense of national Algerian consciousness. What Harbi
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experienced as a child in those Arab classes was the coming-to-fruition of several decades of
nationalist advocacy. But Bachetarzi was born three decades earlier; he came of age just as the
first organized nationalist political movements gathered momentum. As an adult, he was
cognizant of these movements, immersed in them, and in some ways emblematic of them,
especially in the sense that his gradual shift in messaging reflected the general development of
Algerian nationalist discourse over the course of the interwar period. But before we examine
Bachetarzi’s politics, and the ways in which his political views were actualized through music
and theater, it is important to understand the different nationalist parties themselves.
Contemporary historians often subscribe to the post-revolutionary Algerian nationalist
narrative, according to which all of the major nationalist parties of the early twentieth century
were cooperative elements within the same overarching movement, which collectively and
intentionally helped ‘reawaken’ a singular, essential Algerian national character. This is simply
not the case. Furthermore, there has been a tendency to retrospectively assign to each of these
parties a more radical, anti-French nationalism than most really espoused.80 This grand,
sweeping narrative was really created after the fact, in the mid-1960s, by the nascent FLN
government, which hoped to secure and legitimize its monopolization of power after the
Algerian Revolution. In reality, the major nationalist parties of the interwar period had disparate
goals, ranging from continuation and reform of the French colonial system to total independence.
Historian Prasenjit Duara has said that nationalism “is rarely the nationalism of the
nation, but rather marks the site where different representations of the nation contest and
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negotiate with each other.”81 This was certainly the case in colonial Algeria; arguably, it is still
the case today. It has also been argued by Benedict Anderson, James McDougall, and many
others that the ‘birth’ of a nation is a process of construction and deconstruction, rather than an
awakening of some primordial or innate national character. A thorough examination of the
contested space that was interwar Algerian nationalism can therefore help us to illuminate the
nature of the debate there, to determine what aspects of a supposed Algerian national identity
took precedence for which groups, as well as to determine how Mahieddine Bachetarzi and his
peers fit into this space politically.

Assimilation, Association, and the Jeunes Algériens
A key deliberation in colonial settler circles took place over two proposed models for
‘native’ absorption into French society: assimilationism and associationism. The former model
dictated that the best method of integrating the ‘native’ population was by totally incorporating
Muslims into French society through the disintegration of local customs and institutions and the
gradual extension of French citizenship. This conformed with French notions of laïcité, or
secularism, and with presumptions about the inherent righteousness of their own culture. The
latter model dictated that, either by virtue of anthropological respect or cynicism in response to
native intransigence, the only way to peacefully and amicably incorporate Muslims into the
French state would be by preserving their cultural and religious customs, and by accepting the
parallel development of distinct European and Maghribi cultures within a larger French society.82
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Such discussions mirrored those within the Muslim community about the best ways to
respond to French colonialism. Some groups, like the francophilic Jeunes Algériens (“Young
Algerians”), admired French culture, regarded Maghribi and Islamic traditions with ambivalence,
and believed that assimilation was the only viable way forward. The Jeunes Algériens, who first
coalesced in 1907, were initially less of a formal political party than a broad movement of
politically moderate, Western-educated Muslims. They aimed to reform rather than to dismantle
the colonial system by expanding French citizenship rights to all Algerians. They released their
first major treatise in 1912, in which they outlined their platform of “resistance-throughdialogue,” proposed various modest reforms, and questioned the legality and righteousness of
conscription into the French army.83 On the whole, these young men came from the emerging
Muslim middle class of teachers, civil servants, lawyers, doctors, and small businessmen.84
Several generations of Muslim men (and, increasingly through the 1930s, Muslim women), from
the early 1900s to the Second World War, aligned themselves with the Jeune Algérien platform,
but the ‘first generation’ especially, under the leadership of Dr. Benthami Ould Hamida and
Chérif Benhabylès, presented itself as the representative of secularized, lower-middle- and
middle-class Algerians and so-called ‘évolués.’85 Crucially, these men sought reform within the
colonial system because they believed that French culture and Western modernity were vital to
the ‘elevation’ of their coreligionists and compatriots. As a testament to this fact, they wrote
most of their works in French, and they directed their messaging mainly at European, rather than
Muslim, audiences. The Jeunes Algériens believed that most of the power to reform political and
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social structures lay with the French, and that the French could help the évolués to educate and
modernize other Muslims.
Chérif Benhabylès, himself a prototypical évolué, was one of the most important of the
first generation of these moderate nationalists. Born in the northeastern city of Constantine in
1891, he descended from an Arab aristocratic family whose lineage traced back to the Ottoman
era. He studied law at a madersa, becoming a qāḍī (an Islamic judge), and then pursued a law
degree at French university before becoming naturalized as a French citizen. As we have seen,
this was tantamount to apostasy in the eyes of many Muslims, but Benhabylès insisted that he
never ceased to be a devout follower of Islam. In 1914, he published L’Algérie française vue par
un indigène, in which he celebrated the advancements and the “sophistication and good taste” of
historical Muslim civilizations, while simultaneously lamenting what he perceived as Muslims’
present condition in Algeria: “lag[ging] several centuries behind their neighbours [sic].”
Benhabylès concluded that Algerians, “led by a firm, but well-intentioned hand” could “trace
their path towards France…whose glorious mission has been to carry, through the whole
universe and the different ages of its history, the resplendent banner of civilisation! [sic]”86 His
admiration for France and for French culture, though perhaps excessively fawning in tone, was
not unusual among the Muslim middle and upper classes. Dr. Benthami also became naturalized
as a French citizen in 1905, and even some Islamic scholars and religious leaders shared a certain
respect for French ‘civilization.’ But the first generation of Jeunes Algériens were harsh and
uncompromising in their criticisms of Maghribi/Islamic culture, and this won them few allies
among their compatriots. Additionally, their use of the French language made their discourse
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inaccessible for many poorer and especially rural Muslims, who spoke dialectal Arabic almost
exclusively.
El-Hack, an early Islamic reformist newspaper published in Egypt but widely distributed,
derided Muslim converts to Christianity and Muslims who bowed to French influence. It claimed
further that Muslim personal status and adherence to shari’a were the last available means for
colonized Muslims to retain their “community cohesion.”87 In Imagined Communities, Benedict
Anderson quotes Bipin Chandra Pal, a colonized Indian living under British rule. Pal notes the
estrangement of Indians who studied in England and worked for the English colonial government
– Indians who were “as much an Englishman as any Englishman,” but who were simultaneously
estranged from their native communities and therefore “as much a stranger in [their] own native
land as the European residents.”88 Frantz Fanon analyzes this phenomenon in a Marxist context.
“The oppressor,” he declares, “through the inclusive and frightening character of his authority,
manages to impose on the native new ways of seeing, and in particular a pejorative judgment
with respect to his original forms of existing.”89 Ultimately, Fanon interprets the assimilation of
the naturalisé as an “alienation” akin to the kind Marx observed in the European proletariat. Pal,
Fanon, and many other colonized intellectuals regarded the assimilation of ‘native’ elites with
scorn, or at least pity, and Jeunes Algériens like Benhabylès felt such judgments acutely.
Subsequent generations of Jeunes Algériens would take note of this adjust their platform
accordingly, loudly embracing more Islamic and Maghribi rhetoric. But such changes did not
take place for the most part until after the First World War, an event that historian Ethan Katz
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calls a “foundational event for Jewish-Muslim relations” in the French colonial empire, and the
same came be said of its significance for Algerian nationalism.90
“Rumblings of resistance” began several years before the war, as Jewish and Muslim
discontent grew in response to French conscription.91 Muslims, led by members of the Jeunes
Algériens and the ‘ulemā,92 held demonstrations to protest French conscription, but the
authorities repressed them and imprisoned their organizers. Conscription began in 1912, and,
ultimately, two hundred sixty thousand Muslims from across the Maghrib, along with thirty-eight
thousand Maghribi Jews, served France during the war, either by fighting on the front or by
supporting the war effort in French factories and manufacturing plants. Far from home, these
men found solace and connection in one another’s shared Maghribi traditions, and they built
solidarities that would survive the war and accompany them home. At the same time, the
Algerian experience of the war was one of contrasts. The French army was segregated along
ethnoreligious lines; there were ‘French’ units, Jewish units, Muslim units, and ‘Black’ units
composed of men from the sub-Saharan African colonies. French high command treated units
differently and gave different assignments based on their ethnic makeup, with white units
predictably receiving more favorable missions and better-quality equipment. Algerian factory
workers, meanwhile, received less pay for equal work than their French counterparts. The bitter
continuation of French legal segregation was compounded by the fact that Jewish soldiers and
factory workers often acted as intermediaries between Muslim and ‘French’ units, thus
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establishing a Jewish-over-Muslim power dynamic that further enflamed many Algerian
resentments.93
Such regrettable treatment was made all the more intolerable for Muslim Algerians as
they witnessed the alternatives that other European nations and the United States purported to
offer. Travelling outside of North Africa, in many cases for the first time, gave workers and
soldiers the opportunity to compare their living conditions and their daily segregations with what
they saw in France and other European countries, where conditions appeared to be better. As the
war dragged on, new emerging global political discourses also inspired many Algerians to dream
of greater rights and opportunities. United States President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen
Points and his proposed League of Nations outlined a vision of a postwar world in which all
peoples would be able to pursue their own right to self-determination. Time in Europe also
exposed many Algerians to socialist and Marxist theories for the first time, in large part because
of the proactive work of the Parti communiste français (PCF) in factories and on the frontlines.
The collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires and the solidification of the nationstate as the measure of global political legitimacy affirmed for many Algerians that greater
political power and autonomy, if not total independence, were necessary for any future Algerian
nation.
These workers and veterans, both Muslim and Jewish, believed that their service during
the Great War would at least prove their devotion to France and justify their demands for more
equal representation at home. The Jeunes Algériens and the ‘ulemā had demanded before the war
began that Muslim soldiers be granted full political rights in exchange for their military service.
The French government instead offered partial political rights to Muslims who could prove they
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had been honorably discharged after the war. Muslim veterans would not be allowed to vote for
provincial or national representatives, but they would be permitted to vote for conseilleurs
généreaux, advisors to the Governor-General. Additionally, veterans would be exempted from
the code de l’indigénat. The ‘ulemā rejected these terms on the grounds that they were
insufficient, but the Jeunes Algériens accepted them. Meager as they were, these concessions
helped to open up the colonial political process to Muslims after World War One.94
Another opening-up of the political field came with the so-called Jonnart Reforms of
1919, named after the relatively liberal Governor-General, Charles Jonnart. These reforms
represented the culmination of Muslim Algerian reformers’ efforts to make the colonial system
more equitable. They did that, but they fell far short of hopes and expectations, especially
because they did nothing to extend citizenship rights (in many cases, in fact, they made the
process of becoming a citizen even more difficult). For most Muslims, the Jonnart Reforms were
a bitter disappointment. For the Jeunes Algériens, who had promised that cooperation and
assimilation with the French would lead to equality for all Algerians, they were an utter
embarrassment. But while these reforms did not grand citizenship to any additional Muslims,
they did grant select voting rights to close to half a million more Algerian men, mainly in local
municipal and jama’at elections, while select members of the Muslim elite were allowed to vote
for more conseilleurs généreaux and Délégués financiers. Muslim Algerians now could occupy
up to one-third of municipal seats, and Algerian councilors could now vote for mayors, a right
they had previously been deprived. The Jonnart Reforms disappointed Algerians who had placed
their trust in the French, especially veterans and the Jeunes Algériens, but they nevertheless
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allowed for “the advent of mass politics” and the emergence of a new generation of politically
active and empowered Muslims.95
Mahieddine Bachetarzi, for example, took full advantage of the marginal reforms granted
to Muslim Algerians. Soon after the end of the First World War, at the age of twenty-one, he
rallied fellow singers and musicians in Algiers, first forming a committee and eventually
convincing them to unionize. Despite pushback from reticent conservative Muslims, Bachetarzi’s
agitation compelled the colonial government to grant Muslim musicians higher pay for their
performances. In his words, the experience taught him that “[Algerians] are never so well
defended as when we defend ourselves.”96 Bachetarzi continued his political activity the
following year, when he co-founded the Amicale des étudiants musulmans (“Association of
Muslim Students”) with Chérif Benhabylès, as well as Mohamed-Salah Bendjelloul and Ferhat
Abbas, two young nationalists and affiliates of the Jeunes Algériens who rose to prominence in
the interwar period.97 These new generations of Algerian politicians and activists formed and
constituted the major nationalist parties of the interwar period, and they battled both the French
administration and each other over the definition of the Algerian nation, and over what it meant
to be an Algerian citizen.

The Struggle to Claim Legitimate Representation of the Algerian Nation
Gathering momentum in the late 1920s, a new generation of Muslim scholars and clerics
adapted their religious teachings to a new reformist and nationalistic framework. These ‘ulemā
were profoundly influenced by the burgeoning salafiyya movement, which, as we have seen,
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called for modernist reform (iṣlāḥ) of Islam. The labelling of Salafism as “modern” might seem
mistaken, given the movement’s expressed desire to return to the Islam’s original sources, but
anthropologist Donald Donham defines modernism in the context of his work in east Africa as a
“local, culturally encoded stance toward history, one that yearns to bring things ‘up to date’,” and
this definition applies just as well to the interwar Algerian nationalist milieu.98 The Salafist
movement was certainly modern in its frank appraisal of contemporary Islam and in its intent to
reform so as to adapt to changing times. Led and organized chiefly by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī
of Afghanistan and Muḥammad ‘Abduh of Egypt, the Salafists “promoted religious reform and
modernism, with one of their main goals being political revival based on Muslim unity.”99 The
two leading ‘ulemā coedited the newspaper, Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa (“The Firmest Bond”), they
called for unified resistance to colonial oppression, and they argued that Muslim disunity
stemmed from “blind imitation” (taqlid) of competing Islamic legal schools (madhāhib), leading
to sectarian conflicts within the global Muslim community (umma). They recommended the
abolition of all madhāhib, the permittance of “independent interpretation” of Islamic
jurisprudence (ijtihad), and a reconceptualization of the umma as a single community spanning
the entire Muslim world.100 The Salafists’ influence on Algerian ‘ulemā is evident from the
proliferation of Salafist presses that occurred in the late 1920s and through the 1930s, including
newspapers like al-Matbaʿa al-ʿArabīya and al-Shihāb.
In 1931, a group of Algerian Salafists founded the Association des oulémas musulmans
algériens (AOMA; in Arabic, Jam'iyyat al-'Ulemā al-Muslimin al-Jaza'iriyyi). From 1931 to
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1957, the AOMA strove to ‘resurrect’ Muslim Algerian society by providing religious and
political education to Muslims from a distinctly Islamic basis, though often through Western and
modern methods. Further, though, the AOMA claimed and continually campaigned to affirm
their “exclusive control of the cultural authority to define ‘the true religion’ of Algeria,” and, in
doing so, they engaged in political combat not only with French colonial authorities, but also
with other Muslim Algerian religious and nationalist groups.101 One method by which the
AOMA sought to achieve this authority was through the construction of a “master-narrative,” to
use historian James McDougall’s term, of Algerian history that implicitly placed the AOMA at
the forefront of a teleological progression that would culminate in an independent, Arab and
Islamic Algeria.
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson observes that nationalism, when it arises
among colonized communities, seems akin to a people “awakening” from a long slumber, who
thus open their eyes to an “immense antiquity behind the epochal sleep.”102 Anderson notes that,
after the awakening, individual moments are plucked and refitted together from that newly
regarded immense antiquity, like select pieces of a large and incomprehensible puzzle utilized to
form a smaller and more immediately coherent one. These select pieces of historical memory
form a narrative – a national origin story. A national ‘identity’ is built from this narrative, which
is itself a constructed amalgamation of intentionally selected and isolated historical moments.103
For Algerian nationalists and reformists, the moments plucked and refitted from their immense
antiquity included the ancient Maghribi kingdoms of Numidia and Mauretania, the original
Muslim conquests, the kingdoms of al-Andalus, and even the Ottoman Regency.
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Perceptive as it is, Anderson’s account of nationalism in colonized societies does not
sufficiently stress the intentionality and constructedness of historical narratives. McDougall, in
his examination of interwar Algerian nationalism, builds eloquently on Anderson’s ideas to
emphasize the intentionality with which the AOMA and their affiliates retrofitted moments in
Algerian history into a Salafist and nationalist “master-narrative.” As part of the AOMA’s
mission to ‘resurrect’ Islam in Algeria, McDougall illustrates that they “intended to map out, in
Arabic, their community’s glorious past.”104 The AOMA allied with and deployed historians like
Aḥmad Tawfīq al-Madanī to write ‘ulemā-sanctioned versions of Algerian history, and they
partnered with artists and performers like Mahieddine Bachetarzi to spread their master-narrative
in cultural spaces. The teleological narrative of Algerian history that they produced portrays a
“unified and unifying” single national movement with a coherent story enveloping nearly every
major historical resistance figure, from Jugurtha to ‘Abd el-Qādir and beyond.105 After the
Algerian Revolution, the FLN adopted this model of historical construction, and the AOMA thus
became enveloped in the Algerian “master-narrative” as well. Such a narrative depicts the nation
“as will, a dream to be inscribed in reality through human agency, and as essence, a prior, deep
truth requiring revelation to those who have not known it, and recognition by those who deny
it.”106
But this kind of historical depiction, in Algeria and elsewhere, tends to silence the reality
of discussion, negotiation, and struggle that really defined the nationalist ‘movement.’ The postrevolutionary retrospective construction of an Algerian national historical narrative has followed
the blueprint laid out by the AOMA, but the constructive process could only begin after the

104

James McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria, 14.
Ibid., 15.
106
Ibid.
105

61

question of who had the authority to make such judgments had been answered – or after the
majority of those asking the question had been silenced. A debate began before the First World
War but accelerated after it over who in Algeria had the authority to determine the definition and
character of an Algerian, and the AOMA and several other Muslim groups propelled themselves
to the center of this discussion. Ironically, in their quest to claim sole legitimate authority of the
Muslim community in Algeria against their French and Maghribi, the AOMA employed methods
that were distinctly modern and Western, as well as cultural and religious models that clearly
stemmed from pre-colonial and even pre-Islamic Maghribi traditions.
One of the clearest examples of modernism and Western influence in AOMA praxis can
be seen in their so-called “invention of ignorance,” Algerian sociologist Fanny Colonna’s term
for their rigid and divisive ordering of Algerian Muslim society into two classes: the learned and
the unlearned.107 Even more so than resistance to colonial oppression, the AOMA emphasized a
“revolution…against ignorance (thawra ḍidd al-jāhel)” within the Algerian Muslim
community.108 The AOMA viewed Algerian religious practice, particularly in rural areas where
peasants most often sustained pre-Islamic traditions, as “characterized by a state of religious
anarchy, of illicit practice and backwards belief,” and they thereby “recast the lived culture” of
rural Algerians as “uncivilized” and illegitimate.109 They would have been loathe to admit it, but
much of this criticism stemmed from the influence of Western education and the assumed
disdain of Western observers. This is evident in Algerian Salafists’ condemnations of Qur’anic
schools as places of “disorder and noise,”110 and their preference for European models of
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education. In Salafist schools, a standardized timetable, rationally divided by multiple academic
subjects, each to be studied via printed textbooks (usually from the Mashriq), replaced older
Maghribi models, which stressed calligraphy and a more personal and quasi-spiritual relationship
between teacher and pupil.111 McDougall notes that the Algerian Salafists’ Islam was “a
thoroughly new kind of response, seeking to integrate the transformative power of modernity –
science, the school – with an essential, changeless conception of the community’s ‘personality’
in a language of enlightenment as progress and self-rediscovery, which the ‘ulemā alone were fit
to enunciate as the true leaders of the community.”112
Much like their attitude toward Maghribi Islam, the Salafists’ methodology reflected
Western influences. The AOMA took full advantage of the French 1901 Law of Associations,
which permitted the proliferation of amateur and semi-professional collectives organized around
particular crafts, activities, or communities. Despite being a national body, the AOMA often
acted at a local level in order to skirt colonial oversight and legal impositions. They helped found
and continually supported numerous athletic, artistic, and academic associations; they organized
conferences and festivals that celebrated Maghribi and Islamic culture; and they founded schools
across the country that focused on Islamic and Arabic instruction.113 One of the most influential
of the Salafist associations formed in the interwar period was the Nadi El Taraqqi, also known as
the Cercle du Progrès, or the Circle of Progress. It was founded in 1927 by a collection of
prominent Muslim families in the Algiers Casbah, many of whom were actually more closely
connected to the Jeunes Algériens than Algeria’s ‘ulemā, but the connection between the Circle
of Progress and the AOMA grew more intimate throughout the 1930s. The Circle’s main
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objective was to facilitate the “intellectual, economic, and social education of Muslims in
Algeria.”114 It pursued this end by organizing local, nationwide, and even international
conferences where attendees could discuss and debate Muslim and Algerian issues. The Circle
also helped coordinate the activities of other associations, to organize concerts and theatrical
performances, and it also served as a hub of “social action” and charity work.115 As we shall see,
Mahieddine Bachetarzi worked closely with members of the Circle of Progress to produce his
concerts and theatrical performances, and to drum up audiences and financial support.
AOMA leadership encouraged ‘ulemā to provide “wasail al-tanshi’a al-islahiya,” or
“reformist resources for awareness, education, and socialization.”116 In this respect, and in their
promotion of Muslim unity, the AOMA were an organization focused on the uplift of their
coreligionists through modern methods. But their campaign to gain exclusive authority to
represent the Algerian umma led to conflicts with more secular nationalists and with certain sects
of the Muslim religious community. A second generation of Jeunes Algériens came of age
during the interwar period, led first by Khaled ibn al-Hashemi, grandson of ‘Abd al-Qādir.
Known to his compatriots as Emir Khaled, he first came to prominence in 1919 when, after
serving in the French army in the First World War, he wrote directly to U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson, asking him to refer specifically to the Algerian colonial situation at the first meeting of
the League of Nations. Ideologically, Emir Khaled did not stray far from his Jeune Algérien
predecessors, especially Dr. Benthami. He opposed the code de l’indigénat, he called for
increased political representation for colonized peoples, he advocated for the expansion of
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educational opportunities, and he denounced vices like alcohol and gambling. But he
distinguished himself by more vocally defending Muslim institutions and the sanctity of the
Muslim community. He opposed, for example, the sort of selective naturalization that the
colonial government permitted, which demanded the abandonment of shari‘a, because he
believed that it divided and eroded the Muslim Algerian community. His message appealed to a
much broader range of Muslims than the first wave of Jeunes Algériens ever could. In late 1919,
he submitted a list of candidates for municipal elections in Algiers, most of whom defeated Dr.
Benthami and his peers in landslide victories.117 The French government annulled the election
results and eventually chased Emir Khaled out of the country for “fomenting Islamic
nationalism.” He died in Damascus in 1936, but he crafted the blueprint for subsequent Jeune
Algérien leaders.118
The next major figures to arise in the party were Dr. Mohamed-Salah Bendjelloul and
Ferhat Abbas. In 1927, Dr. Bendjelloul and associates created the Fédération des élus
musulmans (“Federation of Muslim Elected Representatives”) with the support of the liberal
metropolitan French government. Unlike the previous generation of Jeunes Algériens, who
directed most of their attention to French audiences, Bendjelloul, Abbas, and the Fédération des
élus resolved to address the Muslim community directly. Rather than naturalizing and
assimilating urbanized Muslim elites, Dr. Bendjelloul and his associates sought to lift up all their
coreligionists, even in rural areas. They summarily rejected piecemeal naturalization, which
Abbas claimed created a “class of naturalisés” who stood apart from their coreligionists and did
nothing to aid the larger community. In one of the defining texts of the movement, entitled Le
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Jeune Algérien, Abbas asked his educated Muslim peers: “Do we want to raise this country to a
higher level, or do we want to divide and rule?”119
The shift in the tone of messaging from the Jeunes Algériens in the interwar period is
significant, for it illustrates the influence of the ‘ulemā. It shows that the Muslim bourgeoisie
was consciously trying to respond to criticism leveled against them by religious elites. The
Jeunes Algériens did not necessarily oppose Algerian ‘ulemā; in many cases, their objectives and
activities aligned closely. But there were nevertheless conflicts, which played out most often in
literary spaces. Generally, this illustrates that Muslim economic and religious elites struggled in
in the period between the wars for the authority to claim “legitimate representation of the
[Algerian, and especially the Muslim Algerian] community.”120 But while the Jeunes Algériens
tried to pivot the target of their messaging from the French to their compatriots, the ‘ulemā
already enjoyed and benefitted from longstanding goodwill and more impeccable Islamic
credentials.
This struggle for authority was typified by a public debate between Ferhat Abbas and the
Salafist ‘ālim and leader and co-founder of the AOMA, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Ibn Bādīs. It
began in 1936, when Abbas published an article, “La France, c’est moi” in response to French
accusations that he was a nationalist. In his defense, he declared, “If I had discovered the
‘Algerian nation’, I would be a nationalist…[But] the Algerian patrie is a myth. I have not found
it.”121 Abbas compared radical nationalists to Don Quixote and compared the idea of an
independent Algerian nation to his windmills. He restated the positive goals of the Jeunes
Algériens – to educate and uplift the Muslim Algerian community – but he also affirmed his
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party’s desire to maintain the colonial system. Whatever his intentions, the article was a relative
disaster for Abbas, who unwittingly confirmed Muslims’ suspicions about bourgeois elites. His
article came across as excessively francophilic and disappointingly dismissive of the prospects
for Algerian nationalism.
Two months later, Ibn Bādīs wrote a retort in his newspaper, al-Shihāb. Written in
Arabic, the article, entitled “Kalima ṣarīḥa” (“Clear statement”), declared, “For our part, we
have consulted the pages of history, and we have consulted present circumstances, and we have
found the Algerian Muslim nation existing just as the other nations of the world have been
formed and exist…Furthermore, this Algerian Muslim nation is not France. It cannot become
France. It does not want to become France.”122 The distinction between Abbas and Ibn Bādīs
could not have been made more apparently clear. In actuality, both the Jeunes Algériens and the
AOMA agreed that reform would demand conversation with and accommodation of French
colonialists, but the AOMA’s rhetoric was seemingly more defiant and obviously more Islamic.
The widely circulated contents of the Abbas/Ibn Bādīs debate seemed to affirm the AOMA’s
stated goal to unite all Muslims in a protracted campaign of communal uplift and colonial
resistance. And indeed, the AOMA did succeed in uniting some previously antagonistic Muslim
sects – especially the country’s Sunnis, who were mostly ethnically Arab, and its Berber Ibadis.
The AOMA convinced these formerly antagonistic groups to shelve doctrinal disagreements in
favor of a unified front against European oppression.123 But the Salafist ‘ulemā of the AOMA
undercut their own claims to be unifiers by willfully engaging in direct and continuous conflicts
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with Algeria’s marabouts (meaning “saints;” in Arabic, murābiṭ), Sufi Muslim teachers and
leaders of their own quasi-religious, quasi-educational, quasi-political institutions called zawiyas.
Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, came to the Maghrib from the Mashriq in the twelfth
century. Sufi Islam merged “philosophical contemplation with devotional practices,” and
encouraged asceticism and solitude.124 The Arabic word for marabout literally means “man of
the ribāt” and refers to followers of the Almoravid dynasty (1040-1147CE), but the term evolved
over time to designate Sufi holy men who removed themselves from regular society. At such a
remove, such men found company only in their Sufi ‘brothers,’ whom they joined on occasion
for travel and prayer. Some groups of Muslim worshippers came to follow a given marabout
with such regularity that they effectively became disciples. Some followers so revered their
marabouts that they established saintly cults of worship around them. Saintly worship is
common practice in North Africa and has been for centuries, but Algerian Sufis also sometimes
developed ancestor cults after marabouts’ deaths. These ancestor cults resembled those seen in
sub-Saharan African cultures,125 but became equally important in the Maghrib, originally in a
religious context but eventually in others as well. In fact, as we will see in later chapters, the
Maghribi tradition of hereditary sainthood permeated Maghribi culture, influencing the
acquisition and transmission of ‘sacred’ knowledge in artistic spheres, as well as religious
ones.126
Similarly fundamental to Maghribi Sufism and likewise influential across religious,
social, and political boundaries in the twentieth century, the Sufi saints’ zawiya institutions
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helped cement their power and prestige. The zawiya tradition dates back to the earliest days of
Sufi Islam in the Maghrib, when rootless marabouts and their ‘brothers’ met along highways and
prayed wherever they could find a roof to cover them. Hence the original purpose of the zawiya,
which was to provide shelter and hospitality to wandering Sufi ascetics and holy men. Over time,
though, these zawiyas grew into larger and larger institutions, performing religious, civil, and
eventually political functions.127 Presiding over these institutions, the once-reclusive marabouts
found themselves drawn together and drawn back into civil and political life over the course of
the Ottoman era.
As has been suggested, the French were not Algeria’s first foreign invaders, and Islam, in
in some form or other, has played “a consistent and central role” in ‘native’ Algerian resistance
movements for over two centuries.”128 Well before the arrival of the French and the ascendance
of Salafism, marabouts and zawiyas provided the ideological foundations for political and
military resistance to the Ottoman Empire. This was made possible by the emergence of five
particularly powerful Sufi brotherhoods, each one originally founded around a given marabout.
Over time, Sufi orders established lines and networks of communication between their scattered
zawiyas, coordinating itinerant brothers’ travels, educational plans, and shipments of food and
other necessities to those in need. They taught classes on Arabic and Islam, cared for the sick,
and, in times of crisis, supplied resistance forces. In the Ottoman era, brotherhoods that clashed
with the imperial government used these zawiyas more like military forts, whence they could
relay information about enemy movements and even stage and launch combat operations.129 Sufi
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brotherhoods launched three major rebellions against Ottoman rule during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.130
The famous resistor of French colonialism, ‘Abd el-Qādir, was himself a member of the
Qadiriyya brotherhood, one of the most powerful in nineteenth-century Algeria, and he owed
part of his political and military success to his brotherhood’s extensive and well-organized
network of zawiyas. The Qadiriyya used these institutional centers to care for the sick and
dispossessed, to supply el-Qādir’s forces, and to disseminate anti-French propaganda. The
Qadiriyya actually put forward a comprehensive “ideological program” after the French
invasion, comprised of four elements: jihad against the French Expeditionary Army, a promise to
create a more egalitarian society after the war was done, the establishment of shari’a as law, and
the appointment of a political leader who would be a faithful follower of Islam.131 In some
respects, this platform was ironically quite similar to that proposed by the AOMA roughly a
century later.
Marabouts and their brotherhoods indeed have a long history of resistance and protonationalism in Algeria, but by the end of the First World War, their influence had faded and their
detractors within the Muslim community had grown more numerous. Their loss in popularity
stemmed in no small part from the French passage in 1905 of a law officially separating religion
and the state. In the metropole, this separation was relatively uncomplicated, but, in Algeria, the
colonial government had secured the ability to appoint Muslim clerics and preachers. Religious
leaders in the Muslim community, in addition to their spiritual influence, were politically
powerful, and government appointments therefore gave colonial authorities the means to oversee
and control an important sphere of ‘native’ religious and political life. An official separation
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between the state and the mosque, so to speak, would endanger colonial authorities’ abilities to
control this sphere, thus potentially eroding their authority. To circumvent this, the Algerian
Governor-General bent the rules of the 1905 law significantly. Utilizing the 1901 Law of
Associations, the Governor-General’s office created a purportedly independent and voluntary
organization, the Association cultuelle musulmane (ACM), which “proposed” religious
appointments to the administration, and thus ensured the continued ability of colonial authorities
to oversee the Muslim community.132 This arrangement greatly discredited marabouts and
brotherhoods, as some select members of the Sufi community engaged in this collaboration with
the colonial government.
Additionally, Salafists regarded Sufism’s mystical and, in some cases, pre-Islamic
practices to be anachronistic and even damaging to Islam’s international image. The AOMA
denounced many traditional Maghribi practices, including the recitation of the burda (a poetic
epic honoring the Prophet Muhammed) at burials, the zarda (public food distribution to the
needy via a celebratory public feast), and the ziyāra (ritual visits to the tombs or sanctuaries of
dead and living saints). All of these practices were labelled as jāhil, or ignorance, and the
AOMA devised new, more supposedly scientific and rational practices, to replace them.133 In the
minds of the Salafists, the varied and in many cases pre-Islamic practices of the Algerian
countryside produced fauḍā, or anarchy, within the Muslim community, and, as tonic, they
prescribed “societal unity under a reformed and purified Islam.”134 This was the only means by
which to realize the Algerian nation, they believed, and thus the marabouts and their followers
had to be chastised. In each of Algeria’s major cities, a leading ‘ālim coordinated reformist
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efforts against marabouts: notably, Ibn Bādīs in Constantine, Muhammad al-Bashir al-Ibrahimi
in the northwestern city of Oran, and Ṭayyib al-Uqbi in Algiers. In talks in Constantine and in
his speeches and articles that reached across Algeria, Ibn Bādīs invoked the Qur’an to rail against
marabouts, and he accused them of “complacency” in the face of French colonialism.135 In
Algiers, Mahieddine Bachetarzi’s home, Ṭayyib al-Uqbi was even more outspoken and
aggressive in his attacks on marabouts.
Born in the eastern city of Biskra in 1889, al-Uqbi traveled abroad at a young age and
became an advisor to Sherif Hussein, Emir of Mecca and leader of the Great Arab Revolt against
the Ottoman Empire. He also served as editor of the reformist newspaper, El Qibla, during this
time, and after the First World War, he returned to Algeria and founded another paper, El Islah,
through which he promoted Salafism and attacked Sufism.136 Somewhat of a unique figure in the
Salafist community, al-Uqbi publicly supported some Jeunes Algériens, including Ferhat Abbas,
as well as the AOMA. And while most AOMA did not publicly attack Algerian Jews, al-Uqbi
was unusual in his outspoken support of the Algerian Jewish community.137 Al-Uqbi was
vehemently opposed to what he declared to be bida’ (unorthodox practices) and kharafa
(superstitions), both of which he attributed to brotherhoods and the zawiyas that connected
them.138 His inflammatory rhetoric provoked responses from marabouts and zawiya leadership.
They criticized his “divergent” interpretation of Islam, and they accused him of turning places of
worship into centers for “propaganda.” Sufis and Salafists even engaged in verbal and physical
disputes in the streets of Algiers, resulting in “incidents” which demanded police intervention.139
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These public incidents prompted the colonial government in Algiers to issue the “Michel
circulars” in February 1933, named after the Algiers prefecture general secretary. The circulars
severely restricted the teaching of independent Arabic at institutions under AOMA direction or
control, and Muslim preachers with Salafist leanings were prohibited from giving sermons at
state-controlled, official mosques. In response, Salafists and their supporters organized one of the
first large-scale protest demonstrations in the country’s history, which occurred after Friday
prayers on February 24, 1933. Demonstrators marched to the offices of the General Government,
where they condemned the general economic segregation of Muslim Algerians and celebrated
“the rightful spiritual head and social reformer” of Algiers, Ṭayyib al-Uqbi.140 In these clashes
between Salafists, Sufis, and the colonial government, the authority to control Algerian religious
space was at stake. The official mosques were important vectors through which the ACM and
their affiliates exerted colonial control over the Algerian Muslim community, and both the
French and their Muslim partners understood the threat that Salafist preachers posed to this
control. As Afaf Zekkour explains, “[t]his conflict over the legitimacy of the religious discourse
in Algiers’ mosques took place because of the threat posed by [the Salafists] to the official
“indigenous” representatives of the colonial power in terms of controlling the city’s Muslim
population. The mosques as public spaces were thus transformed into places of confrontation
between the official and independent religious discourses.” Salafists understood this significance
as well as their adversaries, but al-Uqbi nevertheless refused to preach at an official mosque in
Algiers until 1940.141 Instead, he and other Salafists turned to alternative spaces in order to
disseminate their message. Ṭayyib al-Uqbi became a prominent patron of Muslim musical and
theatrical productions, and it is in this capacity, as a benefactor of the arts, that his path crossed
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with Mahieddine Bachetarzi.142 Anti-Sufi rhetoric disseminating from religious sources had a
profound impact on public perceptions, and this was reinforced by similarly negative
representations of marabouts and their followers in artistic productions, including Bachetarzi’s
plays, in which he depicted Sufis as fools and lambasted them as “retrogrades.”143
Ṭayyib al-Uqbi was popular with some of the prominent bourgeois families that
patronized the Cercle du Progrès, and they made him the head of the Circle’s board of directors
in late 1930 or early 1931. His proselytizing and support of Salafist preachers from this position
contributed to the empowerment of the Algerian ‘ulemā, enabling the formation of the AOMA,
whose headquarters was based in the Circle of Progress’ offices at 9 Place du Gouvernement in
Algiers (now called the Place des Martyrs).144 Under al-Uqbi’s leadership, the Circle witnessed
its members growing more numerous and more diverse. Powerful Muslim families still formed
the backbone of the association, but increasing numbers of union laborers joined the Circle’s
ranks as well. Al-Uqbi also helped found the Shabiba association, a sort of subsidiary of the
Cercle du Progrès, which focused specifically on educating Muslim youths. There, Arab
educators taught male and female students French and Arabic lessons “in parallel,” so that they
could receive both a Western and an Algerian nationalist education.145 Notable students of
Shabiba included prominent Algerian authors and artists, and future FLN revolutionaries,
including Bouzekri Izza, who later married Abane Ramdane, one of the original architects of the
FLN’s political platform.
Al-Uqbi’s outspoken and controversial didactic style compelled the colonial government
to ban him from public preaching in 1933, not long after the demonstrations against the Michel
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circulars, but he continued to lead the Cercle du Progrès, to spread Salafist messaging, and to
organize Salafist-backed gatherings and events. In 1936, for instance, the Cercle du Progrès
hosted the founding of the Algerian Muslim Congress, a short-lived political body that brought
together delegates from multiple Algerian nationalist parties to discuss and implement means of
colonial reform and resistance. The Congress dissolved after the collapse of French Prime
Minister Léon Blum’s administration in 1937, but the hosting of its founding was one of several
prestigious opportunities that helped to solidify the Circle’s power and influence among
bourgeois and Salafist crowds. As we will see in later chapters, Mahieddine Bachetarzi and ElMoutribia became close associates of the Cercle du Progrès in the interwar period, and together
they all contributed to the monopolization of Muslim Algerian intellectual space by the salafiyya
movement.
Artists like Bachetarzi helped champion the salafiyya movement in other ways as well.
But, ironically, despite their vocal opposition to Maghribi Sufism, the ‘ulemā, the AOMA, and
their fans and followers were all inescapably influenced by pre-colonial Maghribi customs and
conceptions. Sufi practices of ancestral worship and saintly cults survived and were utilized by
the AOMA in an attenuated form, as were Maghribi and Islamic rhetorical devices and other
historical and cultural models. As McDougall says, “pre-colonial notions of inviolability, the
assurance of order, and the normative value of collective self-identification, clustered around the
figures of saintly intercessors” were repurposed and repackaged in new “iconic individuals” in
the colonial era, and especially in the interwar period.146 The Salafist historian Aḥmad Tawfīq alMadanī appropriated Maghribi cultural models and flipped them on their heads in his historical
narratives. He took the familiar pre-colonial notion of “saintly intercessors,” for example, which
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had long been applied to esteemed religious figures, and used it to glorify historical empires like
Numidia and Phoenicia, and historical political leaders like Jugurtha and ‘Abd el-Qādir.147 The
latter figure suffered extensive criticism from Muslim peers during his own time; some Muslims
accused ‘Abd el-Qādir of poor judgment and responsibility for Muslim deaths of at the hands of
the French. But Salafist historians like al-Madanī ensured that such criticism has been largely
erased from historical memory by retroactively constructing el-Qādir’s story as that of an
unambiguous hero of anti-colonialism struggling nobly against European imperial powers.148
With el-Qādir and many others, Salafists like al-Madanī incorporated and adapted the Maghribi
“normative model” of the “ancestor-figure” into national histories.149 Similarly, al-Madanī’s
histories often presented ‘the people’ as a “single, unitary category” and an “exemplary figure”
who was “hypostatized in the figure of the resisting fighter for independence.”150 As we will see,
al-Madanī deployed this imagery in mediums outside of history as well, including theater. In the
Algerian theatrical milieu, al-Madanī and Mahieddine Bachetarzi crossed paths, and Bachetarzi
notes his admiration for al-Madanī’s histories and plays in his Mémoires. And the FLN would
later wield al-Madanī’s histories and artistic productions as powerful tools in their propaganda
war against France.

Conclusion
Through their aggressive proselytization and their continual attacks on Sufis, zawiyas,
and marabouts, the AOMA effectively monopolized religio-political discursive space in the
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Algerian Muslim community. This is evident not only from the swelling numbers of Salafists in
Algerian associations and institutions, nor only from the growing pervasiveness of Salafist
rhetoric in most public discourses in Algerian Muslim society in the interwar period, but also
from the escalating frequency of violent confrontations between reformist Muslims and Sufis
noted in French colonial police reports. AOMA leadership generally refrained from such tactics
personally, but laypeople sometimes became so taken with their anti-Sufi messaging that they
literally attacked their religious adversaries when they engaged with them in public spaces.
Indeed, fans of the Salafists, like Mahieddine Bachetarzi, could be exceedingly antagonistic in
their discourse.
James McDougall refers to attempts by the ‘ulemā to claim sole authority to represent the
Algeria as attempts to “recolonize” the nation. He argues that the imposed Salafist “authenticity”
of the AOMA was really an “alienation” from older, more inherently Maghribi traditions.151 The
fact that McDougall uses the same term to described Salafist reform that Fanon uses to describe
Muslim assimilation is noteworthy. In Imagined Communities, Anderson describes the process
he calls “Germanization” or “Russification,” depending on the locus, by which a central
government imposes lingual regularity on a linguistically diverse populous for generally
pragmatic administrative reasons.152 In Peasants Into Frenchmen, Eugen Weber describes in
marvelous detail how the Parisian government undertook a similar project within its own country
with militant resolve.153 The similarities between Anderson’s “Russification,” Parisian
“Frenchification,” Jeune Algérien assimilation, and the AOMA’s “salafiyyication” are startling –
indicative, perhaps, that the AOMA was less of a unifying force than it claimed, and more of a
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centralizing force. As Mohamed Benrabah observes, the AOMA’s strategies suggest that they
learned from and adopted colonial models of administration and subjugation, even as they used
those models to oppose assimilation with the colonizing power and to affirm Algerian
autonomy.154
But the AOMA’s popularity was not merely a product of their aggressive methodology;
at bottom, their methods worked because sufficient numbers of Algerians found their ideology
inherently appealing. Many agreed with the AOMA that Islam in the Maghrib was in some ways
degraded, or degenerate. And Muslim Algerians, particularly young and educated ones living in
cities, found the AOMA so attractive not only because of their Islamic reformism, but also
because of the particular master-narrative of Algerian history that they constructed – a narrative
which supported young nationalists’ claims that an Algerian nation and an Algerian people
existed before and independent of France or any other imperial power. Benedict Anderson
famously argued that nationality is a “cultural artefact [sic],” and that the nation is an “imagined
political community” that, rather than being the actualization of some primordial essence, is a
historically contingent, conscious and active construction.155 Though not all of his prescribed
preconditions for nationalism apply equally to the colonial Algerian situation, his central thesis
holds. Every major nationalist party of the interwar period had a hand in the construction of an
Algerian master-narrative, but the AOMA were arguably the most influential political and
religious figures in this process.
Still, the AOMA did not build a master-narrative alone. As we shall see in the next two
chapters, the AOMA had considerable assistance in their quest to conquer the Algerian cultural

154

See Mohamed Benrabah, Language Conflict in Algeria (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2013), esp. Chapter 3.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York, NY:
Verso, 1983), 4-7.
155

78

milieu. Indeed, the ‘ulemā’s construction of a particularly Muslim-Arab historical teleology and
their monopolization of Algerian religious and nationalist discourse were only possible with the
assistance of other public figures, including historians like al-Madanī, but also artists, poets,
musicians, actors, novelists, playwrights, and others cultural producers. In particular, Mahieddine
Bachetarzi and his troupe, El-Moutribia, played a large and active role in spreading Jeune
Algérien and especially Salafist ideologies through music and theater.
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CHAPTER 4. “THIS MUSIC IS OURS”
PATRIMONY, INTEGRATION, AND THE ANDALUSI MUSICAL REVIVAL

Language stands halfway between the visible forms of nature and the secret conveniences of
esoteric discourse. It is a fragmented nature, divided against itself and deprived of its original
transparency by admixture; is a secret that carries within itself, though near the surface, the
decipherable signs of what it is trying to say. It is at the same time a buried revelation and a
revelation that is gradually being restored to ever greater clarity.
Michel Foucault156

In 1915, when Mahieddine Bachetarzi was seventeen years old, the Grand Mufti of the
Djama’a el-Djedid (“New Mosque”) in Algiers, Shaykh Boukandoura, granted him the position
of hazzab – a public reader of the Qur’an. As musicologist Habib Hassam Touma has explained,
many in the Muslim community consider Qur’anic recitation to be a skill not unlike singing, and
it is both an honor and a privilege to be allowed to recite the Qur’an before an audience.157
Traditional regulations dictated that no man be named a hazzab before his eighteenth birthday,
but ever since young Mahieddine had first entered the Qur’anic school several years earlier, he
and Shaykh Boukandoura had grown progressively closer, connecting over their shared love of
Arab music. During that time, Shaykh Boukandoura had periodically overheard the boy
practicing his Qur’anic recitation, and the youth’s voice had so impressed the Grand Mufti that
he deemed it acceptable to make an exception to customary age requirements in this case.
Around the same time, Shaykh Boukandoura recruited Mahieddine into his choir, the
Quessadines, and entrusted him to the tutelage of three respected vocal instructors. Mahieddine
was also named a quessad, or cantor, at the mosque. The continual encouragement of his
teachers and the constant exercise of his craft as a hazzan, quessad, and choir member honed his
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skills quickly, and introduced him to the wider world of the Algerian musical circuit and the
Muslim Algerian elite. Shaykh Ibn Bādīs, the revered ‘ulemā and future leader of the AOMA,
invited the Quessadines to sing before him in Algiers, and other Muslim notables invited
Mahieddine personally to sing at mosques across Algeria. By the time he was twenty-one,
Mahieddine had been named the bache hazzab, or master of readers, at the Djama’a el-Djedid.
It was not long before people outside of the Muslim community took notice of his talents.
Prominent Jewish-Algerian Andalusi musicians and ethnographers like Mouzino and Laho Seror
saw Mahieddine perform and offered bits of advice and vocal instruction. These men also had
connections with the burgeoning Algerian nationalist scene, especially with members of the
Jeunes Algériens, and it is possible that they helped Bachetarzi establish his first contacts with
these groups. Meanwhile, the famous French composer, Charles-Camille Saint-Saëns, often
wintered in Algiers to escape the cold Parisian climate, and he became close friends with the
mayor, Charles de Galland. De Galland introduced Saint-Saëns to Andalusi music, and he fell in
love with it. During World War One, Saint-Saëns and de Galland saw young Mahieddine
perform with the Quessadines, and they were so impressed that they subsequently invited
Mahieddine to give private solo performances for them at Saint-Saëns’ lodgings.158 All of these
connections influenced Bachetarzi and buoyed his ascendance, but one relationship in particular
shaped the future of his career and his life more than any other.
In late 1918, an Algerian composer and musicologist named Edmond Nathan Yafil
(1874-1928) heard Bachetarzi perform for the first time. Yafil was obsessed with the
performance and preservation of Andalusi music and, although he was Jewish, he had a talent for
“sneaking” into mosques to witness such music being performed.159 On one occasion, he heard
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young Mahieddine, in his position as bache hazzab, reciting verses from the Qur’an. He was
impressed. After the service, Yafil approached Bachetarzi and started a conversation. Yafil won
him over with his musical erudition, and he suggested to Bachetarzi that his talents might be of
better use outside the cloistered environment of the Djama’a el-Djedid. Initially skeptical,
Bachetarzi came around when learned how much more money a singer could make in France
than in an Algerian mosque. He agreed to travel to France, recording and performing Andalusi
music for mixed audiences.160
The opportunity thrilled the young Mahieddine, but his family was dismayed. They
accused him, in so many words, of abandoning them and of selling out Islam and the Andalusi
patrimony to a sly Jewish businessman. They distrusted the Yafil reflexively because of his faith,
and they resented the suggestion that Mahieddine share the Andalusi repertoire with a nonMuslim audience. Furthermore, they could not understand how a career as a secular musician
could possibly be more rewarding or beneficial than a more reserved, quiet life as a cantor at the
local mosque. But the pleas of his family did not sway the teenage boy; he wanted to travel the
world and to make money while doing it. Eventually, Yafil and Shaykh Boukandoura brokered a
deal, whereby Mahieddine would continue his studies in Algiers for two years before leaving for
France. During this time, he could perform and record music with Yafil, so long as it did not
interfere with his work at home or at the mosque. All parties were satisfied, and Mahieddine’s
future course was set.161 In his work with Yafil, he became aware of the opportunities available
in the wider world. He himself admits in his Mémoires that, without Yafil, he might never have
left Algeria, let alone used a centuries-old musical tradition to explore uncharted social and
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musical territories.162 Indeed, that fateful meeting set the course for the rest of Mahieddine’s life,
in which he would master and expand upon the Andalusi repertoire and, in doing so, explore
multiple historical narratives of the Andalusi musical tradition and, indeed, Algerian national
history itself.
In 1924, at age twenty-six, he embarked upon the first of many tours of France that he
personally organized, performing Andalusi music in major cities across the “l’Hexagone.” He
sang mostly in Arabic, but both French and Algerian immigrant audiences flocked to the
concerts. On this trip, he met Si Kaddour Ben Ghabrit (1868-1854), an Algerian religious leader
who had had the idea years earlier to build a mosque in Paris to symbolize the “eternal union” of
France and Islam.163 By the time of the 1924 tour, the mosque neared completion, but still
Bachetarzi agreed to help drum up financial support for the closing phases of construction by
lending his voice to several radio advertisements.164 Islamic doctrinal attitudes toward music
have historically been ambivalent. Poetry is discouraged by the Qur’an, but moderate Muslim
religious and political leaders have tolerated music, and some have even patronized the musical
arts.165 But even those with more liberal attitudes toward music have often scorned the thought of
sharing Arab music, and especially religious music and recitations, with non-Muslim audiences.
Some Muslims have regarded their repertoire as a patrimonial heritage, a cultural legacy of the
Islamic world, and sharing it with the West was thought to allow room for corruption or
cooption. As the Andalusi musician Shaykh Muhamad Ben ‘Ali Sfindja (1844-1908) once told
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French ethnomusicologist Jules Rouanet (1858-1944) when asked to perform the adhan, or
Islamic call to prayer, for European listeners, “This music is ours…it must die with us.”166
Thus, the inauguration of the Grand Mosque of Paris, slated for July 1926, carried
multiple meanings and layers of significance. The Sultan of Morocco, a patron of the arts and a
proponent of French-Maghribi cooperation, asked Bachetarzi to participate in the occasion, and
he happily agreed to be the first mu’adhdhin (in French, muezzin), or “person who proclaims the
adhan,” of the new mosque. By agreeing to be the first person ever to proclaim the adhan before
a mixed audience of Muslims, Jews, and Christians in France, Bachetarzi thumbed his nose at
generations of customary practice. He made public the religious music that many Muslims
believed should be kept private, and he highlighted his own vocal talents, rather than allowing
himself to be subsumed by the music – to remain an anonymous vector for the music that many
considered a communal possession without individual ownership, authorship, or interpretation.
But there is no sign of shame or ambivalence in his Mémoires as he describes the moment,
Arriving on the platform from which I dominated the city, the Seine, and its islands, all
spread out under a blue sky that was worthy of Algeria, I felt a kind of vertigo...and then,
at the moment when chants broke out down below me (this was my signal), I, the quessad
of the Djama’a el-Djedid, launched with all my voice, for the first time in Paris, the call
of the muezzin.167
Bachetarzi’s pride in this passage is palpable, and there is even more at play here. By describing
the Parisian landscape and linking the sky above it to his Maghribi homeland, Bachetarzi
connects the metropole and the colony, the West and the Arab world, and by harkening back to
his time as a quessad in Algiers, he fashions himself as a cornerstone of this cultural bridge.
Instead of shielding Islamic music from European ears, nor even projecting shame at having
lowered his shield, Bachetarzi embraces the role of a cultural ambassador between Algeria and
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France. In subsequent decades, Bachetarzi would temper his enthusiasm for this role; he even
expresses some regret for his actions in this capacity in other passages in his Mémoires. But, in
the mid- to late-1920s, he was deeply enmeshed in the Andalusi musical revival, and his
acceptance of French listeners is indicative of the general thrust of the movement at this time.
In the previous chapters, we discussed the Algerian sociopolitical atmosphere at the turn
of the century and in the interwar period, and we tracked the so-called nationalist ‘movement’
from its relatively moderate beginnings to its cooption by the Salafist ‘ulemā of the AOMA. As
has hopefully been made clear already, the Algerian nationalist movement of the interwar period
was really more of a collection of similarly minded but independent and oft-opposed movements,
rather than a singular one. Discussions, debates, and even clashes between different Algerian
activists and religious and political leaders were just as common and important to the
development of Algerian nationalism as were encounters and conflicts with the French colonial
government. The Association des oulémas musulmans algériens (AOMA) eventually emerged as
the dominant organization among Muslim nationalists, but the ‘ulemā did not singlehandedly
pull young, educated Algerians into a full embrace with the salafiyya movement; they had help.
Historians, journalists, novelists, poets, artists, actors, and musicians – many of whom were
young, educated, and hailed from prosperous Muslim families – likewise embraced Salafism,
and they played equally important roles in the dissemination and naturalization of Salafist
ideology.
In Domination and the Arts of Resistance, James C. Scott defines a whole class of
cultural productions as “hidden transcripts” – mediums by which subordinate groups can express
their political opinions without threat of reprimand or reprisal from the dominant group. As Scott
argues, hidden transcripts may not be hidden in a literal sense, but they are in some way
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obscured so that subordinates cannot be held directly responsible for their contents. These hidden
transcripts stand in opposition to “public transcripts”, which are generally disseminated by the
dominant class and officially approved.168 In the realm of MENA studies,169 several scholars
have followed this line of thinking. Ziad Fahmy has effectively argued that popular culture in
pre-1952 Egypt was a space in which public and hidden transcripts merged, and thus was a
vehicle by which to disseminate and shape Egyptian nationalism.170 Nancy Y. Reynolds has
argued that Egyptian consumer culture served the same kind of function, both disseminating
nationalist ideas and shaping popular nationalist thought.171 In both of these examples, popular
and consumer culture were ‘Scottian’ transcripts writ large. They were not necessarily
completely obscured, nor were they unabashedly critical or unambiguously supportive of
dominant groups, but they did provide relatively safe spaces in which to disseminate nationalist
ideas, process them, and apply them in local contexts.
Christopher Silver has applied these scholars’ ideas to the Maghrib and built on them. In
his article, “The Sounds of Nationalism,” he has shown how a famous Moroccan musician, Samy
Elmaghribi, helped to digest the kinds of academic nationalistic ideas coming from foreign and
domestic elites in the mid-twentieth century into a more general “Moroccanism” – a sort of
wide-reaching nationalism, stripped of classist, religious, or ethnic particularities – universal
enough that the Moroccan masses could proudly cling to it, regardless of socioeconomic or
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ethnoreligious distinctions.172 Following this line of thinking, I contend that Mahieddine
Bachetarzi pursued a somewhat similar strategy in Algeria. Indeed, will show in this chapter and
the next one that Bachetarzi and his peers utilized Andalusi music and Algerian theater as
Scottian transcripts with which to explore and disseminate nationalist ideas among the entire
Algerian Muslim community, regardless of social or economic distinctions.
A child of the rich cultural center of Algiers, he grew up alongside prominent
nationalists, and supported them and their activities practically from the moment he entered
adulthood. But like the different nationalist parties with whom he associated, Bachetarzi
manifested different interpretations of nationalism at different times through different mediums.
Before he became a playwright, he made a name for himself as a singer and composer of
Andalusi music, the genre with storied origins in the Muslim kingdoms of al-Andalus. In his
songs and performances of this music, and in his activities within this musical milieu, Bachetarzi
tended to project a moderate interpretation of Algerian nationalism. This is due in part to the fact
that the Andalusi musical revivalist movement of the early interwar period entailed a significant
amount of interaction and even cooperation between Muslims, Jews, and Europeans – especially
in its early stages in the mid- to late-1920s. The Andalusi musical revival was defined partly by
dual obsessions with particular interpretations of modernity and with an ostensible return to
original sources, and in this way the discourse of the revivalist scene reflects Salafist discourse.
But it is really not until the 1930s that we start to see more uncompromising rejections of
Western cultural influence among Andalusi musical practitioners and a more exclusive focus on
uplifting the Muslim community, indicating the encroaching influence of Salafism and the
concurrent radicalization of Algerian Muslims in a colonial context. Most fans and creators of
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Andalusi music agreed that the genre itself had potential as a tool of uplift, but many Algerian
musicians in the early years of the interwar period also saw Europeans as coequal partners in
Andalusi revival, and they saw Western culture as something in some ways worth emulating.
In this chapter, we will examine Mahieddine Bachetarzi’s early work as a singer and
composer of Andalusi music, and the ways in which his work intersected with, reflected, and
even deviated from the most prominent strands of nationalism in Algeria at this time. As we shall
see, the Andalusi musical revivalist milieu in its early stages was largely representative of more
moderate nationalists like the Jeune Algériens, who openly emulated Western culture and sought
French approval. Bachetarzi’s activities and contributions to the Andalusi musical revival of the
interwar period seem likewise indicative of a positive disposition toward multiculturalism and
the West. His work in the Andalusi musical milieu illustrates some of the ways in which interwar
Algerian nationalists engaged with the French colonial government and with Europeans in
general, as well as with their fellow Algerians. These engagements showcase conflict, but they
also demonstrate the degree to which interwar nationalism entailed negotiation, accommodation,
and even cooperation between different ethnic and religious groups. However, we will also see in
this chapter that Bachetarzi’s activities in the Andalusi musical revival reflects the general thrust
of Algerian nationalism across the country, in that his actions grew more radical over time and
his engagement with Europeans and Jewish Algerians lessened as his eagerness to stress the
Arab-Muslim aspects of the musical genre increased.

The Nūba, and the Historical Origins of the Andalusi Repertoire
The core of the Andalusi musical tradition is the nūba, a complex suite form born in alAndalus, specifically in the cities of Qurṭubah (Córdoba) and Gharnāṭah (Granada). The nūba
itself consists of five vocal movements linked by instrumental sections. The movements vary
88

slightly from country to country across the Maghrib,173 but they invariably serve to highlight
individual performers’ talents.174 The central nūba suite forms the foundation of a network of
pieces, all belonging to the Andalusi repertoire, cumulatively referred to as the “nūba complex.”
While the nūba itself is highly formalized and rather serious in tone, it is ‘surrounded’ in the
nūba complex by lighter pieces, like the qṣāyid, the inqilāb, the qādriyya, and the istikhbār.175
The istikhbār, an unmetered vocal or instrumental improvisation that often accompanied the
performance of a nūba, is generally well-liked by audiences, and it happened to be a particular
strength of Mahieddine Bachetarzi’s.176 But while the lighter pieces, like the istikhbār, tend to be
fan favorites, practitioners and other experts consider the nūba itself to be the sacred core of the
repertoire, and one’s ability to perform it is the metric by which Maghribi classical musicians are
measured.
Many practitioners and patrons, as well as many nationalists, consider the Andalusi
musical repertoire to be the cultural patrimony of Algeria – a musical heritage passed down
through the generations from the kingdoms of al-Andalus. Anthropologist Jonathan Glasser
describes patrimony as a “body of things of such value and significance to the nation that to part
with them puts national sovereignty and self at risk,” and he credits post-1789 France as the
“workshop” of this modern conception of “patrimoine.”177 Compounding this definition, Glasser
cites Pierre Bourdieu, who observed that this modern conception of patrimony melds in Maghribi
culture with the older Islamic idea of waqf or ḥabūs – “Islamic endowments,” or “inalienable”
collective possessions.178 Bourdieu noted that the concept of waqf governed local land
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distribution in North Africa prior to the arrival of the French, and it frustrated French attempts to
privatize land after 1830. The concepts of patrimoine and waqf seem to merge in the Andalusi
repertoire, an intellectual property that long composed part of Maghribi self-identity, as well as
an inalienable heritage of the Andalusi Islamic community. As such, it has often been claimed or
coopted by the sorts of nationalists and elites described in the previous chapter, who try to paint
the repertoire’s significance in the same broad strokes with which they paint many aspects of
Algerian culture and history. But the specific manifestations and meanings of the Andalusi
repertoire vary widely from time to time, from region to region, from group to group, and from
person to person across Algeria. Even the “standard narrative” of the nūba’s Andalusi origins
simplifies what was likely a much more complex process of migration and cultural diffusion.179
Despite the likelihood that the modern conception of the Andalusi repertoire as a cultural
patrimony is derived from a mixture of Western and Arabo-Muslim ideas, the standard narrative
of the birth of the Andalusi genre depicts its roots as geographically Mashriqi and culturally
Arab-Muslim – and nothing else. According to legend, and at least partly confirmed by historical
records, a debate broke out in Baghdad in the early ninth century between “followers and
opponents” of traditional Arabian musical guidelines.180 Abu l-Hasan 'Ali Ibn Nafi', better
known as Ziryāb, was a student of Isḥāq al-Mawṣilī, court musician of the Abbasid Caliph Hārūn
ar-Rashīd. The strict conventions of Arabian musical tradition frustrated the innovative Ziryāb,
and because of his musical prowess, al-Mawṣilī feared that his student would replace him as the
court musician in Baghdad and betray the traditions he valued so highly. Under fire from his own
master, Ziryāb fled Baghdad for al-Andalus, where he joined the court of the Umayyad Sultan
‘Abd ar-Raḥmān II and flourished. He brought traditional Arab music to the Iberian Peninsula,
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but was free there to expand on it, to introduce new modes and methodologies, and thus to create
new music. Ziryāb founded a school of music in Qurṭubah and there created the “nucleus” of
Andalusi music. His style of music proliferated and spread to nearby cities. From the thirteenth
to the fifteenth century, in the wake of Spanish invasions, Andalusi migrants fled to North
Africa, which thus became the “heir” of the Andalusi school of music.181
Or so the story goes. But, like the constructed narratives of Algerian national history we
analyzed in the previous chapter, it is oversimplified. Historical records suggest that Ziryāb did
exist and that most aspects of his legend are true, but he was not the only person responsible for
the development and growth of Andalusi music. Rather, he is the only one typically remembered
by Algerian historians of Andalusi music. Carl Davila has shown that Ziryāb’s role may have
been exaggerated, and that several figures were crucial to the development of Andalusi music, as
well as to its transportation to the Maghrib. He shows, for instance, that some of the changes
Ziryāb made to the Arab suite that would ultimately become the nūba were really just
recommendations for performances given to lay audiences, rather than strict codifications.182
Additionally, there is no evidence that Ziryāb ever used the word “nūba” (or, in classical Arabic,
“nawba,” meaning “shift” or “movement”) to refer to his creations. Not until the thirteenth
century was the word “nawba” applied to this specific form of composition, by a Tunisian
anthologist named Aḥmad al-Tīfāshī. Al-Tīfāshī also codified and expanded the nūba, giving it
the “aesthetic unity” that solidified it as singular and selfsame genre of music.183 Other figures
were influential too. Al-Tīfāshī himself credits Ibn Bājja, a twelfth century Moorish philosopher,
with incorporating the “songs of the Christians” into the Andalusi tradition – a change to the
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form which became immensely popular and ultimately stuck. But even the nūba as devised and
codified by al-Tīfāshī bears little resemblance to the modern nūba found in North Africa. The
standard narrative of Andalusi music acknowledges the shift in locus of Andalusi musical
production from al-Andalus to the Maghrib, but it takes little account of the actual effects that
local Maghribi cultures had on the music.
In the way that the standard narrative erases or silences these local variations and
multiple cultural influences, it reflects the AOMA’s nationalistic master-narrative of Algerian
history. As Davila explains, the Andalusi musical milieu is defined by an “erudite culture.”184
Practitioners and patrons alike commonly associate the nūba with urbanity, education, and
sophistication. This culture of erudition tends to portray Andalusi music as a uniform genre and
as the purview of privileged and educated classes. But the diffusion of this “erudite” music into
local Maghribi circumstances demonstrates that it became a truly “trans-Mediterranean” art
form.185 Cultured and educated migrants from al-Andalus, either fleeing Spanish violence or
moving for other reasons, formed tight communities with other migrants in North Africa, where
they became economically, politically, culturally, and spiritually influential. Among these
communities, Andalusi music served as a “sociocultural marker” by which migrants could
identify and relate to one another.186 Sharing and performing this music together, and with other
members of their new Maghribi homes and neighborhoods, these communities adapted the genre
and, over time, different localities developed slightly different styles. This is evident in the fact
that there now exist distinctly different nūba styles across Algeria today – in Algiers, Tlemcen,
Oran, and so on. These differences attest to the impact of local culture on inherited practices.
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Carl Davila has thus shown that the nūba took different shapes in different Algerian
communities after its transplantation from al-Andalus. Not only different in its presentation and
performance, the nūba was also interpreted by different communities in different ways. The nūba
is a long and complex form of music, both technically challenging and sonically morose. The
Andalusi musical milieu is also a rather severe and serious atmosphere, full of both practitioners
and patrons who regard their music with no small measure of piety. But the reverence and
seriousness with which Maghribi musicians regard the nūba derives not just from its technical
difficulty, but from the historical and cultural associations it summons. As Glasser explains, almafqūd, or “the lost”, is a “central conceit” of the Andalusi musical tradition.187 Many North
Africans remember al-Andalus nostalgically as a cultural high-water mark for Muslim
civilization. In many North Africans’ historical memories, al-Andalus represents something close
to a utopian society, lost to the degradations of time and the depredations of marauding
Spaniards. They call it “al-firdaws al-mafqūd,” or, “the lost paradise.” The Andalusi musical
repertoire is one of the last mementos of this lost paradise, hence its purported national
significance.
Jérémy Geudj elaborates on this idea, arguing that Judeo-Arab music, like the nūba,
highlights the “collective perception” of migrants in exile and shows the “modalities of living in
exile.”188 Not just al-mafqūd, but also ghorba (“exile”), fourqa (“separation”), and ouahch
(“nostalgia”) are crucial undertones throughout Andalusi music. The distinction between these
concepts, especially between al-mafqūd and ouahch on the one hand and ghorba and fourqa on
the other, is subtle but significant. While al-mafqūd and ouahch refer to feelings of loss after the
fact, ghorba and fourqa refer specifically to the phenomenological experience of loss in the
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moment. These feelings were widespread amongst Maghribi communities after the fall of alAndalus, but specific ethnoreligious groups experienced these feelings in different ways. For
Muslims, the fall of al-Andalus represented the end of one of the highest points in the history of
Islamic civilization. In exile, Andalusi music thus reminded Muslims of their illustrious cultural
heritage. For Jewish North Africans, the experience of loss recalled by Andalusi music was
perhaps less severe but also more multifaceted, for the exile from al-Andalus was of course just
one in a long line of exiles in the history of Jewish peoples. For both of these reasons, Jews have
at times both been credited with creating and preserving the ‘heavier’, more somber elements of
the nūba repertoire.189 Meanwhile, of course, none of these associations were particularly salient
for European listeners, who, despite in some cases being intensely involved in the production and
preservation of Andalusi music, tended to regard it more as an archaeological oddity than as a
vibrant and deeply meaningful expression of culture and heritage.
But while different ethnoreligious groups may have experienced the impact of the nūba
repertoire in different ways, it is also important to stress the ways in which Andalusi music
united these groups. Nadir Marouf has shown the importance of the “social origin” and
sociopolitical usages of Andalusi music, and these represent points of convergence for Algerian
Jewish and Muslim communities. He notes that Andalusi music is a hybrid of many different
musical styles, from Catholic Spain to the Afro-Berber Sahara, and he stresses that the “double
semantics” of Andalusi music indicate the multiethnic, social origins of the music. For example,
the style of Andalusi music popular in Algiers is called san’a. Marouf notes that the word
“san’a” can also mean “work” or “craft.” Many other words have similar dual meanings, and
Marouf argues that this is because many practitioners of Andalusi music historically were
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workers, artisans, and craftsmen. In addition to cafés and family backyards, Maghribi musicians
often performed in their workspaces, which were equally public forums. The farms, markets,
factories, and commercial districts in which these musicians/artisans gathered and performed
were richly multiethnic spaces, and this diversity seeped into the musical milieu as well.190 As
craftsmen and customers from different ethnic backgrounds gathered to perform and to listen to
music together, their communities grew closer and more culturally homogenous. Some
distinctions remained, but it is clear that Andalusi music served as a powerful rallying point for
Algerians, regardless of ethnoreligious status. This statement extends to Europeans to some
degree as well, especially musicologists and ethnographers, some of whom became important
figures in the Andalusi musical revival.

Revivalism in Contexts: Rouanet, Yafil, and the Limits of Integrationism
In 1905, Algerian Governor-General Charles Jonnart, a liberal patron of the Arab arts in
the French colonies, presided over the fourteenth meeting of the International Congress of
Orientalists in Algiers, the first time the conference had been held outside of Europe. With the
help of an organizing committee composed of local Muslim scholars, colonial experts in
indigenous affairs, and “resident Orientalists,” the occasion drew hundreds of participants from
Algeria and abroad.191 One of the main attractions at the event was a showcase of Arab music,
organized and presented by French journalist and musicologist Jules Rouanet. Introducing the
gathered musicians with a lecture, Rouanet called them “the last musicians possessing the
[Andalusi] repertoire. They no longer have students, and soon their entire music will fall into
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oblivion.”192 He imparted upon his audience the fact that this music was dying out, and that it
must be preserved before it was too late. It was, to him, one of the last vestiges of a glorious, but
lost, civilization, the Muslim kingdom of al-Andalus, and a testament to the ancestry of peoples
who had, in his mind, not advanced since the fall of Granada centuries earlier. It was, too, a vast
literary artifact which, properly cared for by rational and scientifically minded Europeans, could
be sustained and revitalized; and, properly utilized, it could help to rejuvenate European musical
production.
Opposite Rouanet at this presentation was one of the most revered Andalusi musicians in
Algeria: Mohamed Ben ‘Ali Sfindja, a shoemaker and, in his free time, a master practitioner of
the Andalusi repertoire, so well-known and loved in the Algiers Casbah that a café had been
named after him. He played at that café often through the years, and it is likely that a young
Mahieddine Bachetarzi saw him perform there on occasion. Sfindja seems to have participated
happily in Rouanet’s presentation at the 1905 Congress of Orientalists, perhaps agreeing with
Rouanet’s belief that Andalusi music risked extinction and needed preservation. However, even
at such an occasion, Sfindja told Rouanet specifically that he would not play religious music, nor
perform religious singing. He went so far as to threaten to leave the event if he was asked to play
religious music, or if another musician even so much as performed the Muslim call to prayer
before a European audience. As he told Rouanet, “this music is ours…it must die with us.”193
As a whole, the fourteenth Congress of Orientalists displays many of the intellectual
currents and methodologies flowing through the Andalusi musical revival in Algeria in the early
twentieth century, from the archaeological uncovering of Europeans like Jonnart and Rouanet, to
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the austerity and introversion of Muslim practitioners like Sfindja. Especially noteworthy for our
purposes here, though, is the evident extent to which Europeans involved themselves in the
revivalist movement. As has been indicated previously, both European and ‘indigenous’
Algerian communities considered different varieties of integrationist thought at this time,
advocating for some degree of melding of both cultures in service of a more unified society. But
French and Algerian motivations for such integration were markedly different. Algerians, by and
large, wanted more equitable political representation in the French colonial system and saw
integration as a means to achieve this. The French, meanwhile, looked to integrationism, or
“associationnisme” as they often called it, as a solution to the inherent tension between
colonialism and France’s purported central ideals. As Todd Shepard explains, “the concept of
association offered a rationale – ‘the mission to civilize’ – for why the French Republic,
supposedly committed to ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ and the Rights of Man, had embarked on
the conquest and domination of millions of people across the globe.”194 The Andalusi musical
revivalist movement was but one of many arenas in which Algerians and colonists applied
integrationist ideologies. In this space, the congruences and the divisions inherent within these
different interpretations are typified by the working relationship between Edmond Yafil and
Jules Rouanet.
The revivalist movement peaked during the interwar period, but its roots stretch deeper
into the historical soil. Some officers in the French military’s Bureaux arabes, swayed by
Napoleon III’s vision of a “royaume arabe”, took an interest in Andalusi music as early as the
1860s, and they transcribed the music they heard in Algiers and others cities. ‘Native’ Algerians
had also transcribed the nūba and other Andalusi pieces over the years, though their
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transcriptions rarely left their close-knit circles of practitioners and patrons.195 In this sense, both
‘indigenous’ Algerians and colonists had taken an interest in ‘revival’ in some form or other long
before the twentieth century. But the Andalusi musical revival, as such, entailed a dramatic
increase in the interest in and frequency of transcription of Andalusi music, as well as an
explosion of other forms of musical production and distribution. “Revival” as a concept also
came to feature more explicitly in and shape discourse, though what the word meant specifically
varied depending upon whom one asked. With these notes in mind, it is reasonable to assert that
the revivalist movement really took off in 1904, when Edmond Yafil, in partnership with Jules
Rouanet, published the Majmūʻ Al-Aghānī Fi al-Alḥān Min Kalām al-Andalus (“The Collections
of Songs and Melodies from the Words of al-Andalus”), a massive compilation of Andalusi
music. A landmark text in the Andalusi musical milieu, the Majmū’ demonstrates that AlgerianFrench partnership defined the revivalist movement from an early point, and indeed Yafil and
Rouanet’s relationship is in some ways just as foundational to the Andalusi musical revival as
the texts they produced. Their partnership produced some of the most influential and enduring
compilations of the Andalusi repertoire, and their different viewpoints set the tone for revivalist
discourse in the interwar period. But their bitter disagreements and their eventual falling-out also
reveal how contentious the debate over the repertoire’s significance could and did eventually
become. They were both passionate about Andalusi music, its preservation, and its transcription,
but they disagreed fundamentally about the purpose of their work, and the meaning of the
Andalusi repertoire to Algeria.
The exact conditions of their first meeting were not recorded, but Yafil likely would have
become aware of Rouanet before that time. Rouanet had served as director of the École de
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Musique du Petit Athénée in Algiers before taking a more active interest in revivalism. Yafil,
meanwhile, was, like Bachetarzi, a child of Algiers. Born in 1874 to a family of restauranteurs,
he grew up around the government center, and he loved to frequent the cafés maures of the
Casbah. He listened to Sfindja perform often and he developed a passionate interest in gathering
the texts of musical compositions, Andalusi poems, and lyrics. This passion was not unusual, but
what set Yafil apart was his desire to publish and sell the texts to the public. Thus, Yafil and
Rouanet had similar objectives – to preserve and reinvigorate Andalusi music – but their reasons
for doing so, and their goals for the project, differed widely.
Jules Rouanet in many ways exemplifies the colonialist strand of Andalusi revivalism. In
Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said describes and analyzes the ways that European authors,
artists, and intellectuals participated in the imperial process by benefitting from and normalizing
the colonial system, and by solidifying “Us” versus “Them” conceptions of colonizers and the
colonized.196 Rouanet was one of many Frenchmen caught up in the ‘Andalusi-mania’ that swept
Europe around the turn of the century, and they facilitated just the sort of normalization and
otherization that Said describes, at times going even further, wittingly or not. Such revivalists’
desire to ‘preserve’ and ‘revive’ Andalusi music was often genuine, but their inherently
colonialist and imperialist perspectives blinkered the ways in which they perceived the repertoire
and its practitioners, and they also directed their goals in predictably Eurocentric directions.
Rouanet, believed that the study of Arab music could help “restore” and revitalize European
music, and that musical revival might help revive some of the past cultural glory of al-Andalus in
the contemporary Muslim world. This interpretation of revival became an “exercise of colonial
domination,” as Rouanet and his ilk were less interested in Arab music for its own sake than

196

Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), xxii-xxvi.

99

because of its potential utility to European audiences.197 Other European ethnographers like
Francisco Salvador Daniel and Alexandre Christianowitsch preceded Rouanet and shared his
colonialist conceptions and motivations. Salvador Daniel viewed Arab music as more than the
“barbarous cacophony” which many of his peers lambasted it as, but he nevertheless situated it
within his own Orientalist vision of a static culture, frozen in time and, until he ‘found’ it, lost to
progress.198 The Russian Christianowitsch meanwhile, in his Esquisse historique de la musique
arabe aux temps anciens, catalogued both contemporary and medieval Arab music, and traced
the lineage of the music back to ancient Greece and Arabia. Like Rouanet, he juxtaposed Arab
culture’s past glories with its current, supposedly decadent state.199
Jules Rouanet therefore fit into the typical colonial revivalist mold; he was interested in
the preservation and performance of the Andalusi repertoire, but his conceptions and his
intentions were inextricably linked with the French colonial project. Meanwhile, Edmond Yafil
was a native-born Algerian, and his interests in Andalusi music were arguably ‘purer’. Yafil was
like many of his Algerian peers in the revivalist milieu in that his primary motivation for his
work was passion; he simply loved Andalusi music and wished to perform it, record it, and share
it. He was also similar to many of other Algerians in that he believed European methods of
transcription, recording, and musical reproduction could revive and sustain the Andalusi
repertoire. But just as Rouanet was but one of many European revivalists, Yafil was but one of
many Algerian revivalists, and comparison with other Algerians in the revivalist movement
actually reveals just as many ways that Yafil was unique in his time as ways that he was similar
to his peers.
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Ghouti Bouali, an Arab instructor at a French-Arab school in the northwestern city of
Tlemcen, published the Kitāb kashf al-qinā’ ‘an ālāt al-samā’ (“Book that Unmasks Audio
Instruments”) around the same time a Yafil’s Majmū’. In the Kitāb, Bouali stresses the fact that
the Andalusi repertoire is disappearing and in need of restoration, and he proposes a modernizing
melding of Arab and European musical notation by suggesting that Western staff notation be
added to Arabic lyrical transcription.200 However, unlike Yafil, Bouali’s rhetoric is overtly
political and in line with the reformist discourse espoused by the AOMA and discussed in the
previous chapter. The Kitāb freely merges musical revivalism with Arab-Islamic religious and
nationalistic politics and cites key texts and figures in Arab-Islamic history, like the Qur’an and
Ibn Khaldun. Bouali argues too that Andalusi musical forms like the nūba and the qṣīda are
elaborations of Arabic, which he insists is central to the repertoire. Bouali also finds space to
criticize Sufism and the worship of saintly figures in his compositions. In this way, Bouali’s
Kitāb actually anticipates some of the more radical nationalistic rhetoric that would not become
commonplace until the latter half of the interwar period.201
Thus, we can see that, in some respects, Yafil’s revivalism was actually milder than that
of his Muslim Algerian counterparts. Like other Algerians, he believed that the repertoire was in
danger of disappearing, and that modern transcription methods could restore it. But his rhetoric
was never so overtly nationalistic as those like Bouali, and, given his Jewish faith, it was
certainly never so centered around Islamic history or doctrine. Indeed, because he was Jewish,
the nūba repertoire did not carry quite the same ethnoreligious import for him that it did for
Muslims. Yafil was not so ideologically attached to the repertoire, and he was willing to
transcribe works exactly as he received them from his contemporary practitioners, without trying
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to remove modern influences or personal interpretations, unlike other revivalists like Rouanet
and Laho Seror. Yafil therefore found himself in a rather unique ideological position; unlike the
Europeans, he did not see revivalism as an archaeological exercise or a project of colonial uplift,
and, unlike Muslim Algerians, he did not see it as a religious/nationalist exercise either.
Yafil further distanced himself from some of his Algerian peers by not only to
transcribing and recording Andalusi music, but by trying to profit from it. Drawing the ire of
both Muslim and European revivalists, Yafil sought to copyright his transcriptions, effacing the
widespread, if oft-unspoken, agreement in the Andalusi musical milieu that the repertoire was
composed of public, authorless works, inspired and produced by the entire Andalusi community
collectively. Yafil’s attempts to copyright Andalusi pieces and to sell his recordings violated this
tradition, angered many Muslim practitioners, and ultimately proved one of the fatal fractures in
his relationship with Jules Rouanet. Some of this anger came across in written criticisms of the
Majmū’, which called it a “very poorly done work crammed with giant errors,” or derided it as a
work “inspired more by a spirit of lucre than by a disinterested artistic preoccupation.”202 The
nationalist historian Aḥmad Tawfīq al-Madanī, the associate of the AOMA mentioned in the
previous chapter, praised Yafil’s efforts and intentions, but claimed that the Majmū’ contained
“many large errors.”203 Yafil eventually found partnership with Mahieddine Bachetarzi, who
took no issue with Yafil’s methods despite being a Muslim. In fact, Mahieddine would expend a
good deal of ink later in his life defending the actions of his Jewish-Algerian mentor and friend.
The numerous publications they released between 1900 and 1930 illustrate Rouanet’s and
Yafil’s philosophical differences. The major work of this period was their Majmū’ ‘al-Aghani
wa-l-Alhan min Kalam al-Andalus, released in 1904. Yafil rightly called this massive
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compilation “the most complete chansonnier to date of the so-called Andalusian poems that
remained in use among the Arabs of Algeria and which date back to the sumptuous epochs of the
occupation of Spain.”204 Contemporary criticism tends to portray Rouanet as the driving force
behind the work, but the truth is that the Majmū’ was almost entirely Yafil’s project. The content
of the Majmū’ overwhelmingly consists of Andalusi song texts, organized by mode and
movement, as well as some notes on musical performance. But the compilation also features a
short introduction, written in colloquial Arabic, and a preface, written in French. The French
introduction, directed at a diverse audience, laments the “disappearance” of the nūba repertoire
and lambasts the “excessively jealous” possessors of this repertoire, who hoards its secrets to the
detriment of its lifespan.205 The Arabic-language introduction, meanwhile, addresses a
specifically Maghribi audience in more personal terms. He bemoans that their patrimony is being
“destroyed” and “separated” from them every day, and promises that this compilation may help
to restore peace of mind to lovers of the Andalusi musical tradition.206 In the opening paragraphs
of the Majmū’, Yafil hereby lays out his intention to preserve a repertoire he believes to be
fading, to revive it, and to share it with a wide audience of “Arabists”, Arab laypeople, and
music-lovers around the world.
Published in series between 1900 and the late 1920s, Rouanet envisioned the Répertoire
de musique arabe et maure as a supplement to the Majmū’. It features numerous transcriptions of
types of Andalusi music that fall outside the core of the nūba complex. Mohamad Sfindja gave
much of the work to Yafil, who in turn passed it along to Rouanet. But while Sfindja and Yafil
may have been the driving forces and primary sources behind the Répertoire, Rouanet is its
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unmistakable curator, presenting the transcriptions to an almost exclusively European audience.
Works are written in European staff notation, lyrics and commentary are written in French, and
the content itself gives subtle indications of Rouanet’s colonialist-revivalist aims.
In particular, Rouanet refers to the Andalusi repertoire as the “manifestations” of an
“advanced civilization,” and as the “vestiges” of Muslim peoples’ “artistic greatness,” positioned
historically between Greek and Gregorian music.”207 The clear implication in these passages is
that this “greatness” has faded; Greek music and Gregorian music are presented unambiguously
as relics of the past and, by positioning it between them, Rouanet positions Arab music in the
past as well. Rouanet portrays himself as an archaeologist, uncovering the lost remnants of a
bygone, much more glorious Arab society by sifting through modern corruptions and confusions.
“To accomplish this,” Rouanet says, “it was necessary first, through long years of observation, to
get used to hearing this music, to understand it by listening every day to the most famous
performers among those who remained faithful to traditional forms. After this preparation, we
noted the melodies with repeated hearing, dissecting, in a way, the work heard, stripping it of the
artifices and ornaments that each performer adds according to the degree of his virtuosity and in
the middle of which it was necessary to recognize the melodic line to preserve.”208 Again,
Rouanet’s choice of words is significant. He makes clear that, unlike Yafil, he has tried to
remove modern additions and innovations from his collection. There is an apparent disdain for
modernity in his work, in the context of musical transcription; modern European methods are
used only as much as necessary to record and preserve the music, and practitioners’ personal
additions to the repertoire are eliminated wherever possible. But modern European methods are
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nevertheless used; Western modernity is omnipresent in the work. To Rouanet, Andalusi music
was a living (but slowly dying) relic of a former golden age – one which ended long ago – and it
must be preserved without modern trappings. But the very methods by which Rouanet sought to
preserve it were inherently modern. Ironically, this attitude, while perhaps more appropriate for
the archaeologist than the ethnographer, aligned Rouanet more closely with many Arab shuyūkh
than did Edmond Yafil’s unprejudiced embrace of whatever Andalusi music he heard in the
moment. Laho Seror, for example, seems to have worked closely with Rouanet on the
Répertoire, helping him especially with the stripping away of modern innovations.
The Majmū’ and the Répertoire reveal Yafil’s and Rouanet’s subtly different
interpretations of ‘revival’ in the context of the Andalusi musical milieu. For decades, these
differences were not enough to create any great tension, but, over time, they grew in severity. As
mentioned above, Yafil attempted to copyright the works in his Majmū’, to the chagrin of
Rouanet and many other revivalists. Meanwhile, Rouanet became deeply entangled in colonial
politics, opposing Governor-General Jonnart’s attempts at liberal reform and supporting the
colonial status quo, which was clearly advantageous to Europeans and disadvantageous to
Muslim and Jewish Algerians.209 An unnamed journalist labeled Yafil nothing more than a
“human phonograph.”210 Rouanet accused Yafil of having “debased” the Andalusi repertoire
with his monetizing schemes.211 Yafil fired back, pointing to Rouanet’s colonialist interests and
dismissing him as merely a “transcriber” who was seeking to profit off of the work of others.212
Yafil and Rouanet ended their partnership in part because of disagreements about how
the music should be shared and reproduced. But, at its core, theirs was a debate over the
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repertoire’s cultural and historical significance. Despite the criticisms that Yafil weathered for
his modern methods of transcriptions and his attempts to copyright sections of the repertoire, the
music was nevertheless part of his ethnic and cultural heritage, and, in the midst of the
burgeoning Algerian nationalist movement, it took on extra profundity as an expression of
‘Algerianness.’ But Rouanet was French, and he therefore could never see the repertoire through
anything but a colonist’s eyes. Even as he lambasted Yafil for his supposed greed and
opportunism, Rouanet still reported to the French colonial government and operated as an agent
of it, thus tainting any claims to authenticity he might make. The disagreements and divisions
that ultimately drove Yafil and Rouanet apart reveal the limits of integrationism in the interwar
period. Integrationism in the revivalist context brought them together, but their different
interpretations of the significance of the repertoire, and beneath that, of the motivations for and
objectives of integration, may have doomed their relationship from the beginning.
The Yafil/Rouanet ‘breakup’ occurred in the late 1920s, and Mahieddine Bachetarzi
suggests in his Mémoires that he was by this time already aware of the follies of
integrationism.213 However, it is more than likely that this is a retrospective attempt to save face
– one of several throughout the memoirs. An examination of Bachetarzi’s work in the Andalusi
milieu, of his time with the El-Moutribia musical troupe, and of the general associative trend in
the urban Algerian community at this time, will reveal that Yafil was but one of many Algerians
swept up in the integrationist movement at this time. In fact, Bachetarzi went even beyond Yafil
in his emulation of and appeals to French culture. Indeed, if we track his career through the
1920s and 1930s, we can see the wave of integrationism crest and recede, and we can see the
undercurrent of Salafism encroaching and growing ever stronger.
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Nationalist Revivalism: El-Moutribia and the Associative Movement
In 1901, the French government passed the Law of Associations, which permitted the
proliferation of amateur and semi-professional collectives organized around particular crafts,
practices, or communities. Pitched as the “inheritor of the spirit of the French Revolution”, these
secular associations were intended to reinforce French laïcité and to counteract the influence of
the clergy in French society.214 However, the associative spirit quickly spread to Algeria, where
historical Maghribi “proto-associative” organizations and spaces like unions, clubs, cafés
maures, and Sufi zawiyas adopted the new legalistic mold. Today, the association is a
“ubiquitous social form” in Algeria, but the first ones to officially register with the French state
were all based around either sport or music.215 Indeed, the first Andalusi association founded in
Algeria was the Orchestre Yafil et Rouanet, founded in 1905 and renamed El-Moutribia216 in
1912, when it was officially registered under the Law of Associations.
Modernist revivalism was inculcated in the associative milieu, and El-Moutribia was no
exception in this regard. The association itself was seen as a modern institution, a sociopolitical
body in the Western mold with modern conventions like formal concerts in professional venues.
This was attractive to many bourgeoise Algerians, as it lent a degree of legitimacy to amateur
and semi-professional practitioners, who did not immediately garner the same prestige as old
shuyūkh217 like Sfindja. Modernism was very much in vogue in the Andalusi community too
because the repertoire was widely understood to be endangered and in need of “salvage and
enlightened renovation.”218 In this context and in others, modernism in Algeria often came to be
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equated with Westernism in the interwar period. Andalusi associations took a lesson from
contemporary European acts and highlighted vocal soloists (like Bachetarzi) where they had
once let them blend in with other instrumentalists. Associations grew in size, departing from the
more traditional quartet or quintet structure and slowly morphing into something closer to a
European orchestra. They also made significant strides in modernizing the processes of
reproducing Andalusi music by recording and printing their performances. In short, the
associative movement was instrumental in taking the Andalusi repertoire “out of the homes” and
into public forums.219 In all of this, associations like El-Moutribia led the way in creating new
spaces in which to perform and share Andalusi music – spaces that were not necessarily
indigenous or traditional, but often more European.
In other respects, though, El-Moutribia was a fairly traditional vector for the spreading of
the Andalusi repertoire. In particular, the music performed by the group remained strictly
Andalusi classical music, and in this we see some of the bounds of Andalusi revivalism. While
many practitioners across Algeria participated in the Andalusi musical revivalist movement with
new methods of performance and transcription, few dared to touch the music itself. As
mentioned above, the nūba repertoire had patrimonial significance that rendered it virtually
untouchable for many Algerian practitioners, especially Muslims. Edmond Yafil’s Majmū’ was
noteworthy not just because of its massive size and scale, but because of Yafil’s willingness to
incorporate modern innovations to the repertoire, manifest in the personal musical choices of the
performers he recorded. Whereas Jules Rouanet and Laho Seror strove to rid their Répertoire of
any modern vestiges, Yafil embraced them. His motivations for this may have been suspect,
given the possibility for profit that these changes enabled, but the Majmū’ was nevertheless a
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trailblazer in this sense; it paved the way for Mahieddine’s bolder, more obvious changes to the
repertoire that would come in the 1920s and 1930s.
Mahieddine Bachetarzi joined El-Moutribia in 1926. His star was already rising by this
point, and Yafil, equally impressed by his industriousness as by his vocal abilities, soon made
him vice president of the association. Around the same time, Yafil became the head of the
Algiers Conservatory of Music, and so took a backseat to Bachetarzi in the daily operations of
El-Moutribia. Now essentially the bandleader, manager, and star of the orchestra, Bachetarzi
took El-Moutribia in new directions, incorporating original pieces, new genres of music, and
even dramatic productions. Bachetarzi mixed the nūba repertoire with European styles of music,
like jazz and flamenco, and he mixed classical Arabic lyrics with colloquial Arabic, French,
Spanish, and Hebrew. This was all highly unorthodox in the Andalusi musical milieu, but, in
some ways, Bachetarzi’s genre and linguistic mixing was quintessentially Algerian. Indeed, it
was ideologically aligned with Bachetarzi’s integrationist interpretation of Algerian nationalism.
Christopher Silver has shown how the singer Samy Elmaghribi spread a popular, easily
digestible form of Moroccan nationalism that Silver calls “Moroccanism.” Moroccanism was a
strain of nationalism influenced by intellectual elites, but more easily diffused into local contexts
throughout the multicultural plane of 1950s Morocco. Similarly, Mahieddine Bachetarzi used the
medium of Andalusi music to capture the spirit of Algerian interwar integrationist nationalism.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the AOMO, and later the FLN, tried to frame Algerian
nationalism in a strictly Arab-Muslim context. The FLN would eventually argue that Algeria was
inherently Arab and Muslim, implicitly denying the nationality of other ethnoreligious groups.220
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But Bachetarzi’s early work with El-Moutribia acknowledged and even celebrated the multiculturalism that defined colonial Algeria.
As early as 1921, Bachetarzi made his integrationist inclinations evident through action.
Between that year and 1923, he recorded sixty-six songs with Edmond Yafil, and he performed
at charity events across the country, where his setlists contained a “curious mix of Arab and
French songs…in the spirit of ‘fusion’ that was in vogue.” He claims that the result of this
mixture was a “happy exchange” that fostered Arab “openness to the world” and also introduced
Islamic arts to European communities.221 He goes on, “This practice of placing art above all
ethnic and denominational differences raised hopes for a broader mutual understanding, and it is
natural that we, the young Muslims of that time who were waiting, somewhat vaguely, for
something ‘new’, gave ourselves to it with ardor.”222 He says too that these concerts reinforced
his passion for Andalusi music, which dominated Edmond Yafil’s “fêtes mauresques,” or
“Moorish festivals.” Bachetarzi says that, in retrospect, that moniker reeks to him of “colonialist
exhibition,” but that it did not bother him at the time. They gave him the opportunity to showcase
his talents and to play his beloved style of music. They also provided a platform to mix genres. It
was at one of these Moorish festivals that Bachetarzi put on his first comedic sketch, modelled
after French vaudeville acts, but also after Arab religious festivals like Mouloud and Ashura.
Bachetarzi claims that performances delighted audiences of all ethnic and religious backgrounds,
but he appears less proud of them in retrospect than he was at the time.223
One of the most retrospectively controversial actions of Bachetarzi’s integrationist period
was his performance of the French national anthem, “La Marseillaise,” in Arabic. He mentions
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one specific performance in 1923 in Palestro (now called Lakhdaria), a town about forty miles
southeast of Algiers, but suggests that he performed the anthem in Arabic on many other
occasions. He claims that such performances were always very successful with audiences, but
anticipates that readers of his Mémoires, upon learning that he sang the French anthem, will
accuse him of being an “agent of colonialism” or a “traitor to his country.”224 The fact that he
prepares for such criticism shows the degree to which the nature of colonial discourse had
changed between the interwar period and the 1960s, and it also shows how much Bachetarzi’s
perspective had changed as well. He defends himself, stating that, at that time, “integration was
the agenda for most of the Muslim public. We had not yet realized that it could only be a
deception.”225 He notes with amusement that different audiences interpreted the meaning of his
performances in different ways. French listeners, he says, took his Arabic Marseillaise at face
value, assuming it to be an affirmation of the singer’s love of France. Integrationist Algerian
listeners took it as an affirmation of their values. But Bachetarzi implies that young Algerians
“who already dreamed of freedom,” heard the true meaning of his performance: a call for
freedom that “took the words the colonizer had taught us” and “directed [them] back at him like
a bullet.”226
With this quote, Bachetarzi implies that he was already skeptical of integrationism by this
point in the early 1920s, but his actions suggest otherwise; it is likely instead that he is
retrospectively assigning himself such skepticism in order to save face, knowing that most of his
readership in the 1960s was staunchly anti-French. Indeed, Bachetarzi embarked on his first tour
of France with El-Moutribia in 1924, and the orchestra gladly played for European audiences. He
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sang the majority of his songs in Arabic, but mixed in French lyrics too (“rare exceptions,” he
assures his readers, “…only temporary”), with a similar proportion of genre mixing as well.227 In
early 1925, he performed at a multi-religious charity event in the Algerian city of Oran and
displayed no qualms about the melding of cultures, religions, and genres that occurred.228 Indeed,
he was even glad that his performances could prove to French audiences that Andalusi music is a
legitimate art form, indicating his then still-evident desire to win over Western listeners. And of
course, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Bachetarzi was at the forefront of perhaps the
crowning moment of French-Algerian integrationism: the opening of the Grand Mosque of Paris
in 1926. His call to prayer, coupled with more performances of La Marseillaise across the
country, spurred a French-Algerian newspaper, L’Echo d’Alger, to dub him the “Caruso of the
Desert.”229 Such obviously integrationist actions won him membership in the prestigious Société
des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs de musique (S.A.C.E.M.), which he happily accepted in
1929.230 He was only the third North African ever to join the French association.
Whatever the extent of his internal misgivings, Bachetarzi nevertheless portrayed himself
through his actions as a staunch integrationist throughout the 1920s. But his performances before
mixed audiences, linguistic combinations, and genre-melding innovations came at a contentious
moment in the Andalusi musical revival. In the previous chapter, we discussed, among other
things, how Algerian nationalism became more public and more radical during the interwar
period. Just as the ‘ulemā centered their strand of Algerian nationalism around Arab-Muslim
culture and history, so too did some purists within the Andalusi musical community seek to
highlight the repertoire’s Arab-Muslim roots, at the expense of other influences. Mahieddine’s
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politics and his changes to the nūba repertoire made him incredibly popular with francophone
audiences in Algerian and France, but he ran afoul of some within the Andalusi musical
community, and even of some within El-Moutribia itself.
Around the time of Edmond Yafil’s death in 1928, new Andalusi associations began forming
around other disciples of Mohamed Sfindja. In 1927, the Jewish musician, Mouzino, one of those
who had first taken an interest in Mahieddine Bachetarzi along with Yafil, formed his own
association, called El Mossilia. This group was short-lived, as Mouzino died in the same year as
Yafil, but other associations soon followed. Breaking away from El-Moutribia, El Andalousia
formed with the intention to propagate “the true Arab-Andalusi classical music which the tunes
of the fox-trot and the refrains of the café-concert have the tendency at the present time to
completely deform.”231 The thinly veiled affront to El-Moutribia was clear. The group was, like
El-Moutribia, made up mostly of Algerian Jews, but its focus on playing strictly nūba music
differentiated it from its predecessor. In 1930, two Muslim members of El Andalousia broke off
from the group to form their own association, El Djazaïria. Glasser has called the formation of
El Djazaïria a “signal event” for the Andalusi musical community, because it was the first
predominantly Muslim association in Algeria and because it became very closely and openly
linked with Algerian nationalist groups.232 But while ethnoreligious distinctions are important,
Glasser stresses too that the socioeconomic differences between El-Moutribia and El Djazaïria
were also significant. El-Moutribia was mostly composed of working- and middle-class
musicians, while El Djazaïria was more representative of the Algerois Muslim elite. It was this
same ethnoreligious-plus-socioeconomic group that, as we saw in the previous chapter,
dominated Algerian nationalist discourse in the interwar period.
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Bachetarzi insists in his Mémoires that these other associations never grew as popular as
El-Moutribia because their programs were “too modest,” never stepping outside the musical
bounds of the of the localities in which each one formed (e.g., El Djazaïria, formed in Algiers,
played exclusively san’a, the Algerois brand of Andalusi music). Apparent contradictions
abound, as Bachetarzi quickly follows this seemingly implicit endorsement of integrationist
revivalism with an assertion that El-Moutribia, despite its mixed Muslim/Jewish makeup and its
multicultural program, never benefitted “Jewish music…No. Only Arab music.”233 This
unsolicited remark speaks to integrationism’s fall from favor (as well as antisemitism’s
ascension) in the decades after the 1920s. Bachetarzi provides a much more explicit
condemnation of integrationism later in his Mémoires. “It seemed to us,” he says, “that this was
the way to achieve equality with the French community…We wanted the same rights, but
without losing our [Algerian] personality…we were driven by perfect sincerity at that time, but
today, in light of events that have passed since, it is clear that we were pursuing a perfect
utopia.”234

Politicization and Radicalization through Music and Action
In A History of Arabian Music, Henry George Farmer reminds us that Islamic doctrine is
highly conflicted about the merits of music.235 Because of this, Tony Langlois argues that music
in the Arab world is often implicitly political, even when politics are not explicitly referenced.
Politics, he elaborates, are often made manifest in music through the exercise of power,
especially through the regulation of who can perform and listen to music, and where and when
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music can be performed.236 As we have seen, the Algerian nationalist movement expressed
power similarly by delineating the bounds of Algerian nationality, identity, and history. In the
Andalusi musical milieu, these two restrictive frameworks melded quite naturally. Leo Plenckers
describes how the growing influence of Algerian nationalists in the interwar period led to a wider
dispersion of Maghribi cultural forms, like Andalusi music, and clear sociopolitical messaging in
the naming of music and musical associations.237 When it comes to this increasing politicization
of musical performance, Mahieddine Bachetarzi was no exception. Clearly, his attitude toward
integrationism changed in the years between 1920 and 1968, when he published the first volume
of his Mémoires. In fact, his mind began to change much earlier, as political developments in
Algeria betrayed Europeans’ selfish intentions. Already politically active by the end of World
War One, Bachetarzi grew more politicized throughout the interwar period, and his politicization
coincided with a gradual radicalization that pulled him further from the integrationist camp and
the first-generation Jeunes Algériens and closer to the Salafists of the AOMA.
As early as 1918, Bachetarzi was already fairly politically active. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, he convinced many fellow singers and musicians to come together in that year
to form a union and advocate for higher pay. He also co-founded the Amicale des étudiants
musulmans with prominent nationalists like Chérif Benhabylès. Bachetarzi intended these
actions to strengthen Muslim solidarity, but the organizations he founded relied heavily on the
French state to function. But events in the 1920s eroded his confidence in the French colonial
government. Observing them, he felt compelled to become even more politically active and to
rely more heavily on his own associations and his Muslim coreligionists. A significant moment
came in 1930, with the Centenary of the French invasion of Algeria. Former Governor-General
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Maurice Viollette, a leftist who took office in 1925, had wanted the Centenary to mark a “new
beginning” for Muslims and Europeans in Algeria.238 A socialist, Viollette sought to liberalize
the Algerian colonial state in ways that may very well have pleased moderate nationalists like the
Jeunes Algériens. However, he faced significant pushback from conservative colonists and was
chased out of office in 1927, replaced by Pierre-Louis Bordes, “who was fully committed to
colonization.”239 This was a harsh blow to Bachetarzi’s confidence in the ability of the colonial
state to reform itself. The Centenary itself added insult to injury, as Bordes “reconstituted” the
French Expeditionary Army of 1830 and marched it through the streets of Algiers. Bachetarzi
calls this event a cruel “humiliation,” and recounts with shame his recruitment into the
proceedings. The Governor-General commissioned him to perform a cantata, written by the
Office of Indigenous Affairs, at a gala thrown by the government. He claims to have been
“caught up” in the moment and agreed to perform. When the time came, he found himself before
a largely Arab audience. The mixture of reproachment from his compatriots and coreligionists
and the weight of his own shame compelled him never to participate in such an event again.240
Another humiliation came the following year, when El-Moutribia performed at “l’Exposition
Coloniale,” an event produced by the colonial government. Initially, the performance seemed a
success and Bachetarzi saw no issues. But, as he toured the exposition, he saw “Africans and
Asians assembled to satisfy the exotic tastes” of European orientalists.241 This turned out to be
another shameful performance like the cantata at the Centenary, and it was perhaps the final
blow to Mahieddine’s integrationist convictions.
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Beginning in the late 1920s and increasingly so with these successive humiliations,
Bachetarzi focused his energies more and more on the uplift of his coreligionists. Starting around
1927, he shifted the focus of El-Moutribia’s “fêtes mauresques” from multicultural exposition to
a sort of cultural opposition to “bals arabes” (“Arab balls”), orientalist events organized by
Europeans which, “under the guise of amiable paternalism,” really only exploited Arab
performers and only benefitted European-owned venues and businesses.242 Bachetarzi also
shifted the focus of El-Moutribia’s French and European tours from mere entertainment to Arab
solidarity. He began booking concerts in specifically Algerian immigrant neighborhoods, much
to the delight of those who lived there. These tours were financially disastrous, much to Edmond
Yafil’s displeasure, but Bachetarzi felt it worth it for political reasons. Si Kaddour Ben Ghabrit
helped to spread the word of these tours each year when they came to France.243 Bachetarzi also
toured the Maghrib, educated fellow performers about the dangers of the music industry, and he
helped enlist Maghribi artists in S.A.C.E.M., ensuring greater financial stability for them.244
Bachetarzi also eschewed the conventions of the Andalusi milieu by catering to a wider
socioeconomic range of listeners. As mentioned above, Andalusi music had long been the
purview of elites, considered a sophisticated music for erudite listeners and bourgeois patrons.
Bachetarzi came from a bourgeois Muslim family, but he hated to be considered bourgeois
himself. As he says in his Mémoires, “I was always concerned above all with conveying the
streams of ideas that interested all Algerians at that time.”245 He says that bourgeois artists seek
self-expression, whereas he sought always to express will of all Algerians Muslim collective. He
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even goes so far as to call bourgeois introspection antithetical to the Muslim character.246 It was
this thinking that compelled him to perform for a wide variety of audiences in a multitude of
places across the country – not just in major cities, but in small towns and villages, too. It was
also this line of thinking that compelled him to mix classical Arabic lyrics – the norm in
Andalusi music – with Algerian dialectal Arabic, thus enabling more Algerian Muslims to
understand the music’s lyrical content.

Conclusion
Thus, we see how Mahieddine Bachetarzi lost his integrationist convictions and grew
more and more focused on his own coreligionists throughout the late 1920s and 1930s. But,
despite his views growing ever so slightly more radical during this time, Bachetarzi still tended
to avoid explicitly nationalistic language. And yet, as early as 1918, he had connections with
Algerian nationalists in both Algeria and France. He had met several members of the Jeunes
Algériens during the early days of his musical career, when he had toured with Yafil as a solo
artist, and he had performed for the AOMA leader, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Ibn Bādīs, as part of
the Quessadines choir. And, of course, as mentioned earlier, after World War One, he cofounded the Amicale des étudiants musulmans with a number of Jeunes Algériens and ‘ulemā.
During the early interwar years, Andalusi musicians in El-Moutribia and other associations grew
increasingly connected with the Jeunes Algériens, but a significant shift was coming that would
result in many Algerian artists aligning with even more radical nationalists. For Bachetarzi, this
shift happened rather suddenly and unexpectedly. This event would fundamentally change his
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conception of Algerian religious practice, and would ultimately compel him to align himself ever
more closely with the salafiyya movement and the AOMA.
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CHAPTER 5. MAHIEDDINE THE MORALIZER:
THE DIDACTICISM OF ALGERIAN THEATER
AND THE INTRANSIGENCE OF FRENCH COLONIALISM

Where is there a more enjoyable way to gain experience than in the theater? Where do we find
more striking examples? Where does one find a greater intensity of life? I say therefore that the
theater is a school of life…I do not know how to congratulate [the founders of Algerian theater],
who knew how to launch it despite everything that is against it. I am speaking here both of the
crisis that is raging, and of all those who want to keep in ignorance those whom they exploit.
La Voix Indigène247
In October 1929, after a “great tour” of France with El-Moutribia, Mahieddine Bachetarzi
returned home to Algeria, where a friend promptly invited him to a wedding feast being thrown
by a wealthy tobacco grower in the port city of Bougie (now called Béjaïa), about one hundred
forty miles east of Algiers.248 In his Mémoires, Bachetarzi describes walking through the halls of
this grower’s estate and noticing adornments and idols indicative of “ancestral customs” which
he felt “no longer corresponded at all with modern practice, and which, moreover, did not have
an Islamic origin.”249 In all likelihood, what he observed were vestiges of pre-Islamic Maghribi
culture with more modern Sufi Islamic dressings. Bachetarzi recalls discussing the experience
afterwards with friends and taking stock of the “many customs, peculiarities and shortcomings,”
which he felt were “based only on the stubbornness of clinging to the past and the fear of
anything new.”250 The incident inspired him to write a song, entitled “Min-el-Djahli” (“O, This
Ignorance!”), in which he skewered the kinds of customs and peculiarities that he observed at the
wedding feast.
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Bachetarzi performed his new song for the first time at the Municipal Theater in the
western city of Blida on November 13. In attendance at this performance was the nationalist
historian, Aḥmad Tawfīq al-Madanī, who, as we have previously discussed, was a close
associate of the AOMA and who later worked for the FLN government. After the concert, alMadanī approached Bachetarzi and expressed his approval of the new song. However, he also
advised that such sentiments might be better expressed through theater, which was then only just
beginning to blossom in Muslim Algerian communities. Al-Madanī told Bachetarzi that he
hoped El-Moutribia would soon be willing to put on performances in which music and theater
were totally separated, so that the morals and messages contained within the plays might not be
diluted by the distracting innocuousness of Andalusi music.251
Bachetarzi envisioned himself as an educator and unifier of the Algerian masses. To
some degree, this was accurate. His songs and plays encouraged secular and religious education
for men and women, they highlighted social issues and contradictions and injustices in Algerian
society, and, they called for Muslim unification in the face of European colonial occupation and
oppression. Many Muslim Algerians, especially young, middle-class, educated men, flocked to
El-Moutribia’s theatrical performances with the enthusiasm of people conscious of their
participation in a nationalistic exercise. But Bachetarzi’s entreaties to Algerian pride and unity,
genuine as they may have been, were consistently undercut by his shuttered conception of
‘Algerianness’ and ‘Muslimness.’ Even as he conveyed a multicultural and multiethnic
interpretation of Algerian identity, Bachetarzi still deplored those within the Algerian Muslim
community whom he viewed as “retrogrades” and “backsliders” – in particular, Sufi marabouts,
who had for centuries been one of the pillars of the Algerian Muslim community, but whom
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Salafist reformers believed to debase orthodox Sunni Islam.252 By the 1930s, Bachetarzi had
become closely affiliated with the AOMA, and he agreed not only with their politics, but with
their religious interpretations as well. Both he and the Salafist ‘ulemā viewed marabouts as
strange, mystical “puritans,”253 and they suspected the marabouts (sometimes justifiably) of
colluding with the French colonial government. And while the AOMA pursued the dismantling
of Sufi brotherhoods and zawiyas through political means, Bachetarzi attacked and discredited
the marabouts and their followers in his songs and plays, such as Djouhala Mouddaïna Fil-Ilm
(“The False Scholars”), Phaqo (“Poverty,” or “Wretchedness”), and Les Béni Oui-Oui (“The Yes
Men”).
Bachetarzi’s plays capture the multivalent and contradictory nature of interwar Algerian
nationalism, especially when they are contrasted with his musical work. Even as he combatted
French colonial authorities, invigorated young Algerians and intellectuals, and performed for and
accepted assistance from benefactors of all stripes, the content of his plays veered ever closer to
the line of AOMA Salafist ideology. In the way that it developed and came to dominate his
messaging, Bachetarzi’s shift toward ‘Salafism-as-nationalist-doctrine’ is indicative of the
general thrust of Algerian nationalism at this time. With Andalusi music, Bachetarzi painted a
more expansive, inclusive picture of Algeria, but with his original songs and especially with his
dramatic works, the borders of the picture were pulled inward, the image drawn less expansive.
Ultimately and somewhat ironically, in a fashion similar to that pursued by others in the
Andalusi musical milieu, Bachetarzi’s conception of Algerian theater as an educating and
modernizing force complemented Salafi reformists’ modernism by plucking selectively from the
Algerian past so as to construct a rigid and blinkered definition of the modern Muslim Algerian.
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Bachetarzi’s dramatic works therefore contributed to the Salafists’ construction of an ArabMuslim Algerian historical narrative and national identity, and they therefore reinforce the
argument that Algerian nationalism in the interwar period was itself a constructive, destructive,
and interminably contentious process.

The Origins of Algerian Theater
Despite a lifetime of contributions to Algerian dramatic theater, Bachetarzi once stated
that he agreed with the Scottish historian and orientalist, H.A.R. Gibb, who argued that theater is
not “innate” in Arab culture.254 Author Abdelkader Djeghloul has similarly described Algerian
theater as a “triple novelty” because of its supposedly new attitudes toward culture, socialization,
and popular experience. He argues that the use of satire, wordplay, and dialectal Arabic in
modern Algerian theater were all novel innovations; he argues that the kind of closeness between
performer and spectator that Algerian theater fostered was unprecedented; and he argues that
Algerian theater’s allowance for cultural, ethnic, and national “self-recognition” simultaneous
with “cathartic distancing” from the subject matter was also new.255 These assertions that theater
was in some way or other ‘new’ in Algeria implicitly reinforce depictions of the interwar period
as a time of Muslim nationalist ‘awakening,’ as the AOMA and the FLN would have one
believe, rather than a time in which various groups renegotiated the bounds and meanings of
preexisting cultural mores and traditions. Formal dramatic theater in the Western style may have
been novel in interwar Algeria, but theatrical historians Khalid Amine and Marvin Carlson
contest the assertion that pre-colonial North African ethnic groups shunned dramatic
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performance as a rule, showing instead that all of the elements described by Djeghloul had
historical antecedents in the Maghrib.
Amine and Carlson admit that Western theater is indeed not “indigenous” to the Maghrib,
but it did, they argue, mix with older Islamic and pre-Islamic dramatic forms upon its arrival on
North African shores.256 They lament that Western scholarship tends to portray the time period
after the Arab conquests as a “blank” space in Maghribi theatrical history, arguing instead that
the region has a “long tradition” of performing arts under the guise of “collective festivities and
quasi-sacred ritualistic formulae.”257 They remind us that, prior to European colonization, both
North and sub-Saharan African theatrical performances tended to emphasize “orature” over
written text, giving Western historians the false impression that there is a dearth of theatrical
material.258 Instead, they assert that public performance and storytelling were common and
culturally significant in the Maghrib long before Western theater was introduced. Within their
homes, a female storyteller, called a “settut,”259 would mix Islamic and pre-Islamic narrative
models and literary themes and motifs as she wove stories for her families and close friends.260
The reader might recall from an earlier chapter of this essay a quotation from Mohammed
Harbi’s memoirs, in which he recounts tales his mother told him of “Bijou,” a monstrous figure
in whom she melded ancient mythical monsters and much more recent historical figures. In
public settings, especially marketplaces, men called “gouwāl,” meaning “dramatic storyteller,”261
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put on a kind of interactive performance called “al-halqa.” This word also refers to the space
created by storyteller and listeners and in this context, al-halqa means “the circle.” Amine and
Carlson explain that orality and interactivity with the audience are crucial aspects of performance
within al-halqa, as the spontaneousness and intimacy give both the storyteller and the audience a
degree of control over historical events and narratives, allowing these stories to become “a part
of the community’s own history.”262 Amine and Carlson point out, too, that orality is critical in
Islam, and we have seen this in our discussions of Mahieddine Bachetarzi’s early life, when he
was so greatly honored by his appointment as hazzab and quessad at the Djama’a el-Djedid.
Other incarnations of Maghribi performative culture predate the introduction of Western
theater, and they also had a profound influence on Bachetarzi and his peers from an early date.
One example was the wa’da (plural wa’dat), a seasonal votive festival held for a given patron
saint. A prototypical expression of Maghribi Sufism, in which Islamic and pre-Islamic practices
merged, the wa’da was seen more often in rural areas than in cities, and it was considered by
some orthodox Sunnis and Salafists to be an archaic, heretical practice that debased Maghribi
Muslims.263 Nevertheless, even in the Algerian capital, some Muslims held wa’dat on occasion,
and Bachetarzi attended several when he was young. Rich with costumes, “buffoonish pranks,”
and dramatic exaltations, the wa’dat resembled an Algerian “kind of commedia dell’arte” and
undoubtedly influenced Bachetarzi in his early years.264 Khayal al-zill, or shadow theater, was
another popular style of performance, especially noted for its use of obscenity and satire for the
sake of social criticism. Carnivals like Aid-id-al-kabir (“The Great Festival”) and Aid-id-es-sghir
(“The Small Festival”) were occasions for masked and costumed performances, often featuring
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typical carnival archetypes like the wise man, the qadi, or judge, the corruptible authority figure,
and so on.265 As in other parts of the world, carnival in the Maghrib offered a rare occasion to
suspend and even flip the ordinary hierarchical power-structure.266 As we shall see, vestiges of
both the forms and functions of these performative events survived into the colonial period and
reappeared in Bachetarzi’s and El-Moutribia’s theatrical productions.
But, despite these early influences, and despite Amine and Carlson’s true assertion that
theater is not completely alien to Maghribis, it is true too that most Algerians were uninterested
in or unaware of formal dramatic theater in the Western style prior to World War One. European
colonists constructed theaters in major cities across Algeria, but considered them to be
“privileged entertainment” unfit for ‘native’ audiences.267 Mashriqi dramas appeared by the turn
of the century, but they appealed primarily to a group of urban, educated youths that was then
still very small. However, after 1918, Mashriqi troupes, especially from Egypt, began touring the
Maghrib and inspiring young Algerians to explore theater. In 1919, the Association des étudiants
d’Alger (“Algiers Students’ Association”), a formerly multiethnic organization that supported
students in a variety of activities, including artistic endeavors, made the formal decision to
exclude Muslims and Jews. This sparked a flurry of collective activity from young, urban
Muslims and Jews, including the creation of the Amicale des étudiants musulmans d’Afrique du
Nord, the foundation of numerous independents schools that taught the “national languages” of
literary and dialectal Arabic, and the foundation of numerous Muslim and Jewish associations,
including some of the musical associations discussed in the previous chapter.268 Additionally, the
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slight from the Students’ Association motivated some Muslims to begin to produce their own
dramatic pieces.
As early as 1920, Bachetarzi and El-Moutribia participated in “fêtes mauresques” meant
to celebrate Muslim Algerian culture and to showcase it to interested European colonists. At
these festivals, Bachetarzi infused performances of Andalusi music with brief comedic sketches,
modelled after the folk sketches performed for generations at the open-air religious festivals of
Mawlid (“Mouloud” in Maghribi dialectal), Ashura, and others. These folk sketches had
recurrent themes, characters, and motifs from which Bachetarzi drew – the wise man, the thief,
the faithful woman, the devious and plotting woman, the dangers of alcohol, the benefits of
science, and so on – and such recurrent characters and themes would have been familiar to most
Muslim audiences, who had seen similar archetypes in performances at religious festivals for
centuries.269 Middle Eastern cultural heritage continued to have an influence on Algerian theater
into the interwar period, as Bachetarzi, El-Moutribia, and others repeatedly drew on sources such
as One Thousand and One Nights for inspiration. Bachetarzi and others referred to these sources
not only because they were familiar to them, but also because they were familiar to their
audiences. Dramatic renditions of tales from One Thousand and One Nights pleased Algerian
crowds, while attempts to tackle French sources were usually met with ridicule.270
However, beginning in the early 1920s, luminary Algerian intellectuals invested more
effort in directly connecting Bachetarzi and other Muslims active in artistic associations with
professional theatrical companies from further east. In 1921 or 1922, Professor Mustapha Haffid,
a prominent Algerian academic and the founder of the esteemed Medersa El-Assria, introduced
members of El-Moutribia to the famous Tunisian actor and director Ouez-Ouez Bey. Bey invited
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the Moutribistes to put on a play with him at the Kursaal Hall in Algiers and permitted and even
encouraged them to perform and improvise in Algerian dialectal Arabic. Their performance drew
a meager crowd of three hundred people, many of whom were friends and personal
acquaintances, but the experience nevertheless proved that there was an appetite in Algeria for
theater.271 That same year, the prominent Algerian nationalist Emir Khaled invited famed
Egyptian actor Georges Abiad to Algeria. The Emir bought out the casino on the Rue d’Isly for
the occasion, and Abiad performed two plays there, both dealing with Islamic and quasinationalistic subject matter: Chahamatou El-Arab (“The Generosity of Arabs”) and Salah Eddine
(“Saladin”). Both performances drew relatively small crowds, but they were enthusiastic, and the
very occurrence of these productions inspired many young Algerian students, intellectuals, and
merchants to involve themselves with theater. Bachetarzi himself helped to sell tickets for both
productions, working closely alongside Emir Khaled in the process. The following year, the
Egyptian Azzeddine troupe toured Algeria and received a similarly small but positive
response.272
Around the same time, Mohamed Mansali, an Algerian “man of culture” and friend of
Bachetarzi’s, returned from a long stay in Beirut.273 He brought back with him several plays by
Lebanese dramatist Maroun An-Naqqash, including Fi-Sabil-El-Wathane (“For the Fatherland”),
which both Mansali and Bachetarzi loved, in no small part because it was written in Arabic. With
encouragement from Edmond Yafil, Bachetarzi and Mansali put on their own version of the play,
performed in literary Arabic, on the Kursaal stage in Algiers on December 29, 1922. Yafil led
the El-Moutribia orchestra as the musical accompaniment.274 The performance was a praised by
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the few young Muslim intellectuals who saw it, and it received a glowing review in Nouvelles,
which highlighted and praised its nationalistic undertones. But the journalist noted the sparse
number of “indigenous spectators” in the audience.275 The next production put on by Bachetarzi
and Mansali was Fath-El-Andalous (“The Conquest of Spain by the Moors”), which premiered
on June 18, 1923. Again, the audience was small, but they did not miss the play’s nationalistic
themes.276
Crowds grew gradually and modestly in size, but Bachetarzi’s vocal performances and
El-Moutribia’s renditions of traditional Andalusi music remained the main attraction for most
spectators. Algerian theater continued to flounder through the first half of the decade. It was not
until Selalli “Allalou” Ali published his first play, Djeha, in 1926 that Algerian theater really
began to draw national attention. Born in the Algiers Casbah in 1902, Allalou’s childhood rather
closely resembles Bachetarzi’s. Like Bachetarzi, Allalou was the son of a shopkeeper. His father
was a pharmacist, and Allalou grew up working in his father’s pharmacy. Recruited by Edmond
Yafil, he joined El-Moutribia around the same time as Bachetarzi, and it is there that the two
met; indeed, Bachetarzi calls Allalou his “friend from the first hour.”277 In his own memoirs,
Allalou does not dispute that the two were friends, but he does question the veracity of some of
Bachetarzi’s recollections. Allalou claims, for instance, that it was his idea rather than
Bachetarzi’s to add comedic sketches to El-Moutribia’s performances, in order to lighten the
heavy mood of Andalusi musical performance.278 Most of the points that Allalou debates,
however, are minor and basically irrelevant to our discussion. Regardless, in 1926, Allalou
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finished and published his first play, Djeha, which would become his country’s first theatrical
hit. It is for this reason that Allalou is often called the “father of Algerian theater.”279
Some reviewers believed Djeha to have been inspired by The Doctor in Spite of Himself
by the French playwright, Molière, but Allalou explains that the play is actually an adaptation of
“The Tale of Kamar al-Zaman” from One Thousand and One Nights.280 Djeha opens with the
character, Sultan Qaroun, worrying about his son, Prince Maimoun, who has come down with a
serious but unidentifiable illness. The Sultan dispatches two emissaries to find a doctor who can
diagnose and cure his son. Meanwhile, in a nearby village, Djeha, a more or less average fellow,
gets into a dispute with his wife. Djeha storms off from his home with his wife still angry at him
and, while he is away, the emissaries arrive in search of a doctor. Djeha’s conniving wife decides
to lie to the emissaries, telling them that her husband is a brilliant doctor who can surely cure the
prince. She figures that, when Djeha fails, he will be beaten by the Sultan’s men. That will show
him! When Djeha returns home, the emissaries try to recruit him, but Djeha insists he is not a
doctor. The emissaries assume he is simply being obstinate, and they beat him savagely with
canes. Wishing for nothing more than an end to the pain, Djeha finally relents and claims that he
is in fact a doctor. Brought to the prince’s quarters, Djeha finds Maimoun looking sickly indeed.
Lacking any better ideas, Djeha picks up a lute he sees in the corner and begins to play, hoping
to distract the prince from his discomfort. Deeply moved by the song, the prince reveals that he
is really not sick at all, but rather depressed because his father has arranged for him to marry a
woman he does not love and to abandon the woman he does love. Djeha devises a scheme. He
cunningly tells the Sultan that Prince Maimoun is indeed sick and that the only cure is for him to
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marry the woman he really loves, rather than the woman the Sultan has selected for him. Fearing
for his son’s life, the Sultan agrees, congratulates Djeha for his scientific brilliance, and orders
his court to celebrate the happy outcome with song and dance. The play concluded, the ElMoutribia orchestra produces the music to which the audience, taking the role of the court, can
dance.281
As we can see from this summary, Djeha plays on pre-colonial Maghribi dramatic
models and simultaneously satirizes old Islamic customs like arranged marriage. We see in the
character of Djeha a comedic portrayal of the wise man, as he is bumbling and foolish just as
often as he is clever and wise. The Sultan provides the wretched authority figure, though like
Djeha, he is more foolish and comedic than the archetypical standard. Meanwhile, Djeha’s wife
is a mischievous conniver, as women in Maghribi stories often are, but it turns out that Djeha is
just as much a trickster as she. Indeed, the story of Djeha in many ways resembles the famous
trickster tales of sub-Saharan African and African American cultures. In both types of stories,
protagonists are often portrayed as physically weaker than their opponents, and they must
therefore rely on their wits and their cunning to outsmart and outmaneuver their antagonists. As
Lawrence E. Levine explains, this sort of story helped enslaved Africans and their descendants
make sense of their oppressive conditions in the Americas,282 and Maghribis could likewise
translate their sorts of trickster tales to colonial situations. It is possible and even likely that this
is at least partly why Allalou’s Djeha became such an instant success.
Djeha also encourages a kind of interactivity reminiscent of al-halqa, especially in the
final scene, when audience members are supposed to take the roles of courtly attendants as they
sing and dance along to El-Moutribia’s music. This collective experience of theater not only
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offered extra entertainment, it also points to Allalou’s intentionality: like Bachetarzi, Allalou was
at this time enmeshed in the Algerian nationalist milieu. And he deliberately used his dramas as
tools to build Algerian collective consciousness. For spectators, especially Muslim ones, the
experience of joining in with the El-Moutribia in song and dance, reveling in the public and
modern production of familiar Arab tales, helped to foster a sense of collective Muslim Algerian
consciousness, precisely as Allalou had intended.283
Another reason for the play’s success and another method for building a sense of Muslim
Algerian consciousness was Allalou’s use of Algerian dialectal Arabic, as opposed to the
customary practice of using strictly classical Arabic in literary pieces. Different characters in
Djeha spoke in different dialects, reflecting their different backgrounds and dispositions. In his
Mémoires, Bachetarzi gives readers the impression that he staunchly supported the use of
dialectal Arabic in Algerian theater from the start, but the truth is that, initially, Bachetarzi
resisted its usage.284 He feared that the use of Algerian dialectal would stifle the play’s ability to
resonate with foreign audiences, but Allalou insisted. He saw dialectal Arabic as one of the few
forms of “collective expression” left available to Algerians, and he feared that even this one form
they had left was being restricted and taken away. Because this dialect was specifical to Algeria,
Allalou felt that it could provide a sort of linguistic rallying point, a means for Algerians to
fashion and solidify their national consciousness.285 Despite Bachetarzi’s misgivings, Allalou
went ahead and published the play in its linguistically mixed form, and it was a hit. In his
memoirs, Allalou asserts that it is precisely because Djeha used dialectal Arabic that it became
so popular. “The viewer,” he says, “understanding the play’s dialogue, finds pleasure and
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relaxation, unlike with some arduous plays, written in literary Arabic, which most viewers can
only barely understand.”286 Indeed, the use of dialectal Arabic made Djeha much more
immediately appealing to average Algerians and it did not limit the play’s popularity with elite or
foreign audiences either, proving Bachetarzi’s fears to be misplaced.
In many ways, Djeha paved the way for future Algerian theatrical productions. The
play’s success illustrated there was indeed an appetite for theater in Algeria, and it therefore
inspired many Algerians to try their hand at dramatic writing and performance. But Djeha’s
themes and cultural trappings also set the standard for Algerian theater in the interwar period.
For Bachetarzi and many other dramatists, Djeha demonstrated that theater could be wielded as
an instrument of modernist reformism, as a tool with which to construct an Algerian national
identity, and as a weapon against European colonialism. Through the rest of the interwar period,
the social, cultural, and political significance of Algerian theater would become clearer and ever
more salient.

El-Moutribia’s First Theatrical Exploits
Historian Joshua Cole has depicted Mahieddine Bachetarzi’s dramatic works as examples
of an integrationist ideology. He argues that Bachetarzi wanted to show the Muslim community
that “openness to the world [i.e., to France] did not necessarily threaten [one’s] allegiance to
family, religion, and custom,” and he claims that Bachetarzi intended to use Algerian theater as a
means to adapt Maghribi culture to “modern forms of life.”287 This is not inaccurate. Bachetarzi,
Salafists, and other nationalists very often employed Western methodologies in political
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discourse, in historiography, and in literary and other artistic endeavors. But a selective focus on
the Western methods that Bachetarzi and his peers employed risks losing sight of their
intentionality. In the early years of the interwar period, Bachetarzi did indeed believe that
integration was the best means for Muslims to achieve equality and an equitable future in
Algeria, but his perspective changed over time. By the time Bachetarzi began writing his own
plays, Western methods were mostly just the means to ends which were Muslim uplift, Muslim
solidarity, and the realization of a Muslim Algerian national consciousness.
In fact, although the trappings of modern Western theater were present in and even
fundamental to El-Moutribia’s productions, it is worth stressing again that Maghribi, Arab, and
Islamic features were equally represented and equally essential, and they carried cultural and
national significance that Western features did not necessarily share. Philip Schuyler describes
public spaces in the pre-colonial Maghrib and highlights the ways that performers and
storytellers fostered a sense of collective consciousness:
…itinerant entertainers acted as journalists, carrying news from one market to the next.
Public preachers offered moral guidance and explanations of religious text sot a largely
illiterate public. Comedians provided political and social commentary. Storytellers gave
lessons in history. Musicians put all these messages into song…288
In the marketplace and in similar public spaces, performers conceptualized the community
before itself and narrated and idealized its history, and the interactivity of these performances
gave audiences the ability to help shape these conceptualizations. As Amine and Carlson put it,
al-halqa and other similar public spaces provided a means of “spacing cultural identity” in the
Maghrib; they contributed to the “representation of historical consciousness and cultural identity,
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through [their] formulaic artistic expression.”289 The kinds of performances that these historians
describe date back centuries, but similarities abound in interwar Algerian theatrical productions.
Amine and Carlson also describe the “magical” ability of al-halqa to “implicate ‘Others’,”
or, in other words, to delineate the bounds between a given ‘Us’ and ‘Them.’290 Most fictional
narratives depict at least one clear protagonist and antagonist – a boldly drawn line between good
and evil, and interactive spaces like al-halqa draw spectators into even closer association with
protagonists than typical stories. And when stories and narratives are even quasi-historical, as is
often the case in Arab storytelling, they can fashion listeners’ sense of who is ‘good’ and who is
‘bad’ in their own times, of who is ‘Us’ and who is ‘Them.’ As we shall see, Bachetarzi’s plays
exhibit very similar otherizing dynamics, but Europeans are not the only Others to be found.
Social and political affiliations linked Algerian theater to the Jeunes Algériens and the
AOMA practically from the start. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Edmond Yafil,
Mahieddine Bachetarzi, and the other members of El-Moutribia already had connections to urban
religious, economic, and intellectual elites before they made their first forays into theater. Many
educated Algerians perceived Andalusi music to be a patrimonial heritage of both elevated
dignity and historical significance. In much the same way that Andalusi music satisfied Algerian
reformists’ perceptions of modernist cultural production through its links to the past and
perceived potential to uplift Muslim populations, nationalist politicians like Emir Khaled and
Ferhat Abbas and Salafist ‘ulemā like Ibn Bādīs expressed a profound interest in theater. They
saw in it the potential for uplift because it could introduce Algerians to more distinctly Western
cultural forms, while also offering opportunities to harken back to an idealized Algerian past
through reference to older cultural productions and standard Arab-Muslim themes, motifs, and

289
290

Amine and Carlson, 28-29.
Ibid., 33.

135

characters. Nationalist political organizations and Salafist religious organizations partnered with
theater troupes like El-Moutribia in order to produce and circulate dramatic works, but also to
help defend against the potentially repressive advances of French colonial authorities and to
gently guide the thematic material within works created.
It has already been shown that Emir Khaled was instrumental in bringing Mashriqi actors
and producers to Algeria in the years immediately following the First World War, but the
intimate connection between Algerian theater and Algerian nationalism did not end there. The
1926 premier of Allalou’s Djeha proved to observers that there was an appetite for Muslim
Algerian stories told through modern Western mediums. It also demonstrated that dialectal
Arabic was a legitimate and popular linguistic vehicle for theater in Algeria. Both El-Moutribia
and many nationalists quickly grasped the potential of theater performed in dialectal Arabic as a
means to reach Algerians outside the relatively small educated, bourgeois communities of the
major cities. As Bachetarzi says in his Mémoires, “What would serve Algerian theater better? To
be applauded by one hundred fifty intellectuals (including one hundred forty-nine guests [invited
by us]), or to gather twelve hundred spectators who come to hear a play they understand?”291
After the surprising success of Djeha, Algerian theater gained ground in 1927. Muslim
presses around the country offered El-Moutribia and other troupes free advertising space, and
they published glowing reviews of new theatrical productions.292 As mentioned earlier,
Bachetarzi and El-Moutribia staged “fêtes mauresques” to compete against French-backed “bals
arabes,” which tended to sport caricaturized depictions of Arab and Maghribi culture to satisfy
French settlers’ orientalist curiosities. The fêtes mauresques, meanwhile, blended traditional
Andalusi music with theatrical performances, and they especially appealed to younger Algerians,
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intellectuals, students, and members of the bourgeoisie. By holding these festivals in smaller
cities and towns across the country, Bachetarzi intended to showcase new artistic movements to
Algerians who might otherwise never see them.293 Those attracted by the fêtes mauresques also
formed the nuclei of audiences for future theatrical tours. One young Muslim intellectual, writing
under a pseudonym in a paper called L’Impartial, praised these festivals and lauded Bachetarzi’s
voice, illustrating their impact on his demographic. However, the writer also lamented the lack of
more authentic Andalusi musical instruments among the concert performances.294 For his part,
Bachetarzi acknowledged the criticism and took it to heart.
Prominent Algerians participated actively in the organization of these festivals and in
their festivities, and they also helped Bachetarzi organize similar events for Algerian immigrants
in France. El-Moutribia’s first tour of France as a full troupe took place in 1927, and Si Kaddour
Ben Ghabrit, the rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris who had worked with Bachetarzi on many
occasions beforehand, helped to coordinate the event and to drum up attendance.295 Bachetarzi
continued to organize such tours throughout the interwar period. On one of these tours, also in
1927, he noticed something that gave him an idea: El-Moutribia’s orchestra was fairly large for
an Algerian troupe at the time – between twenty-five and thirty musicians – but they traveled on
these tours accompanied by family and friends, so that the number of people in El-Moutribia’s
caravan sometimes neared one hundred. This inspired the “Excursions of El-Moutribia,”
European tours on which Bachetarzi invited musicians’ friends and family to come, and he
offered to pay for their travels. On these Excursions, El-Moutribia would “bring Arab music to
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Algerians residing in France, and it would provide those coming along from Algeria with
pleasant, educational, and economical vacations.”296 In Belgium, a local correspondent witnessed
a concert from one of these excursions, and he wrote about it in L’Étoile Belge: “The ElMoutribia Orchestra of Algiers played its picturesque, characteristic tunes with a mixture of
enthusiasm and very curious virtuosity. There were also stars…especially Mr. Mahieddine, the
famous Arab tenor who was well received and much applauded. The audience hears ancient and
modern Arabic tunes. They were also not surprised to hear [French and American songs] in
Arabic.”297
There were many successes, but there were also difficulties for Bachetarzi in the late
1920s. But even these difficulties brought opportunities. Several of Bachetarzi’s former mentors
and friends died in 1928, including Grand Mufti Boukandoura, Mouzino, and Edmond Yafil, his
“most precious support” and “dear master.”298 But with Yafil’s death, Bachetarzi became
president of El-Moutribia and took over his former mentor’s role as the Chair of Arab Music at
the Conservatory of Algiers. This appointment only increased Bachetarzi’s standing in the
Muslim Algerian community. Additionally, disastrous flooding along the Chélif River, which
stretches from the Mediterranean in the northeast to the Atlas Mountains further south, offered
El-Moutribia the opportunity to put on several benefit concerts which, despite making no money,
increased the troupe’s standing with Algerian citizens and nationalists.299 The Jeunes Algériens
and the AOMA lent material and financial support to El-Moutribia, and Bachetarzi and the
troupe reciprocated their kindnesses. During the 1928-1929 new year’s holiday season, ElMoutribia gave a concert in Algiers for the Amicale des étudiants musulmans, which Bachetarzi
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had helped to found, and which was now led by Ferhat Abbas.300 Such gestures and charitable
events increased Muslim Algerian goodwill toward El-Moutribia, but did little to fill the troupe’s
coffers. Lacking the funding to acquire their own practice space, a necessity for any musical or
performative group, the Cercle du Progrès bought and gifted El-Moutribia a new space in that
same year.301 Similar signs of mutual support continued through the 1920s, but the connections
between El-Moutribia and Algerian nationalists grew stronger in the 1930s, when Bachetarzi and
his troupe suffered the close scrutiny of the French colonial government.
Bachetarzi’s first significant clash with French authorities occurred in March 1929, when
he performed an original song entitled “Djebbar” in the town of Laghouat, on the northern edge
of the Sahara Desert, along the Amour Range of the Atlas Mountains. Djebbar, a song
Bachetarzi insisted he “paved with good intentions,” criticized Muslim and French elites and cast
a light on Muslim Algerian poverty. As Bachetarzi put it, he “shamed the rich with the misery of
the Algerian people.”302 The performance prompted a confrontation with the Governor-General,
Pierre-Louis Bordes, and the head of Indigenous Affairs, Jean Mirante. With an air of paternal
protectiveness, Mirante strongly advised Bachetarzi to stick to classical Andalusi music, and to
avoid any lyrics that risked being “misinterpreted.”303 When Bachetarzi returned home to
Algiers, the head of the Conservatory, Victor Aubine, warned him that he had been secretly
contacted by the colonial administration, and that they had asked him to covertly monitor
Bachetarzi and to ensure that he did not teach his students any lyrics that might “disturb the
healthy spirit of the Muslim population.”304 The head of Gramophone also contacted Bachetarzi
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and informed him that he had been prohibited from recording Bachetarzi’s new song, and Radio
Algiers was also warned not to let Bachetarzi sing the song live on the radio. The first
confrontation between Bachetarzi and the colonial government had been spurred by an original
song, but Indigenous Affairs would scrutinize his theater more closely in the coming decade.
French authorities surveilled Bachetarzi and El-Moutribia intermittently throughout the rest of
the colonial period.
The following year, 1930, was relatively uneventful, especially for Algerian theater, but,
as we discussed in the last chapter, it did mark the centenary of the French invasion of Algeria.
This moment, a celebratory one for Europeans across the country, marked a “sad memory” for
most Muslim Algerians.305 For Bachetarzi and many Muslims of his generation, it also offered a
doleful reminder of the failures of former Algerian Governor-General Maurice Viollette.
Viollette, first elected in 1925, had intended for 1930 to mark the starting date of a sweeping
liberalization program, which would have greatly reformed the colonial state and loosened legal
and political restrictions on Muslim Algerians. Unfortunately, the plan had collapsed under
relentless colonialist opposition, and in 1927 Viollette had been chased out of office by
conservative settlers, who replaced him with the more pro-settler Bordes. Bordes had much less
sympathy for Muslim Algerians and very little interest in their arts. Bachetarzi’s run-in with the
new Governor-General in 1929 would not be the last.
In 1932, El-Moutribia staged a theater series during Ramadan, showcasing six plays, all
written by one of Bachetarzi’s partners, the Jewish Algerian actor, comedian, and playwright,
Rachid Ksentini. Bachetarzi intended to premier a play during this series entitled Faqo, which
lambasted Muslim and French elites with a force and pointedness unseen previously in publicly

305

Ibid., 115.

140

circulated Muslim Algerian cultural productions, but news of the play’s impending release
reached the General Intelligence Services. Governor-General Bordes deemed the El-Moutribia
troupe to be a threatening “bearer of ideas” and forced Bachetarzi to shelve his new play.
Frustrating as this was for him, French censure actually made El-Moutribia more popular with
many Muslim Algerian youths and intellectuals. The Ramadan series went off without further
impediment and was received warmly by Muslim audiences.306
Also in 1932, Bachetarzi came down with a serious illness that relegated him to a sickbed
for nearly a year. He wrote several new “educational” songs and a new play during that time,
Djeha and the Usurer, a variation of the story told in Allalou’s 1926, which similarly resembles
a sub-Saharan trickster tale.307 In this time, too, Bachetarzi resolved to bring the same
educational and moralizing sentiments found in his original songs to his plays with more
directness and regularity. His new outlook first became evident in 1934. The year opened for ElMoutribia with two “real” tours; unlike in previous years, the put an emphasis on travelling not
just to major cities, but to smaller towns and villages, too, where Bachetarzi felt that townspeople
and peasants could help to “consecrate” theater as an Algerian custom. Among the plays
performed was Hammaz, which Bachetarzi premiered at El-Moutribia’s annual new year’s gala
in Algiers. There, the French journalist, Victor Barrucand, seemingly equally impressed and
incredulous, assessed what he saw,
…hundreds of spectators had to be turned away and still the hall from the parterre to the
galleries was crowded…Mahieddine, spoiled child of the Algerian public, carved out a
great success for himself with a sort of hymn to the union of the people’s hearts and
minds…his pathetic exhortation to break the bonds of ignorance was enthusiastically
applauded…The play "Hammaz" could have served as the theme to one of those fine art
comedies that the old Italian actors and authors knew how to adapt to the tone of
everyday life. It is a case of marriage by persuasion obtained in writing, tricks and
subterfuge, to allow the accountant of a merchant to receive an honest brokerage of one
306
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hundred thousand francs…Algerians, who have a very particular sense of comedy which
they supplement with their mimicry, are expressive in their silence…308
Another critic, Lucienne Darrouy, was also in attendance, writing for L’Echo d’Alger. She wrote,
“There is a certain interest in observing the evolution of the taste of the theater under the
influence of Mahieddine and the Company El-Moutribia...The practice of going with the family
to the theater became more and more widespread; the ladies, usually veiled, attended in large
numbers with their husbands.”309 Darrouy’s article speaks to the increasing sophistication of
Bachetarzi’s works and to the evolving tastes of his audiences, who grew along with him.
The ever-more apparent political messaging in Bachetarzi’s productions pleased Algerian
nationalists, who made their approval known through their support of El-Moutribia’s activities.
The fact that numerous moderate nationalists decided to support Bachetarzi’s new plays
demonstrates the ways in which their own ideological and political views shifted during the
interwar period. For example, Dr. Mohamed Salah Bendjelloul, the first-generation Jeune
Algérien who had supported integration in the 1920s, supported El-Moutribia’s theatrical tours
throughout the 1935-1936 touring season, in which they would put on plays that were explicitly
critical of both Sufi Muslims and French colonialists.310 Later in 1936, the Amicale des
Algériens, a nationalist association closely affiliated with the Jeunes Algériens, invited
Bachetarzi and El-Moutribia to perform one of their latest plays at a gala thrown in Fez,
Morocco.311
But the Jeunes Algériens and their affiliates were not Bachetarzi’s only benefactors. As
time passed, he grew closer to members of the AOMA and to their Salafist sympathizers. In early
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spring 1934, Bachetarzi put on a festival with AOMA leader Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Ibn Bādīs,
AOMA ‘ālim Shaykh Ṭayyib al-Uqbi, and historian Aḥmad Tawfīq al-Madanī. As we saw at the
beginning of this chapter, al-Madanī was himself a staunch supporter of Algerian theater who
would go on to write two plays of his own: a dialectal Arabic version of Shakespeare’s Othello,
and an original piece written in literary Arabic, Ḥanba’l (“Hannibal”), which dramatized the
story of the famed North African general. The nationalistic undertones in both plays were fairly
evident. In Hannibal, the titular hero at one point declares, “The lives of men are measured but in
years, those of nations in generations and generations.”312 Bachetarzi, who considered himself a
close friend of al-Madanī, would put on his own production of Ḥanba’l in 1952.313 The crowd
sizes at festivals like the one held in 1934 with the AOMA and al-Madanī varied greatly
depending upon the location at which they were held, but overall, they confirmed for Bachetarzi
that there was a great appetite among the Algerian people for this kind of moralizing and
educational theater. His many conversations with Ibn Bādīs, al-Uqbi, and other reformers further
inspired him.314 The influence of these Salafist clerics became clearer in Bachetarzi’s work as
time passed.

Pro-Salafism and Anti-maraboutism in Bachetarzi’s Works
Through the 1920s and into the early 1930s, most of Bachetarzi’s works centered around
themes of Muslim solidarity, unity, and cultural and intellectual uplift. But, as time went on, he
devoted more and more attention to those he believed to be his enemies: the colonial
government, yes, but also marabouts, their followers, and the Sufi brotherhoods. As Bachetarzi’s
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connections to the AOMA and other Salafists grew deeper and more intimate, his ideology and
methodology came to reflect theirs ever more. By choosing to direct so much energy against
Sufis, Bachetarzi effectively endorsed the Salafist master-narrative of Algerian history, which
assumed an Arab-Muslim origin to the nation, rather than acknowledging its multiple
geographical and cultural points of origin. Not only this, Bachetarzi’s plays, which drew so much
attention and praise from Muslim audiences, helped to naturalize this narrative and thereby to
facilitate the silencing and erasure of non-Muslim groups from Algerian history.
Bachetarzi wrote his first full-length original play in 1927. He entitled it Djouhala
Mouddaïna Fil-Ilm (“The False Scholars”), and it solidified his intellectual and political links
with the AOMA, while also demonstrating some of his intentions as a playwright. As Bachetarzi
describes it, Djouhala Mouddaïna Fil-Ilm was a “farcical comedy” with a “small educational
pretension.”315 He explains that he always believed education was one his responsibilities as an
Algerian artist, and this is made exceedingly clear in The False Scholars, as is Bachetarzi’s
disdain for maraboutism, which he believed to stand in opposition to education and modernity. In
the play, two descendants of a marabout, a father and his son, seek to “dazzle” a group of
Muslim students with their Sufi mysticism. In their encounters with the students, they praise
marabouts, speaking in a “dithyrambic and grotesque” style, blatantly misinterpreting Islamic
doctrine and butchering Arabic vocabulary. Through these exchanges, the maraboutic
descendants reveal themselves to be fools, while the students prove themselves to be much more
knowledgeable and eloquent. Eventually, after a “flowery oratorical debate” full of “nonsense
and non sequiturs,” the father and son are chased off by the students, whose intellectual and
moral superiority is made abundantly, undeniably clear to the audience. The audience, for their

315

Bachetarzi, Mémoires, vol. 1, 77-78.

144

part, is encouraged to join in the jeering as the maraboutic descendants are chased away.316 Here,
we see the power of al-halqa weaponized, as Sufis are turned into Others and the majority ArabMuslim audience is directed against them.
As Bachetarzi admits, the play openly attacks the “bête noire” of interwar Algerian
youth: marabouts, who were thought synonymous with “fatalism, immobility, and fanaticism.”317
But this was not mere pandering on Bachetarzi’s part; his animosity was entirely genuine.
Indeed, El-Moutribia’s alliance with the AOMA was first forged largely in support of Algerian
arts and culture and in defense against French colonial repression, but those bonds were
strengthened over the years by a mutual opposition to Algeria’s brotherhoods, zawiyas, and other
Sufi organizations. Many more of Bachetarzi’s plays, as well as some of his song lyrics, attacked
the marabouts and their followers, which in turn spurred various forms of retaliation from the
marabouts. The frequency of these retaliatory attacks accelerated in the early 1930s.
French administrators, bureaucrats, and gendarmes physically carried out most of these
attacks, but Bachetarzi insists in his Mémoires that the “maraboutic clan” was always his greatest
enemy, for it was they who informed the colonial administration of Bachetarzi’s supposedly
seditious actions, and it was they who motivated the government to crack down on ElMoutribia’s activities.318 In his Mémoires, Bachetarzi accuses the marabouts of colluding with
the French colonial government and of exploiting European anxieties about Muslim agitation in
order to undermine political and religious rivals within the Muslim community. Additionally,
Bachetarzi shared the AOMA’s concerns that maraboutism debased and degraded Islam in the
eyes of foreign observers, thus undermining nationalists’ arguments that Muslim Algerians
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deserved the right to self-determination. Ironically, marabouts worried that it was Western
theater, rather than Sufism, that harmed the Muslim Algerian image.319
As mentioned above, French-backed marabouts dissuaded Bachetarzi from performing
his play, Faqo, in 1932. In the two years that followed, he put on some of the aforementioned
festivals in partnership with members of the AOMA and the Jeunes Algériens. These festivals, in
addition to strengthening El-Moutribia’s finances, also strengthened their resolve. The
outpouring of support they received from both intellectual elites and young Muslims inspired
Bachetarzi to return to the theater. The conversations he had with his fans, in which they
expressed concerns about the state of the Muslim community, motivated Bachetarzi to rework
and republish his condemned play – this time renamed as Phaqo so as to evade colonial censors,
at least temporarily. Phaqo, which, in this context, means “moral depravity” or “wretchedness,”
seeks through comedy to tell of the “brigands” who “eat away” at the Algerian people.320 It tells
the story of Kouider, a “brave illiterate fool,” who tries to sue a marabout for selling him bogus
enchanted amulets, but who is continually grifted by every person to whom he turns for help. A
rogue businessman from Syria and a shifty Arab trader both finesse poor Kouider out of
additional money, while Antoine, a shady pied noir, gets Kouider hooked on alcohol. Finally, the
naïve fool is rescued by M. Mourad, an “honest” lawyer (seemingly representative of the Muslim
Algerian bourgeoisie), who helps him kick his alcohol habit and get restitution. The play
concludes with Mahieddine speaking directly to the audience. “Algerians, be aware!” he shouts
(usually to raucous applause). “Phaqo? We won’t take it anymore!”321
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The play mixed literary and dialectal Arabic with “cayagous” French,322 each one spoken
by the appropriate characters. It was immediately a hit with the young and educated portion of
the Muslim community, but just as quickly provoked attacks from marabouts and their followers.
In Constantine, a piece circulated in En-Nadjah, a local newspaper with Sufi sympathies, which
heralded the arrival of El-Moutribia and their new play, and subtly (though not dishonestly)
implied that Phaqo took aim at marabouts. The Zawiya de Chentouf had a considerable presence
in and around Constantine, and the Sufis of this institution were instrumental in the attempted
sabotage of Bachetarzi’s performance there. When he and his company arrived at the Mascara
Theater in Constantine on May 28, they were met by a summons from the police commissioner,
who informed them of the zawiya’s concerns. He did not prohibit El-Moutribia’s performance,
but he did warn that they might experience pushback from local marabouts. Bachetarzi resolved
to put on his performance anyway, and that night they premiered Phaqo. In his words, he
“trusted the youth, convinced that they would screw the old beards.”323 He was not wrong. The
Mascara theater was packed that night, and any time a lone member of the audience attempted to
heckle or denounce the performers, a mass of voices called out against him and in support of ElMoutribia. Bachetarzi says that marabouts tried again to sabotage productions of Phaqo in many
other cities, too, but were usually repelled by greater numbers of supporters. On November 6, the
Office of Indigenous Affairs met with Bachetarzi and threatened him with further sanction and
worse should he continue to play songs and perform plays with social and political messages, but
Bachetarzi did not relent. A second tour of Phaqo staged soon after was an even larger success
than the first. Indicative of El-Moutribia’s successes and momentum, El-Nadjah, the very same
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publication that had led the charge against in Constantine against Phaqo during the first tour,
now published a highly laudatory article in favor of Bachetarzi and his play.324
In late 1934, Bachetarzi published Alennif, a play that tackles racial barriers and
especially interracial marriage, cultural estrangement, and dignity in the face of repression. The
play tells the story of a young Arab singer and the French woman who falls in love with him.
The Frenchwoman convinces him to move to Paris, where she believes that he can find more
fame and financial success. But the change is too sudden and too great, as the Arab man finds
himself over-whelmed by racial barriers and cultural shocks. His pride wounded, he leaves and
returns home to Algeria. But the French woman refuses to give up on their love and follows him
back. There, she meets the Arab man’s father, who explains to her the meaning and importance
of the word alennif, which in this context means “self-esteem.” He makes clear to her that his
son’s pride has been grievously wounded, and the French woman falls into a deep despair.
Seeing her pain, the father is moved, and he promptly reunites the young couple and helps them
rekindle their love. In the end, the play affirms that love can overcome all barriers, even those of
race.325 The play quite blatantly supports interracial unity, but it did not dissatisfy nationalists
like the AOMA because of its strong affirmations of Muslim Algerian dignity. Young people
yearned for plays with “social content”, and the theme of stolen dignity in Alennif resonated
strongly with Muslim and Jewish Algerian audiences.326 The subsequent 1934-1935 tour was
mostly a success, as El-Moutribia was welcomed across the country by young audiences,
intellectuals, and Muslim municipal counselors and delegates.327 In a contemporary article in the
Muslim paper, La Voix Indigène, an anonymous author comments on Alennif and ruminates on
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its success with Muslim audiences. The author suggests that education is becoming more a
priority to young Muslims than traditional customs and racial anxieties, thus explaining why they
do not take exception to the union of a Muslim man and a Christian woman. But the author also
wonders whether or not Muslim women will be left behind if Muslim men continue to seek
education over tradition. The implication is clear: Muslim women must be educated, too.328 This
was a conclusion that Bachetarzi would also soon reach. The success of the Alennif tour provided
Bachetarzi with the money to organize a similar tour in France for the benefit of L’Étoile NordAfricaine, the far-left nationalist party founded by Messali Hadj.329
However, in the first half of 1935, despite El-Moutribia’s success with young Muslims,
the French colonial government issued a ban on all theatrical activity for six months because of
the troupe’s purported political and social agitation. For Muslim audiences, such European
attacks and impositions testified to the El-Moutribia’s integrity, and they therefore increased
their popularity among Muslim nationalists. But the bans still put a major strain on Bachetarzi’s
finances. Restless and anxious, he began writing what would become one of his most successful
plays, Les Béni Oui-Oui (“The Yes Men”), during this six-month hiatus. El-Moutribia premiered
the play in the city of Blida on November 28 and ran it across Algeria through the new year. The
play focuses on two Muslim “béni oui-oui,” or “yes men,” who, despite (or perhaps because of)
their idiocy, illiteracy, and excessive sycophancy, achieve political appointments in the colonial
state. The Algerian intellectual Lamine Lamoudi praised it as “a study of everything that touches
the life of the Algerian Muslim; his elected officials, his leaders, who are portrayed here with
accuracy and precision…”330 Meanwhile, the periodical L’Entente praised the play for its hilarity
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and for its talented cast. The report in L’Entente also made note that the “spectators participated
in the action, and seemed to discover, at each new point, wider horizons.”331 Such observations
echo the descriptions of the pre-colonial al-halqa described by Amine and Carlson. Muslim
nationalists also lent their support to the tour of Les Béni Oui-Oui. Dr. Bendjelloul, for instance,
supported the tour financially. But, in the face of continual resistance from colonial authorities
and disgruntled marabouts, the tour still lost money for El-Moutribia.332
Later in 1936, Bachetarzi published Houbb Ennessa (“Love of Women”). Reeling from
colonial censures, Bachetarzi insisted that Houbb Ennessa was devoid of any political
messaging. But in reality, the play elaborated on ideas he had first considered in Alennif by
advocating for the equal treatment and the education of women. Marabouts were relatively
uniform in their discomfort at the play’s message, but, perhaps more surprisingly, Muslim
intellectuals were not unanimously supportive either. Some bristled at the idea of educating
women equally. But Bachetarzi at least was consistent in his assertion that education for all
Muslims was the most important tool against colonial oppression.333 Bachetarzi followed up this
subtly feminist piece with a play called Mariage par Téléphone (“Wedding by Phone”) in
August 1936, which continued the theme. This play satirizes and criticizes arranged marriages,
another message which met mixed responses.334 A third play, Ennessa (“The Women”),
published in 1937, would return to the subject of Muslim women’s rights and would again meet
mixed reactions even from the more progressive elements of the Muslim Algerian community.
Bachetarzi’s feminist plays were also controversial because of the ambivalent stance they took
towards Europe and Western values. Houbb Ennessa in particular seemed to advocate for a
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reevaluation of Muslim relationships with the West, neither endorsing integrationism nor full
separation, but rather a kind of “transcendence” of racial and social boundaries.335 A decade
earlier, this attitude may have been popular among the Muslim Algerian community, but by the
middle of the 1930s, with tensions between different ethno-religious groups rising to such levels,
any hint of appeasement to the West was anathema, and thus such messaging in Bachetarzi’s
plays was often ill-received.
The plays Bachetarzi wrote through the early- to mid-1930s bolstered his positive
reputation among Muslim intellectuals and Salafist reformers while eliciting the opposite
reaction from marabouts and colonialists, but it was in 1937 that these currents really began to
crest and collide most intensely. The year opened with Bachetarzi hounded by creditors chasing
his debts, and with “maraboutists” and colonial authorities gunning to shut down El-Moutribia
permanently. In January, Bachetarzi published El-Kheddaine (“The Traitors”), adding fuel to
these flames. As we saw in the introduction to this essay, the tour of El-Kheddaine in 1937
prompted diverse reactions and sparked major clashes between El-Moutribia, Algerian youths,
marabouts, and the colonial government. In the eastern city of Sétif, near the coast, El-Kheddaine
met an “ambiguous” reception as El-Moutribia found themselves embroiled in a developing
“quarrel” between opposing factions of the Jeunes Algériens.336 Further south, in Biskra, the
Salafist cleric Shaykh Khirreddine, a member of the AOMA, was “delighted” by the play.337 A
January 25, 1937 article in La Voix Indigène took Bachetarzi’s side by decrying his Muslim
critics and denouncing intrareligious factionalism.338 But the next day, back near the coast in
Médéa, two members of the Jeunes Algériens interpreted the play completely different than their
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peers in Sétif, and their interpretation angered them. They spread “malicious propaganda” about
Bachetarzi and his troupe in the local presses.339 Around this time, El-Moutribia began to face
equally harsh opposition from French gendarmes and politicians, who set up roadblocks and
passed laws prohibiting them from performing in local municipalities. In Sidi Bel-Abbès, about
eighty miles from the Moroccan border, several members of the Jeunes Algériens-affiliated
Cercle du Jeunesse (“Circle of Youth”) countered the colonial roadblocks and ushered crowds in
to see the performance.340 And of course, there was the conflict in Inkermann, where the mayor
cut the power to the theater during El-Moutribia’s performance, which only further invigorated
local youths.
In some his last works published before the outbreak of the Second World War,
Bachetarzi continued his assault on French authorities and their purported colluders, the
marabouts, while also exploring possibilities for armistice. Bachetarzi wrote Le Devoir (“The
Work”) as a tribute to Lebanese Druze Emir, Chakib Arslan, who was deeply influenced by
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abduh and who supported pan-Islamic policies in the
Ottoman Empire. Bachetarzi also intended Le Devoir to be an indictment of the continuing
struggle between Muslim reformers and “retrogrades.”341 In the play, Bachetarzi recognizes that
this rupture in the Muslim community represents a weakness that is often exploited by colons,
but still, he cannot restrain himself from attacking those Muslims whom he believes to be
regressive. In his next play, Keddabine (“The Liars”), Bachetarzi again attacked both the French
government and marabouts, though he unfortunately says little else about the content of the play
in his Mémoires.342 Despite numerous warnings from local municipal leaders, from intelligence

339

Ibid., 300.
Ibid., 301-302.
341
Bachetarzi, Mémoires, vol. 1, 349-350.
342
Ibid., 354.
340

152

agents, and from the Governor-General’s office, Bachetarzi continued to write politically
charged material. Both Le Devoir and Keddabine were banned. These bans pushed Bachetarzi
and El-Moutribia to the brink of financial ruin.
Aware of the hardships that El-Moutribia faced, a journalist for L’Alger Républicain
published an article in early 1938 entitled “Algerian Theater is not Dead.” The journalist pointed
to and celebrated Bachetarzi’s many plays and El-Moutribia’s many achievements, and he
beseeched Muslim audiences to stand firm in their support of Algerian theater. “A man,” he
declared, “whatever his devotion, cannot alone overcome all difficulties, thwart all maneuvers
and overcome all resistance. Mahieddine created Algerian theater, but so that this art continues to
live and fulfill its mission, it is up to each Muslim to bring his help or his courage.”343
Nevertheless, legal difficulties mounted, as Bachetarzi, El-Moutribia, and members of the
AOMA all came under increasing administrative scrutiny. In late 1938 or early 1939, for
instance, Shaykh al-Uqbi was arrested by French authorities, falsely accused of assassinating a
man known as Shaykh Kahoul, a Sufi imam with known ties to the colonial government. The
charges were without merit and clearly politically motivated, but al-Uqbi was nevertheless held
in custody for several months. When he was finally released in June 1939, Bachetarzi and
Shaykh Ibn Bādīs organized a concert together and held it in al-Uqbi’s honor.344

Colonial Pressures, Communal Pressures, and Antisemitism
Bachetarzi weathered assaults from the colonial government for over a decade and
refused to stop producing politically charged music and theater. But, as his financial situation
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reached a crisis point toward the end of the 1930s, he suddenly backed away from some of his
more controversial social and political convictions. While his Salafist turn had seemed genuine at
the time, his behavior during the interwar period in retrospect has convinced some observers that
he went most willingly wherever money and fame seemed most assured. Antisemitic fervor grew
in scope and intensity in Algeria during the interwar period, and while Bachetarzi had been a
friend to his Jewish compatriots for many years, he position shifted as the European and Muslim
communities grew more hostile to both ethnically Arab and European Jewish Algerians.
Bachetarzi also made some questionable decisions in regard to the French colonial government.
He fairly consistently criticized colonists and settlers in his artistic works, but some of his
business choices belied a more ambivalent position. Integrationism largely fell out of vogue in
Muslim circles through the 1930s, as we have seen, and Bachetarzi’s theatrical pieces suggested
that he gave up on integrationism too. But his behavior, especially as it appeared that another war
in Europe was drawing nearer, suggested that he had some trouble letting Europe go, even as he
tried to maintain his relationships with Muslim Algerian nationalists. It seems he recognized that,
despite his political and cultural allegiances, it was always Europeans who paid the best.
Anti-Jewish rhetoric and violence rose during the interwar period, but antisemitism had
been an inescapable part of Algerian society as long as Bachetarzi had been alive. Since the
passage of the Crémieux Decree in 1870, which naturalized all Algerian Jews, tensions between
Algerian Jewish and Muslim communities had mounted. As it happened, Jewish reactions to
naturalization were initially very mixed; some feared they would lose their Maghribi heritage
and customs as European culture was foisted upon them.345 But Jewish ambivalence did little to
dampen Muslim and European animosities. On January 18, 1898, hardly a month after
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Bachetarzi’s birth, bubbling antisemitic fervor congealed into ten days of riotous violence in
Algiers, which engulfed the city and left two people dead, one hundred wounded, and over one
hundred Jewish properties damaged and burgled. Some reports suggest that the French army and
municipal police joined with the antisemites in their looting and violence, and the mayor of
Algiers effectively endorsed it.346 The 1898 Algiers Riots even took on a secessionist tone as the
rioters threatened a full-scale revolt against the metropole if their demands to repeal Jews’
French citizenship were not met. Regardless of the threats of secession, and despite some
historians’ arguments that these indicated more political motivations,347 the primary motivation
for the hate speech and violence was antisemitism.
Algerian Jews assimilated largely in response to this rising tide of anti-Jewish hate. Many
of them felt torn between their impulse to communal insularity, their Maghribi heritage, and
French citizenship, but they figured that envelopment within French culture might prove their
commitment to France and thus might shield them from some of the worst antisemitic behaviors
of European settlers. Jews and Muslims had largely operated in the same economic sector in the
nineteenth century, but after 1900 and especially after the end of the First World War, Jews
began to gravitate more toward European markets, spelling products in European neighborhoods
that Europeans wanted. The number of Algerian Jews in civil service jobs and skilled labor
positions also increased over time, bringing them into closer contact with European settlers.
Albert Memmi, a Tunisian writer of mixed Berber-Italian/Jewish descent, declared that
his North African coreligionists “turned [their] back happily on the East” by assimilating with
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French culture, but the reality is more complicated.348Jews’ deepening relationships with
Europeans did in turn pulled them further apart from their Muslim neighbors in many cases, but
it was for this very reason that El-Moutribia’s mix of Jewish and Muslim performers was so
significant. For many years, into the interwar period, El-Moutribia represented a challenge to
Muslim, European, and Jewish assertions that there was too much enmity between ethnoreligious
groups to overcome. Not only were many of the troupe’s musicians Jewish, but Rachid Ksentini,
a comedic actor and arguably the most famous of the Moutribistes at the time, was a Jewish man.
In his Mémoires, Bachetarzi claims that Ksentini was just as important to El-Moutribia’s
theatrical success as himself and Allalou.349 And indeed, Bachetarzi frequently supported
Muslim-Jewish cooperation during the interwar period, and he supported prominent Jewish
politicians, including former French Prime Minister Léon Blum. In 1929, an all-Jewish Andalusi
troupe had been formed, called El-Andalousia, and many Muslim Algerians had interpreted this
as an existential threat to El-Moutribia. Bachetarzi was even discouraged from hiring any more
Jews into his troupe. But Bachetarzi refused to comply and chalked Muslim anxieties up to
antisemitism, which he, at the time, unambiguously disavowed.350 And in 1932 Bachetarzi again
endured withering criticism from Muslim Algerians who took exception to the fact that ElMoutribia was then mostly made up of Jewish actors and musicians. Bachetarzi fired back,
reminding critics that it was Jewish Algerians like Edmond Yafil, Mouzino, and Laho Seror who
had revived Andalusi music in the first place, and that it was the lack of Muslim membership in
El-Moutribia was not due to any prejudice on Bachetarzi’s part, but rather due to a Muslim
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“reluctance to perform.”351 In turn, Jewish Moutribistes supported their Muslim partners. In the
1931, for example, the French government imposed harsh travel restrictions on Muslims across
the Mediterranean, and Jewish Moutribistes joined in a public denunciation of these measures.352
But tides began to turn in the early 1930s, making Bachetarzi less and less comfortable
with his pro-Jewish position. Italian fascist and German Nazi propaganda flowed into France and
Algeria in these years, and far-right and explicitly antisemitic political parties followed,
including the Croix-de-Feu, or “Cross of Fire.” These organizations exploited preexisting
prejudices to drive a wedge between Muslim and Jewish communities, and some even recruited
Muslim Algerians into their ranks.353 German propagandists and “racial philosophers” visited
Algeria as well, and they intentionally exacerbated these divisions and spread anti-Jewish
rhetoric among Muslim communities.354 A July 1934 report from the Algerian Governor-General
indicates that many Muslim Algerians were fans of Hitler and the Nazis.355 But Muslims were
not merely swayed by outside influences. In fact, Shaykh Ibn Bādīs and other ‘ulemā stoked the
fires of hatred with increasingly antisemitic rhetoric. While there is no evidence that members of
the AOMA actually participated in any antisemitic violence, contemporaries charged that their
“freedom of social criticism…also meant freedom for the crowd to murder and pillage.”356
Bachetarzi experienced Salafists’ distaste for Jews firsthand, when he weathered criticism in
1934 for participating in an advertising campaign for a Jewish-owned brand of anisette, which
Salafists found doubly offensive because of Bachetarzi’s perceived endorsement of both Jews
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and alcohol – a substance he had previously denounced in his plays. Bowing to Salafist pressure,
Bachetarzi refused to participate in any more advertisements, and he doubled down on his antialcohol stance.357
This surge of hateful rhetoric and bubbling tension culminated in a massive outbreak of
rioting in the northeastern city of Constantine in August 1934. The Constantine Riots, called a
pogrom by many Algerian Jews, began when a drunken Jewish shopkeeper passed a group of
Muslim men and insulted them and their religious customs. Rude as this affront was, the reaction
was outsized. Muslims quickly stormed Jewish neighborhoods, vandalized Jewish businesses,
and attacked Jews in the streets, all while police stood by and watched.358 Between August 3 and
6, Muslims killed about twenty-four Jews, and four Muslims died in turn.359 Historians like
Joshua Cole and Charles Robert-Ageron have rightly pointed to Muslim dissatisfaction with the
Jonnart Reforms and the Crémieux Decree and reasons for the violence, but Sophie B. Roberts
points out too that the widespread broadcasting of antisemitic propaganda from both European
and Muslim sources had a tangible effect on antisemitic fervor.360
The Constantine Riots did nothing to dampen anti-Jewish sentiments among Muslims,
and the Jewish members of El-Moutribia suffered psychologically and financially because of
this. Interestingly though, Bachetarzi’s main concern, as conveyed in his Mémoires, seems to
have been for the financial implications of these events for El-Moutribia’s coffers, rather than for
the emotional well-being of his friends and business partners. He notes that his troupe was
scheduled to perform in Paris in the days following the riots, and he was warned by prominent
Parisian Muslims that they would not attend shows in which so many of the actors were Jewish.
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Ultimately, to show that they felt no ill-will toward Bachetarzi personally, they agreed to attend
the first show of the tour, and then to boycott the remainder. Rather than standing in solidarity
with his Jewish friends, partners, and coworkers, Bachetarzi agreed to these terms. Not only this,
he went so far as to promise Parisian Muslim notables that he would return later that year with a
Muslim-only cast “to thank them” for their kindness to him personally, and he promised that the
proceeds from their performances would go to the popular Algerian nationalist party, the Étoile
Nord-Africaine, led by the vocally antisemitic Messali Hadj.361
This was only the first of several betrayals. In 1935, El-Moutribia’s annual new-year
gala, an event Bachetarzi had organized for years at that point, drew only three hundred people –
a paltry number compared to crowds the previous years. It soon became clear to Bachetarzi that
the cause for this drop in attendance was antisemitism; many Muslims still refused to attend
shows featuring Jewish actors. Because of this, Bachetarzi says, “there was therefore an absolute
obligation to only take Muslim artists on our next tour.”362 This conclusion enraged and
presumably hurt Rachid Ksentini, but Bachetarzi brushed him off and claimed he had simply
been “carried away by the general movement.”363 In February, Bachetarzi put on a production of
his play, Alennif, with an all-Muslim cast, and it was praised by Muslim periodicals like La Voix
Indigène.364
Bachetarzi’s apparent about-face on the issue of Jewish-Muslim collaboration was
certainly motivated by his own financial interests, but it is likely too that he felt a certain degree
of disillusionment in regard to Léon Blum’s Front Populaire (“Popular Front”) party. In his
Mémoires, Bachetarzi suggests that he always felt skepticism toward the Blum administration
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and the Blum-Viollette proposal, but this is likely an attempt to retrospectively save face. The
truth is that, for a time, he quite openly and ardently supported the proposed Blum-Viollette bill.
In doing so, he put himself in a somewhat vulnerable position, as many prominent Muslims
denounced the proposal as a means to “co-opt the Algerian bourgeoisie while leaving six million
peasants in ignorance and misery.”365 And the proposal also met heavy resistance from European
settlers. The Algerian Federation of Mayors even went so far as to stage a strike in protest of the
bill.366 Political pressure became so intense that Blum eventually abandoned the proposal
entirely. Instead, the metropolitan and colonial administrations under Blum and Viollette started
cracking down on El-Moutribia’s activities harder than ever. Frustrated, Bachetarzi wrote several
new songs, compiled in a 1937 album called Recueil des chansons Mahieddine. One of the songs
was entitled “Maarefnache Ache men Teriq Nakhdous,” meaning “We Do Not Know Which Path
to Take,” and it clearly outlines many of Bachetarzi’s frustrations. Its lyrics read as follows,
We do not know which path to take.
Must we have eternal patience?
Or rely only on ourselves?
Or must we rely only on God?
More than a hundred years that the settler accuses
The Arab of being an ignoramus and a fool
But when you're trying to learn, he laughs.
He doesn't even deign to answer you.
All your goodwill
Runs into his indifference.
He's at home in your country,
And in your country, you are the stranger.
To defeat the German, from fourteen to eighteen,
Our blood flowed in waves
As for the Moroccan War [Franco-Moroccan War of 1844],
It's better not to talk about it.
They made us almost disown
Our language and traditions.
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They need all our sacrifices
But nothing earns their trust.
Last year brought hope
With the advent of the Popular Front.
“We will respect your rights
And you will become our equals!
No more contempt! No more oppression!”
And since then, we have been waiting
While the settler whispers,
“You'll stay under our boot!”
Remember the saying:
“The forest will catch fire only from its own wood.”
When the people defer
To those who betray them
What good can it come to?
People, lay the pillory
For all the bought-off and the traitors
If you ever want to be free.367

This song expresses the many disappointments and frustrations of an Algerian Muslim who had
long put his faith and trust in the French, and who had been continually disappointed. For years,
Bachetarzi had tried to walk a line between pro-French integrationism and Algerian nationalism,
but “We Do Not Know Which Path to Take” shows that, by the late 1930s, Bachetarzi had
essentially given up on the dream of a multicultural Algeria – not because he wanted to, but
because those politicians who he thought represented that philosophy had so often let him down.
The Governor-General promptly banned the Recueil des chansons, declaring its lyrics to be
“tendentious and likely to disturb the public order.”368 But Bachetarzi continued to perform it
illegally at El-Moutribia productions anyway.369 He also wrote a play, Zid Ayette (“Cry Once
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More”), which essentially took the themes of frustration and disappointment conveyed in his
song and dramatized them. Within a matter of months, the government banned Zid Ayette, too.370
Unfortunately, Bachetarzi’s willingness to stand up to legal restrictions eventually caught
up with him. We have seen how his and El-Moutribia’s finances suffered, but Bachetarzi faced
legal retribution as well. In late 1937, After performing songs from the Recueil in violation of the
Governor-General’s decree, Bachetarzi was summoned by the correctional court of the city of
Orléansville (now called Chlef). They informed him that he would have to stand trial in several
months. When the time came, Bachetarzi was sentenced to a hefty fine and fifteen-day prison
term. The latter part of his sentence was suspended, but the fine further crippled a man who was
already reeling from financial distress.371
Such legal and financial difficulties eventually seem to have sapped Bachetarzi’s will to
resist. Some have also interpreted some of his actions during the last years of the 1930s as
attempts to lash out at Algerians with whom he had partnered in the past. Some of his
contemporaries, for example, interpreted El-Kheddaine not only as an attack on Sufis and French
authorities, but also on moderate nationalists, especially Dr. Bendjelloul, the Jeune Algérien who
had so often helped Bachetarzi and El-Moutribia in the past. Some believed that Bachetarzi
blamed Bendjelloul and other moderates for placing too much trust in French leftists to help
alleviate Muslim suffering.372 It is possible, too, that Bachetarzi was angry at himself for doing
exactly the same thing.
With his financial prospects fleeting, Bachetarzi wrote a series of intentionally apolitical
plays between 1938 and 1939, presumably in the hopes that the colonial and French governments
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would not ban them. In August of 1939, he was on tour in Paris when he sensed the looming
threat coming from further east and resolved to return home. He made it back to Algeria three
days before Adolf Hitler and the Nazis invaded Poland.373 In June 1940, Paris fell to the Nazi
invasion, and the Vichy government was established the next month. Five months after that, the
French colonial administration approached Bachetarzi and asked him to organize a tour that
would rally the Muslim public behind the new government. He agreed, which likely shocked and
angered his Jewish partners and compatriots. Around the same time, the Vichy government
determined to repeal the Crémieux Decree, robbing Algerian Jews of French citizenship. Adding
insult to injury, Bachetarzi decided to adapt Molière’s L’Avare (“The Miser”) for his pro-Vichy
tour, a play known for its antisemitic undertones.374 Perhaps even more egregious, many
performances of the play were accompanied by a hymn that Bachetarzi had written for the
occasion: “Je sais que tu comprends” (“I Know You Understand”). Bachetarzi directed the
Arabic lyrics at Philippe Pétain, the former general and hero of World War One, and now the
Chief of State of Vichy France.375

Conclusion
On February 13, 1941, Bachetarzi was back in Bougie, the city in which he had witnessed
the anachronistic wedding that inspired his song, “O, This Ignorance!”, more than a decade
earlier. This time, he was there to put on a performance of his adaptation of Molière’s L’Avare.
There is no record of the ethnic makeup of the cast that performed the play, but it is doubtful that
any Jews were left among El-Moutribia’s touring ranks by this point. After the performance,
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Bachetarzi took to the stage and beseeched the audience to be patient with the Vichy
government, and to steadfastly support Pétain. A contemporary police report says that he
“warned the natives in particular against the actions of the Jews who, he said, when they were
the masters, never stopped biting us, and who, now demoted, caress us like brothers.”376 The nine
hundred mostly Muslim spectators in attendance met these remarks with enthusiastic applause.
It is difficult to say exactly why Bachetarzi so quickly and dramatically cast aside his
skepticism toward and criticism of the French colonial state and threw himself fully behind the
Vichy government, nor can we say for sure why he so swiftly abandoned and arguably even
betrayed his Jewish compatriots. Opportunism and financial desperation likely motivated him on
some level to agree to these tours and to make these remarks, but it is also likely that he felt a
profound disappointment with the Jewish leftists of Blum’s Popular Front, in whom he had
placed such high hopes. In Paris, Si Kaddour Ben Ghabrit turned the Grand Mosque of Paris into
a haven for Jews hiding from the Nazi and Vichy regimes. His humanitarianism earned him fame
and much admiration in the Jewish and Western communities after the war. But, across the
Mediterranean, Bachetarzi rode the wave of antisemitism cresting in Algeria. Whatever his
internal, unspoken feelings, this choice benefitted him, as it lost him few Muslim supporters and
allowed him to put on plays with the approval of the state once more. However, it does appear
that, looking back, Bachetarzi was ashamed of what he did under Vichy rule, for he makes no
mention of these events at all in his Mémoires. It is almost as if they never happened.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are not
more than starting-points, which if followed into actual experience for only a moment are quickly
left behind. Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a global scale. But
its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly,
exclusively, white, or Black, or Western, or Oriental. Yet just as human beings make their own
history, they also make their cultures and ethnic identities.
Edward W. Said377
November 1, 1954 – “La Toussaint Rouge,” (“The Red All Saint’s Day”) – marked the
start of the Algerian Revolution. In the seven and a half years that combat raged, before Algeria
could claim its independence, the war became a battle for world opinion at least as much as it
was an actual battle on the ground. The French government swiftly recognized the need to
silence propaganda emanating from the revolutionary party, the Front de libération nationale
(FLN), and any news and developments that reflected poorly on the French army were likewise
silenced when possible. The FLN responded in kind, calling upon Algerian actors, filmmakers,
singers, musicians and athletes to vocally, loudly support the cause through their respective
mediums and outlets. In February 1958, the FLN formed an artistic troupe, composed of some of
the country’s best-known actors and musicians. As Ahmed Cheniki explains, the troupe’s
objective was clear: to “make known the fight of the Algerians. The theater became, in a way, an
appointed spokesperson for the revolution.”378 Touring across Algeria and in the USSR, China,
Yugoslavia, and several Arab countries, the FLN troupe put on plays like Vers la lumière
(“Toward the Light”), Les enfants de la Casbah (“The Children of the Casbah”), and El
Khalidoun (“The Eternals”). The troupe’s mission was implicitly political, as their plays testified
to the noble crusade fought by the FLN and to the savagery of the French army. The manager of
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the FLN troupe was a man named Mustapha Kateb. About three decades earlier, during the
interwar period, he had joined the El-Moutribia troupe and studied under Mahieddine Bachetarzi.
Tracing Bachetarzi’s artistic lineage through the decades is but one way to demonstrate
his lasting influence on Algerian culture and politics. In this study, I have done this as well by
focusing intensively on his exploits, his published works, and his thoughts and memories as he
recorded them in his Mémoires. More than this, though, I have analyzed, through the lens of
Bachetarzi’s life, the intersection of culture and nationalist politics in interwar Algeria. In
essence, this survey of Bachetarzi’s life and career has shown how polyphony characterized the
Algerian nationalist milieu in the early interwar period, but how the Foucauldian methodologies
of the AOMA gradually commandeered the nationalist movement and restricted it, defining the
Algerian nation as strictly Arab and Muslim, and even drawing restrictions within that to Salafist
Sunni Islam. Furthermore, I have shown how Mahieddine Bachetarzi, as a friend, affiliate, and
business partner of many interwar nationalists, emblemized some of the major trends in the
nationalist movement. Most notably, as his allegiance to the AOMA grew stronger through the
1930s, Bachetarzi’s music and theater helped to reinforce and to naturalize their particular
construction of an Algerian historical master-narrative.
In the course of this study, we have seen how Bachetarzi and his nationalist peers were
born into an ethnically and culturally diverse colonial state that experienced an explosion of
cultural, intellectual, and political activity leading up to and especially in the wake of the First
World War. We have seen how some of the major Algerian nationalist parties arose amidst this
vibrant atmosphere, and we have seen some of the ways in which they strove for their objectives,
and the ways in which they colluded and clashed with one another. For historians of Algeria, this
is all familiar territory. However, the latter half of this essay represents a novel contribution to
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the field, as I have inquired into the intersections of culture and nationalism in the Algerian
nationalist milieu, with a specific focus on one man’s use of music and theater to reflect, explore,
negotiate, and disseminate nationalistic ideas.
In the third chapter, I demonstrated the ways that Bachetarzi used Andalusi music to
explore his integrationist ideology, and I showed his gradual movement away from
integrationism toward the more radical Salafist nationalism of the AOMA. In the fourth chapter,
I showed how Bachetarzi used the new medium of Algerian theater to advocate for Muslim uplift
and radical nationalism in order to help define, rigidify, and naturalize Salafist conceptions of
Algerian national identity and national history and as exclusively Arab and Muslim. On top of
that, I illustrated the way that Bachetarzi’s (and, by proxy, the AOMA’s) Arab-Muslim
conception of Algerian identity excluded Sufi Muslims, who made up a significant proportion of
Algerian Muslims at the time. Finally, I showed how some of Bachetarzi’s convictions seemed to
finally collapse under the weight of legal and financial pressures, and how this culminated in his
abandonment of his Jewish partners and his ultimate sycophantic gestures toward Philippe Pétain
and the Vichy regime. All this is novel scholarship, and it opens the door to further research.
While I have looked here at culture and nationalism in interwar Algeria, I have neglected
or overlooked several topics that require more research. More than any other subject, women’s
roles in the interwar Algerian nationalist movement demand further investigation. Scholars have
written extensively about women’s activities during the Algerian Revolution, but significantly
less has been written about Algerian women in the interwar period. I have mentioned already that
several of Bachetarzi’s plays had feminist themes, but the contributions women made to both
Algerian theater and the pre-revolutionary nationalist movement have regrettably been glossed
over here in my essay. It is clear from Bachetarzi’s Mémoires that women literally and

167

figuratively played important roles in Algerian theater in the interwar period, and I have a hunch
that women’s growing presence in the cultural sphere during this time led to a growing
acceptance and normal-ization of their presence in the political sphere as well. But I am not sure
about this; I leave it up to others to inquire further.
Another element that has been considered only briefly is the specific contributions of
non-Muslim Algerians to culture and politics in the interwar period. Scholars like Ethan Katz,
Sophie Roberts, and Sarah Abrevaya Stein have all written about Jewish Algerians during the
colonial era, but Bachetarzi makes clear in his Mémoires that Jews were just as important as
Muslims, if not more so, in their contributions to the Andalusi revivalist movement and the
foundation of Algerian theater. Their artistic activities during the interwar era demand further
inquiry. And arguably even more overlooked than Algerian Jews are Algerian Berbers. Berbers
have been a subject of interest for ancient historians like Michael Brett for some time, but only
very recently have studies of modern Berber history gathered momentum. Scholars like Jane E.
Goodman and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman have done great work in this respect, and Dr. Goodman
has branched into modern Berber cultural activities, but she has few partners in her work. As
some of the Maghrib’s indigenous peoples, Algeria’s Berbers deserve greater attention.
For now, though, I content myself with the work I have done here. Above all, I have tried
to follow in the footsteps of thinkers like Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, Benedict Anderson,
James C. Scott, and others, all of whom have argued in various ways that human beings can and
do exert much more control over their narratives, their systems of thought, their identities, and
their histories than they might realize. The FLN and the AOMA before them would have had
their compatriots believe that the Algerian nation is a primordial and eternal thing that exists
objectively, beyond the confines of human imagination. But this is simply not the case. No
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nation is eternal, no identity essential, no history ossified and unaffected by observers in the
present. Through the mediums of music and theater, Mahieddine Bachetarzi contributed to the
construction of particular narrative visions of Algerian national identity and national history, but
neither one is or was ever objectively true. Bachetarzi’s own ever-changing convictions are
testament to this fact. Such things do not exist without us. They are not eternal essences; they are
subjective things, constructed and constantly renovated with the tools of the human mind, and
their meanings are constantly negotiated through the interactions of many minds across time and
space, all through history.
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